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C�P�R I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
In October, l96 1 ,  the G�naian l egislature enacted two laws which 
rece ived cons ide rable a t tent ion from the world p ress . One made illega l 
any s ta tement wh ich could be taken as  critic ism of the Pre s ident . This 
wa s to apply even in the legislature , so tha t it would be extremely 
di fficul t  for any anti-Nkrumah force s there to ope ra te e ffectively . 
The othe r law empowered the Pres ident to appoint spe cial courts to deal 
wi th crime s agains t the s tate . This might not have been especially 
notewo rthy excep t tha t they we re clearly set  up so tha t they could 
ea s ily be us ed to bring about the execut ion of persons who had done 
no th ing more than expre s s  oppo s i t ion to the Pre s ident in some ord inari ly 
lega l  manner . The law gave the Pres ident the right to appoint person-
ally and without res tric t ion the j udge s who would t ry any spe ci fic ca se 
of s ubversive ac tivitie s ;  there would be no j ury or appea�, and only a 
majority o f  two out of three opinions would be nece s sa ry for convict ion . 
If one o f  the three j udges dis sented , his op inion wo uld no t become pub ­
l ic . Penal t ie s  would range t o  dea th . 1 
Tha t a single dicta tor would decree s uch powe rs for himsel f  i s  
not difficu l t  t o  understand , b ut why a legislature would extend them to 
1 New York Times , Oc tober 18 , 196 1 ,  p .  6 ;  Oc tober 31 , p .  3 .  
1 
2 
anyone , re ta ining no mea ns for controlling the ir use , is . It  impl ied 
ei ther tha t the legisla tors who vo ted with the ma jority had some evidence 
tha t s uch extraord inary powe rs were ne ce s sary in the interests  of the 
s tate or the ir cons t ituent s ,  tha t the cons t ituents thems elves  demanded i t ,  
that their behavior wa s irra tional i n  some way , o r  tha t the Chie f Execut ive 
held s ome powe r over them which fo rced them in e ffec t  to enact the leg isla ­
tion . Or the explanat ion could have been a comb ina t ion of these . 
The disre spec t  and spec ial courts laws have by no means been the 
only manife s ta t ions of dicta to rial p ractice s in Ghana . They have pe rhaps 
attracted more attention among Wes te rners than mos t  manife s tat ions . This 
the si s  i s  a t rea tment o f  severa l such mea s ure s and the rea sons they we re 
enacted by the Ghana ian legisla t ure . Spec i fically ,  it wil l  be demons t ra ted 
tha t 
1 .  By 196 0 the re was not enough popula r s upport for dictatorial 
mea sure s that a manda te for them could be secured from the 
e lectorate , so that thi s wa s not a fac tor in the behavior 
of the legislators at tha t time . 
2 .  Despite thi s , a maj ority of the l egislators voted in favor 
of provis ions in a new constitution in 196 0 which gave 
Nkrumah, the Chie f  Exec ut ive , vir tually unl imited and ill imi t ­
able power . 
3 .  After 196 0, the decis ive fa ctor in securing the enactment o f  
autocratic meas ure s wa s the autoc ra tic powe r which Nkruma h 
al ready pos se s sed , and not a conviction on the pa rt o f  a 
ma j ority o f  legisla tors tha t s uch mea sure s we re in the be st 
interests of Ghana . 
3 
Tha t the mea s ure s in question were no t enac ted because  of a general 
re cognit ion that they we re ne ce s sary for the gene ral we lfare is es tab­
lished with cons iderable cer ta inty . But the rea sons they we re enac ted , 
and e specially the rea sons that  the 196 0 cons t i t ut ion wa s approved by the 
l egislature , are more di ffic ul t  to ascerta in .  Seve ral fac tors appea r to 
have contributed . An e ffort i s  made to outl ine the probable nature of 
the se fa ctors and to s ugge s t  the infl uence ea ch might have had on legi sla­
tors bel ong ing to  the majority party . The s ugge s tions are tentative and 
are in the nature of a theory which seems be s t  to explain the events 
ob served . 
The approach is hi s torical . Chap ters I and II p rovide the setting . 
In Chap ter I the beginnings of the contemporary pol itical sys tem are d is ­
cussed . In Chapter II , cove ring the years  1951 to 1957 , i s  explored the 
na ture of a p roblem which, in the early pos t-independence pe riod , served 
as the princ ipal j us t i fica tion for the dic ta torial mea sure s the Nkrumah 
gove rnment sought to have enac ted . That p roblem was pa rochialism: a 
te ndency to p ut regional , ethni c ,  and othe r group inte re s t s  above those 
of the nation as a whole . The que s t ion of the extent to which thi s 
tendency and the violence a s socia ted with it  we re re spons ible for certain 
autocrat ic mea sure s enacted be tween 1957 and 1 9 59 is the s ubject o f  the 
third chap te r .  
I n  196 0 a new const i t ut ion , wi th ce rtain unique p rovis ions which 
gave Nkrumah an ext raordinary increa se in powe r ,  wa s adopted . The add i ­
t ional power wa s not jus t i fied by the gove rnment , howeve r ,  at lea s t  no t 
in s ta tements circula ted to the gene ral publ ic . I t  is argued in 
4 
Chap ter IV tha t the cons tituent s o f  the legisla tors we re for the mos t  part 
not in favor of this enhancement of Nkrumah1s authori ty; no generally 
recognized ne ce s s i ty for it from the standpo int o f  the wel fare o f  Ghana 
wa s found . But it  wa s ra tified anyway by the legisla ture; the que st ion 
of why is pos tponed until the concluding chap te r .  
Chap ters V and VI advance the the s i s  tha t  from the t ime o f  the 
adop tion of the 196 0  cons t i tut ion Nkrumah ' s  power wa s the de cisive fac tor 
in the enac tment o f  all  mea sure s which would have the e ffec t  o f  hampe ring 
oppos i t ion to Nkrumah , and not a convict ion on the part  o f  mos t  legis­
la tors tha t  they would be bene ficial to Ghana . The pa rticularly critical 
pe riod in 196 1 which triggered the pa s sage o f  the d is re spect and spe cial 
courts acts is  examined in Chap ter V, and an a t tempt is made to re la te 
the pa rt icu lar c ircums tance s then in exis tence to the spe cific act ions 
the government�ok in response to them . It is concluded tha t  the act ions 
we re not forced by the c ircums tances .  In Chap ter VI an e ffort is made to 
demons tra te more direc tly tha t Nkrumah has made oppos it ion to his pol icies 
nea rly fut il e , even for high-ranking members of his own government .  I t  is 
concluded tha t coerc ion is a regular and de cisive ins trument for p romo ting 
pol icie s which Nkrumah cons iders to be de sirable , even though its  pra c tice 
in promoting specific mea sure s is not ea sy to dete c t . 
The evidence conta ined in Chap ter VI indica ted tha t Nkrumah holds 
power through force ra ther than through cons ent . Chapter VII is an a t­
temp t to explain how this might have come abou t ,  in view o f  the fac t  tha t  
originally h e  held powe r through cons ent . The assertion is made that 
there were a numbe r  of fac tors contributing to the ab ility o f  a would -be 
dictator to a s s ume absolute power , b ut tha t they were no t de cisive . The 
s ugge s t ion is made tha t if mos t  of the legisla tors in 196 0 had been more 
fore sighted and de termined , they could have prevented the d ictatorship 
which exists  a t  p resent . 
The Cul tural Set ting 
As will be noted in deta il in Chap ter II , one o f  the mos t  out -
s tanding cha racteristics o f  Ghana i s  i t s  fractiona tion into a number o f  
triba l ,  rel igious , and economic group s . (Such g roup s  whose  members 
cons tituted a minority in the pop ula tion and whose intere s ts did not 
always coincide comple tely with the inte re s ts of the nat ion as  a whole 
are re ferred to in thi s thes i s  a s  pa rochial group s . I t  wi ll be noted 
5 
tha t by this de finition nearly all  group s  might be regarded as parochial . )  
Cul turally , Ghana ' s  popula tion cons i s t s  o f  four major divis ions . The 
larges t  and dominant one ha s been that which is s i t ua ted along the coa s t  
excep t for the ext reme eas tern portion and extend ing into the inte rior 
app roximately s eventy - five miles . Thi s  is the sec tor which ha s had the 
longe s t  period of contact  with E uropeans and which tends , there fore , to 
be the mos t  We s ternized;  i t  is known , as a matter  of fac t ,  a s  " the 
Colony" ra ther than by some tribal·  name . Several tribal group _s are 
represented there . 2 
2J. D . Fage , Ghana: A His torical Interpre ta t ion (Mad ison: The 
Univers i ty of Wiscons in Pres s, 1 959) , p. 23. 
6 
Further inland , aga in in the central and we s tern pa rt s ,  is Ashant i ,  
formerly a rather powe rful and warl ike confedera t ion . 3 In the pas t  it was 
accus tomed to mak ing succe s s ful raids on the coas tal  area s ,  and the two 
regions have tradi t ionally been enemie s .  The capital and cul tural center 
o f  Ashant i is  a city cal led Kumas i ;  it ha s been a focal point o f  re s is t -
ance t o  the CPP government . The CPP , a s  wil l  b e  indica ted later ,  drew 
mo st  o f  its  s trength from the Colony .  
Running u p  along the ea stern part o f  Ghana i s  Togoland , the sou th -
e rn part o f  which is inhabited principally by members o f  the Ewe tribe . 
The pre sent Republ ic of Togo al so  is predominantly Ewe ; the Ewe s were 
spl it at the end of World War I when the old German colony of Togoland 
was divided between Grea t Brita in and France . The re has been a strong 
sentiment among Ghana ian Ewes in favor o f  reunion ever since ; this ha s 
been a major source of violence agains t the Nkrumah gove rnment . 
The e xtreme North o f  Ghana is generally re ferred to simply as  the 
Northern Territorie s . Of  all the regions, i t  has had the l east  conta c t  
with Europeans and is still  gene rally close ly a t tached to tribal cus toms . 4 
A maj or pol it ical  goal of its  l eaders ha s been the protection of i t s  
peo pl e  from domina t ion and the seculariz ing influence o f  the CPP . 
O f  the four major reg ions , the Colony i s  not only the mo s t  We s tern-
ized , which probably g ives it an init ial  pol it ical advantage over the 
other sections of the country , but it also  is by far the mos t  populous . 
_ 
3w. E. F.  ward , A History o f  the � Coas t (London : George 
Allen and Unwin Limited, 1948) , pp. 133 ff. 
4navid E .  Apter , The Gold Coa s t  in Transit ion (Princeton :  
Prince ton Univers ity Pre s s , 1955) , p. 387 
7 
The re sults  of the 1948 censu s ,  the mo s t  re cent available to this write r ,  
ind ica te the general d is tribution o f  the popula tion: 
The Colony 
Ashant i 
Northern Territorie s 
Togo land 
2 , 050 , 23 5  
818 , 944 
866 , 503 
382 , 76 8  
5 The e s timated populat ion o f  the ent ire country by 1 9 57 wa s 4 , 763 , 000 . 
The Beginnings of Nkrumah1s Pol itical Caree r  
Nkrumah and the United Gold Coas t  Convent ion 
Sentiment in favor of independence for the Gold Coa s t ,  as Ghana 
was cal led be fore 1957 , became more insi s tent fol lowing the Second World 
War than it  had been be fore . I t  wa s e xpre s sed in part in the forma tion 
o f  the Uni ted Gold Coa s t  Convent ion, an organiza t ion in a s socia t ion with 
which Nkrumah later  began his pol it ical  career .  The founders o f  the 
"UGCC" repre sented the conservative sectors of socie ty ,  who favored a 
gradual trans ition from tradi t ional to secular forms without a s igni fi cant 
al tera tion of the e xisting socia l  and pol it ical re la t ionships among 
Africans . The choice o f  the charter members was direc ted by one o f  the 
weal thie s t  African businessmen in the country ,  George Grant , and by a 
hal f-b ro ther of a forme r  chie f,  Dr. J. B . Danquah . 6 The persons the se 
men p icked to form the core of the organization were among the Gold 
Coast e l ite from which legislative councillors , or advise rs to the 
5 
F . M. Bourre t ,  Ghana : lli_ Road to Independence (Stanford : 
Stanford Unive rs ity Pre ss, 1960) , p .  2 .  
6 Ibid . , p .  166 ; Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana : The Autobiography of 
Kwame Nkrumah (New Yo rk :  Thoma s Nel son and Sons , 1 957) , p. 7 0 . 
8 
Brit ish colonia l  go vernment , had been drawn in the pa st . 7 The aim of the 
UGCC wa s " ' to ensure tha t by all  legitimate and const itutional means the 
control and d i .re ct ion of Government shal l  within the shorte st t ime possi ­
ble pa ss into the hand s o f  the people and the ir chie fs. '"8 
�warne Nkrumah, the pre sent President o f  Ghana , was invited by 
leaders of the Convention in 1 947 to become i t s  gene ral secre ta ry . He 
had been ab sent from the Gold Coa s t  for twelve years, first in the United 
Sta te s  where he stud ied and taught at Lincoln Universi ty and the Univer-
sity o f  Pennsylvania and then, from 1945 unt il 1947 , in London where he 
was engaged in pol i tical activi ty with the pan-Africanist movement . 9 He 
accepted the UGCC invita t ion only a fter some he sita t ion , and arrived in 
10 the Gold Coast in December 1 947 . 
De sp i te the orienta tion of the founders of the Convention, i t  
be came apparent fa irly early tha t Nkrumah1s outlook wa s far from conserv-
a t ive . Bu t he wa s an effective pol itical organizer and carried on his 
ac t ivi t ie s  in the name of the Convent ion . Tha t organiza t ion flourished 
while Nkrumah wa s its  general secre tary ,  bu t i t s  founders and the 
members of the ' 'Working Commi t tee" to whom he supposedly was re sponsible 
11 became increa singly d is sa tis fied with him .  They did not a t tempt to 
discharge him until June , l 949 ,  however; in the meantime , Nkrumah built  
7 
Bourre t , �· c it . , p .  16 7 .  
8Quoted in Nkrumah, loc . c it . ;  source not given . 
9 rbid . ,  pp . 26 -63 . lO rbid . , p. 6 2 .  
11Bourret, �· cit . , p .  1 73 . 
up a personal following and established his own organization within the 
12 Convention. By the time the rift between him and the conservatives 
developed into an open break, Nkrumah possessed an independent base of 
political power. 
At the time he arrived in the Gold Coast, only two branches of 
the UGCC had been established, and according to Nkrumah's estimation, 
9 
these were not very active. Within six months the new general secretary 
had organized fifty branches, distributed membership cards, and collected 
dues.13 In February, 1948, a demonstration against British policies 
followed by severe rioting occurred; several persons were killed, and 
the disturbances were serious enough that the British Colonial Office 
sent a special commission to the colony to inquire into their causes 
14 and to recommend new policies. This was the 11Watson Commission," 
whose very influential report will be treated in the next section. 
Almost immediately after the riots the Crown sent another representa-
tive, Sir Sidney Abrahams, for the official purpose of encouraging 
sports in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah, whether out of conviction or not, 
declared publicly and persistently that Sir Sidney had been sent not 
for the purpose announced, but to divert the attention of the popu­
lace from political matters.15 Danquah and other UGCC leaders 
12Apter, �· cit., p. 168. 
14Apter, �· cit., p. 169. 
13 Nkrumah, �· cit., p. 74. 
15Bankole Timothy , Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1955), p. � ---- --
1 0  
refused to share in Nkrumah's contention; as  a re sult , Nkrumah carried 
on a campaign to d iscredi t  them . l6 
Nkrumah was among those arre s ted in conne ction with the Feb ruary 
riots . Seve ral s t udents demons trated in p rotes t  aga ins t his arre s t ,  
17 
and as a re s ul t  they we re expelled from the col leges they a ttended . 
Nkrumah , primarily on his own ini tia t ive , e s tabl ished a new coll ege 
for them, in the name of the Convention . Al though he had used his own 
money for the p roject,  it wa s cons idered to be outs ide his authority 
and the Working Commit tee obj e c ted s trenuous ly . 18 Another activity 
carried out on his own authority wa s the e s tabl ishment of his own 
newspaper- -the Accra Evening News . He ma in tained in his autobiography 
tha t he had s trongly urged on the commit tee the importance of a party 
newspape r ;  when they re fused to cons ide r the ma t ter favorably , fea r-
ing that they would become involved in l ibel s uits , he ac ted on hi s 
own initia t .ive . 19  Finally , he organized a "Youth S tudy Group" wi thin 
the UGCC wi thout the consent of the Working Commit tee. In his auto-
b iography he admit ted read ily tha t a ma jor p urpose in do ing so wa s 
to have organized s upport behind him when the spl i t  which appeared 
inevitable finally came . The s tudy group la ter me rged into a 
1 1 Commit tee on Youth Organiza t ion, 1  which in turn was transformed 
20 into the Convention People's Pa rty . 
16 rb id . 17Nkrumah ,  �· cit . , p .  89 . 18rb id . , p .  92 . 
1 9rb id . , pp . 95-96 ; Timothy , �· cit . , pp . 77 -78 . 
20Nkrumah ,  2.£..· c it . , p .  96 . 
Nkrumah and the Convent ion People ' s Party 
The CPP wa s officially e stabl ished a t  a ma ss ral ly in Accra 
21  
(now the cap i tal o f  Ghana) on June 12 ,  1 949 .  In  effect it  was a 
revo l t  by Nkrumah and his fol l owers agains t the l eadership o f  the 
UGCC which ,  according to Nkrumah , wa s laying p lans to expel him from 
the Convent ion; he " took the wind ou t of the ir sa ils. 112 2  He la ter 
offe red to d i s solve his new party if the Working Commit tee would 
agree to the election by the ra nk and file of the UGCC o f  an execu -
t ive commi t tee to work with Nkrumah. That offer  wa s refused , and a 
few minute s  later Nkrumah, at  the urging o f  a crowd ou tside the 
conference room, resigned from membership in the UGCc . 23 He had 
fore seen the spl i t  and had planned we l l ;  be fore he removed himself 
from the party structure in  which his  pos i t ion wa s fo rmally a sub -
ordinate one , he had al ready b uil t his own organizat ion o f  which he 
wa s the und isputed leader and "Li fe Chairman . "  
The CPP posse ssed a formal structure del inea ted by a const i tu-
11 
t ion, but the de finition of the locus of power within the organizat ion 
was vague . Nkruma.h wa s never ment ioned by name , but the te rms "Li fe 
Cha irman" and "Party Leader" were both used without be ing de �ined . 24 
Intriguingly enough ,  the ident ity of Nkrumah as Life Cha irman wa s 
e stabl ished in a roundabout way , through the const i tu t io nal st ipula t ion 
2 1  
Ibid . , p .  1 04 . 
22
Ibid . , p .  102 . 2
3
Ibid . , p .  107 . 
24const itution of the Convent ion People ' s  Party , "Na t io nal 
E xecut ive Commit tee" and "Party Nat ional Hol idays. " Publ ished in 
Nkrumah, op . c it . , Append i x  A .  
1 2  
tha t Sep tember 18 was t o  b e  celebra ted as  the Life Chairman ' s  b irthday. 25 
This wa s Nkrumah ' s  birthday. 26 Nkrumah was orig inally party leader by 
virtue o f  his having organized the party , and the consti tution made no 
provis ion for the selection o f  a new one . 27  
The plenary body o f  the pa rty wa s the Annual Delegate s '  Confer-
ence , a ma jor function o f  which wa s to lay down the CPP ' s  ba sic 
p rogram and pol icy . This wa s to be carried out by the Na t ional 
Execut ive Commi t tee , which could be controlled by members elec ted at 
conference s in each of Ghana ' s  const ituencie s and ove r whom Nkrumah 
had no formal authori ty .  The dec i s ions o f  the Na tional Execut ive 
were to be "executed" by a " Cent ral Commit tee of the Na tional Execu -
t ive . " It  wa s here tha t the "Party Leader" could exert h i s  authori ty 
constitut ionally , for he wa s empowered to select  the members o f  the 
28 
Central Commit tee . That commit tee wa s the active agent of the 
party , giving sub stance to the pol icies o f  the E xecutive Commit tee 
29 and supervising gene ral adminis tra t ion. It wa s not to rece ive 
spe c i fic supervision from the Na t ional Executive but the la tter body 
wa s to ra t i fy from t ime to t ime act ions the Cent ral Commi t tee had 
30 al ready carried out . 
2511Party Na t io nal Hol idays. " 26 Nkrumah, �· c it . , p .  5.  
27 
Passim. 2811Central Commit tee o f  the Na t ional Exe cut ive . "  
29 rb id . 30 ib id. 
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Power within the party was distributed by the constitution 
rather vaguely among the Delegates' Conference, the Executive Committee, 
the Central Committee, and the Party Leader. While ultimate authority 
was by no means vested specifically in Nkrumah, according to observers 
on the scene he was able to exercise control effectively.31 Bretton, 
on the basis of research undertaken in 1956 and 1957, pointed out that 
Nkrumah controlled the Central Committee through his power of select-
ing its members and contended emphatically that that body, whatever 
the provisions of the constitution, actually provided the policy direc­
tion for the National Executive and the Delegates' Conference.32 
Apter, writing in 1954, demonstrated in considerable detail his asser-
tion that in the CPP authority stemmed from above, from Nkrumah, 
rather than from below. His views are presented in more detail in 
the final chapter. 
Both the CPP and the UGCC from which Nkrumah had resigned had 
the same primary goal: independence. But Nkrumah emphasized that 
his party's program was different in that it advocated "Self-
Government Now" rather than self-government within the shortest 
possible time, which was the avowed program of the Convention.33 
Nkrumah did not expect to achieve immediate independence, but he 
found "Self-Government Now" to be a popular slogan, and he claimed 
31Henry L. Bretton, "Current Political Thought and Practice 
in Ghana," American Political Science Review, LII (March, l958), p. 55; 
Apter, ·�· cit., p. 208. 
32Bretton, loc. cit. 33Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 70. 
that the ultimate goal was likely to be attained sooner if it were 
sought in a more or less militant manner.34 
Acting on that philosophy, six months after he launched his 
independent party he led it into a program of "Positive Action," a 
14 
campaign for autonomy based on the Ghandian principle of non-violence. 
It culminated in a strike and boycott which, according to Nkrumah, 
brought the economic life of the Gold Coast to a standstill. 35 He 
and other leaders of the CPP were arrested by the British (Nkrumah 
for printing seditious material) and sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from six months to a maximum of three years for Nkrumah.36 That was 
in January, 1950. Nkrumah was to spend the next thirteen months in 
prison, during which time his only means of communication with the 
party was notes written on toilet paper and smuggled out by prison 
37 guards. 
The Introduction of African Government 
Meanwhile, the Watson Commission had concluded its investiga-
tion of the circumstances surrounding the disturbances of 1948 and 
published its report in August 1948. It had recommended the establish-
ment of a governmental arrangement which would give the Gold Coast a 
measure of self-rule. 38 The Colonial Office of Great Britain accepted 
34Ibid., p. 111. 
37Ibid., p. 128. 
35 Ibid. , p. 118. 36Ibid. , p. 126. 
38Bourret, op. cit., p. 170. 
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its main features and appointed a committee of thirty-eight Africans 
(the "Coussey Committee") to consider specific governmental arrangements 
which would embody the Watson Commission recommendations. The Office 
made the mistake, however, of omitting Nkrumah and his followers; the 
committee represented all sections of public opinion except the radical, 
led by Nkrumah. 39 
The Coussey Committee, whose report was published in October 1949, 
recommended a governmental structure combining western parliamentary 
forms with traditional ones. In particular, it proposed that an execu­
tive cabinet comprised of both Africans and Britons be created and made 
responsible to an all-African unicameral assembly, a majority of which 
would be elected indirectly or appointed by chiefs.40 The British 
Colonial Office accepted the major provisions with one significant 
exception and embodied them in a new constitution which was put into 
effect in 1951.41 The exception was that it required that the cabinet, 
which was to be comprised of eight African ministers drawn from the 
assembly and three Britons appointed by the governor, be responsible 
to both the assembly and the governor.42 
Nkrumah found the Coussey Report unsatisfactory and denounced it 
as "bogus and fraudulent."43 It was in opposition to it and the Brit-
ish government's refusal to grant immediate independence that he 
39
Ibid. 4
0 
171. 4
1
Ibid. Ibid., p. 
42Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
43Apter, op. cit., p. 179. 
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launched his campaign of Positive Action.44 As a res ult, he and other 
leaders of the CPP were in pris on at the time elections were held for 
seats in the Legis lative As sembly provided for by the new constitution. 
This was Februar� 1951 . 
Des pite his dis satis faction with the constitution, Nkrumah deter­
mined that his party should contest every elected seat in the As sembly.� 
And des pite the fact that he was incarcerated during the entire cam-
paign, th e CPP flouris hed. Active leaders h ip was ass umed by Komla A. 
Gbedemah, who had helped Nkrumah organize the party in 1949 . Gbedemah 
had already led the CPP to victory in one important election, a local 
46 one for the Accra Municipal Council in 1950 . That party swept the 
general election of 1 9 51 also; of the thirty-eight seats contested on 
a party basis , the CPP won thirty-four.47 This did not give it firm 
control of the As s embly, however, for there were seventy-four seats in 
a11.48 
Nkrumah hLms elf had been one of thos e elected to the As sembly. 
Even though in jail, he had secured permis sion to declare himself a 
candidate in a constituency in Accra and defeated his opponent by an 
overwhelming majority of 22 , 780 votes out of a possible 23 , 122 , 
4 9 
according to Nkrumah. He still had two more years of his term to 
44Nkrumah, �· cit., pp. 112-1 13 . 45Ibid., p. 13 2 .  
46Edwin Munger, African Field Reports, 1952 -196 1  (Cape Town: 
c. Struik, 196 1) , p. 21 . 
47 Bourret, �· cit., p. 175. 
48Nk:rumah , �· cit. , p. 142 .  49Ibid., p. 133 . 
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serve, but the governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, came to the conclusion 
that it was best to release htm. He wrote later that 
Nkrumah and his party had the mass of the people behind them and 
there was no other party with appreciable public support to 
which one could turn. Without Nkrumah, the Constitution would 
be still-born and nothing come of all the hopes, aspirations 
and concrete proposals for a greater measure of self-government, 
there would no longer be any faith in the good intentions of the 
British Government, and the Gold Coast would be plunged into dis­
orders, violence and bloodshed.50 
Nkrumah was asked to become Leader of Government Business and to 
select the seven other African members of a new cabinet. He chose five, 
including Gbedemah, from his own party and, in a gesture of conciliation, 
two non-party members who had been appointed to the National Assembly 
51 
by regional assemblies. In 1952 his title was changed from Leader of 
Government Business to Prime Minister, but there was no increase of 
52 power. 
49Ibid., p. 133. 
50 Charles Arden-Clarke, African Affairs, LVII (January, 1958). 
Quoted in Bourret, op. cit., p. 175. 
51 Bourret, �· cit., p. 176. 
52rbid., p. 183. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EMERGENCE OF MAJOR ISSUES 
The Question of Local Authority 
Part of the report of the Coussey Committee in 1 949 consisted 
1 of recommendations relating to local government. The Committee argued 
that sound parliamentary government in the Gold Coast depended on sound 
and democratic local governmental systems, which, in its opinion, were 
lacking in some areas, particularly those still relatively traditional-
istic. In Bourret's words, "The type of local authority it recommended 
carried with it a direct threat to not a few features of the traditional 
system. 
Bourret was somewhat careless in the use of the term "traditional 
system, " for there was no single traditional system. Not only were 
there a number of different tribes, each with its own traditions, but 
in most localities the traditional systems which existed before 
colonialization by Great Britain (and other European powers in the case 
of some areas) had broken down. The local governments to which the 
Coussey report referred were not traditional systems in any pure sense. 
They consisted of systems which were changing rapidly due to recent 
conquests by other African tribes and of the products of European 
influence on traditional systems as well as of indigenous systems of 
long-enough standing that they might accurately be termed "traditional." 
1 Bourret, op. cit., p. 181 . 
2Ibid. 
18 
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Fo r example , Bourre t d ivided the tribal gove rnments found in the 
Northe rn Territories into three types :  those in which the ruler wa s of 
the same e thnic o rig in as the ruled ; those in which the rul er was of 
d iffe rent e thnic orig in and his power s temmed from conque s t  o f  one Afri-
can tribe by anothe r ;  and those in which the a ·uthority of the ruler wa s 
3 dep endent on European power .  Ap ter reported tha t in Ashan t i ,  which had 
had considerably more contact with E uropeans than the Northe rn Territorie s ,  
traditional government had undergone serious deteriora t ion . 4 Al though 
be fore the advent of the Brit ish Ashanti's gove rnments were e s s ent ially 
democra tic , under  the sys tem o f  " indi rect  rule" o f  Grea t Brita in, in 
which the a uthority of a na tive chie f who cooperated with the Bri tish 
wa s backed up by British might , the nat ive chie fs became increa s ing ly 
autocratic . 5 Thi s  wa s the s ta te of affa irs a t  the time o f  the Co us sey 
Bepor t . 6 It is  worth not ing that some of the more notable leaders of 
the oppos it ion to the CPP in la ter years we re eithe r Ashanti chie fs them-
selve s or related to Ashant i chie fs ; the se  included Danquah , who after 
his early associa tion with Nkrumah be came one o f  his more o ut spoken oppo-
nent s ,  and Dr . K. A . Bus ia ,  who in 1957 wa s des ignated head of the single 
party in opposit ion to the CPP. 
When the Cous sey Report wa s publ ished , its  potential threa t to 
the exis t ing sys tem o f  local and regional government aroused l it tle 
3 Ibid . , p .  8 9 . 
4David E .  Ap ter ,  "The Role of Tradit ionalism in the Pol i ti cal 
Modernizat ion o f  Ghana and Uganda , "  World Pol it ics , XIII (October ,  
1960) ' p .  45 . 
5 Ibid . , p .  51 . 6 Ibid . 
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concern, for if new organs we re e s tabl ished those persons whose p ower wa s 
a s s ocia ted with tradi tional ism expected s till to be in p os it ions of 
7 au thori ty . No one foresaw the outstand ing succe ss of the CPP . In 1951 , 
however ,  tha t party , even though it  did not by itself command a ma j ority 
in the Leg islative Assemb ly , wa s able t o  at tract  enough independent votes 
t o  secure the pa s sage of its ve rs ion of a l ocal government ord inance 
b il l .
8 
The law which wa s enac ted effe c t ively truncated the powe r of 
chiefs and e s tabl ished cond itions under which the CPP could dominate 
l ocal as  well as  na tional affa i rs . 9 It provided for local council s two 
third s  of whose members would be elec ted popula rly and one third app ointed 
by chie fs . The cha irman would be selected from among the elected membe rs ; 
a chie f would be council pres ident but , excep t in the Northern Territorie s ,  
would pre s ide only on ceremonial occa s i ons . The bill and subsequent law 
were strong ly opp osed by chie fs and other conserva t ives ,  bu t with l i t tle 
10 e ffe c t . The British gove rnor could have mod ified or ve toed the law ; 
he l e ft the issue t o  be set tled by the Africans themselves.  
The Cons titut ion of 1954 
Two potentially severe re stric t ions on Nkrumah1s p ower p rov ided by 
the 1951  cons t i tution were the re tention in the cab ine t of three Br it ish 
minis ters (holding the p ort fol ios of Finance , Jus tice ,  and De fense) and 
7Bourre t ,  �· c it . , p .  181 . 
9 Ibid . 
8 Ib id . 
l Oib id . ,  pp . 181 -182.  
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a Leg isla t ive Assembly ha l f  of whose membe rs we re selected through tribal 
ins t itu tions . The CPP wa s skill ful at  appeal ing to p opular opinion,  even 
in area s  whe re pa rochialism was rela t ively entrenched; it cap tured , as  
i t  had expe cte d ,  over ninety per cent of the local council seats  when 
the first ele ction wa s he ld for them in early 1 9 52 . 1 1  Now Nkrumah began 
making e fforts  to have the ent ire legislative a ss embly selected by popu ­
lar vote and to rid the cab inet of its  Brit ish repre senta tives . 
The Bri t i sh Colonial Office itsel f would have to take the nece s­
sary action, but i t  could be persuaded to do  so by a demons tration tha t 
the Gold Coa s t  wa s ready for a grea ter measure of independence and that 
sectors of the publ ic other than those repre sented by the CPP favored 
i t . Nkrumah there fore stre ssed tha t the altera tions his gove rnment pro­
p osed were " for the chie fs and the people t o  cons ider . 111 2  He invi ted 
all group s who we re intere s ted to submi t their  views on cons.titutional 
re form. 1 3  Over one hundred responded . 
Among the views presented , one wa s out standing: there wa s a 
s trong demand from all the councils  of chie fs tha t an upper house made 
up of chie fs be added t o  the p re sent legislature . This would ,  they 
a rgued , g ive the na tion a s  a whol e the bene fit of the wisdom and expe ri­
ence of the t radi ti onal rul ers , mol l ify the uneasy re la t ionship which 
then e xis ted be tween them and the secular CPP , and se rve as a che ck on 
11  Nkrumah, op . c it . , p .  1 5 3. 1 2 rb id . 
1 3  
Bourre t ,  �· c it . , p .  1 8 3. 
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hasty legislation by the government party.14 The government, however, 
contended that such an arrangement would produce the danger of constant 
friction and embroil the chiefs in political controversy, a consequence 
15 which both they and the government sought to avoid. Accordingly, when 
the government made its official proposals for a new constitution in the 
summer of 1953, it advocated only a unicameral legislature, all of whose 
members would be popularly elected. 
That proposal was accepted by the British, and it, together with 
other proposals relating to the cabinet and other matters, was embodied 
in a new constitution instituted in April, 1954.16 From then until 
complete independence was granted in 1957 the link between Great Britain 
and the Gold Coast government was intentionally tenuous. A governor, 
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, continued to serve in a formal capacity and 
to hold reserve powers, but he never exercised them. It is important 
to note, however, that he could have done so at any'time and that he 
possessed this authority until the British Crown decided to grant complete 
autonomy with a new constitution. The possibility that Arden-Clarke might 
interfere or that the British might delay the date of independence may 
have caused Nkrumah to act toward his opposition in a more restrained 
manner than he would have otherwise. 
The country was divided into 104 electoral districts. In the 
election which followed, in June, 1954, the Convention People's Party 
won an overwhelming victory by capturing seventy-one of them. It 
14 Ibid., p. 184. 
15Ibid. 16Ibid., p. 185. 
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received a smaller majority of the popular vote. About 392,000 favored 
it while about 315,000 cast their ballots for the combined opposition.
17 
Several parties contested the election. The most significant, 
and the opposition party which won the greatest number of seats (twelve), 
was organized only a few months before the election. This was the North-
ern People's Party, a frankly regional organization which was established 
for the specific purpose of protecting the inhabitants of the Northern 
Territories from domination by the CPP. 18 Three other parties which 
entered the contest also were parochially based, as is apparent from 
their names: the Moslem Association Party, the Togoland Congress Party, 
and the Anlo Youth Organization. The Togoland Congress Party won only 
two seats; the others, only one each. The single nationally-organized 
party which opposed the CPP, the Ghana Congress Party (many of whose 
members had belonged to the now-defunct UGCC), likewise captured only 
one seat. The remainder of the seats not held by the government party 
19 
were held by independents. 
The 1954 election indicates fairly clearly the popularity of the 
CPP and the absence of widespread popular support for parties whose 
appeal was regional or religious. While electioneering tactics prob­
ably tended to deemphasize appeals to rationality, all parties, since 
the election had to be conducted under British auspices, had an equal 
opportunity to play on the electorate's emotions. The program of the 
17 
Ibid. , pp. 185 and 186. 
18 Ibid. , p. 185. 
19Ibid. , pp. 185-186.  
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CPP, which by then had been demonstrated through three years of effec-
tive power, appears to have been fairly well accepted, whether emotionally 
or rationally. 
Economics and the Rise of the NLM 
The most important industry by far in the Gold Coast for a long 
time had been the cocoa industry. During the decade ending in 1957 
20 it accounted for about seventy per cent of exports. World cocoa prices, 
however, fluctuate sharply, so that both the British before 1951 and the 
Nkrumah government found it necessary to fix prices in the interest of a 
21 
stable economy. All cocoa was sold to the government, which paid a 
guaranteed price to the fanner and collected the surplus or absorbed the 
losses itself. Since the war, prices generally had been considerably 
higher than the price paid to the farmers, and the Gold Coast Marketing 
Board had accumulated large reserves, most of which it used specifically 
for distressed farmers or for research in the industry as a whole. The 
Nkrumah government inaugurated in 1951 a new policy of levying an export 
tax on cocoa, the proceeds from which would be used for the general wel­
fare of the entire nation.22 
As the 1954 season {September to October) approached, prices rose 
precipitously to an average of $1200 per ton.23 In August, the Nkrumah 
20 Ibid., p. 206. 21Ibid. 22 4 Ibid., pp. 20 -205. 
23Douglas Anglin, "Whither Ghana?" International Journal, XIII 
(Winter, 1957 - 19 58) , p. 43. 
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gove rnment secured the enactment of legislation which fixed p rice s  the 
farmers re ce ived a t  only $3 78 per ton , while at the same time ra is ing 
24 
the levy . Immed ia tely a fte rward s a new pol itica l group and the mo s t  
conce rted re s is tance the CPP had y e t  had t o  deal wi th emerged-- the 
"Nat ional Libe ra t ion Movement . "  
The NLM wa s founded by a pe rson cl osely associated with the tribal 
sys tem o f  Ashant i .  The founder wa s the chie f l inguis t ,  or official spoke s -
man, for the Asantehene, the sup reme chie f of the ent ire Ashant i confed -
eracy . The immedia te issue which sparked the movement and gave it much 
of its  popula r support in Ashanti wa s the low cocoa price s ,  bu t soon 
othe r issue s  emerged . NLM leaders with the support of the Asantehene 
and fifty other chie fs of Ashant i pe titioned the Brit ish gove rnment to 
send a commi s s ion to inquire into a federal form of gove rnment for the 
25 Gold Coas t .  They also  became the chie f critics of  the gove rnment , 
cha rg ing it  with bribe ry and corrup tion and demanding tha t adequa te sa fe ­
guard s be ins t i tuted to p revent it from abus ing its  authori ty . 26 On the 
othe r hand , the gove rnor, Arden-Cla rke , s ided with the government and 
vigorously opposed the NLM ,  which he dismis sed , accord ing to one reporte r ,  
as  "a collection of irre spons ible opportuni s t s , reactionary tribal i s t s  
and fru s t rated intellectual s . "27 
The Nkrumah gove rnment re fused at first to compromise with the 
NLM on the que st ion of federal ism and fa iled also to grant its  othe r 
24 Ibid . and Bourre t ,  �· ci t . , p .  187 . 
25 Bourre t,  op . cit . , p .  188 . 
26 Angl in, �· cit .,  p .  44 . 
26 
28 demands. Feeling ran high and fairly quickly erupted into violence. 
The national propaganda secretary for the CPP was shot to death and the 
Prime Minister's residence was bombed.29 Attempts at bombing were also 
made on the homes of a CPP regional chairman and an Ashanti chief who 
supported the government party.30 A CPP loudspeaker van was burned, 
and large numbers of persons were injured in violent clashes between 
supporters of the CPP and the NLM in Kumasi.31 The disturbances con-
tinued for several months; CPP sympathizers in Kumasi were being forced 
by the violence directed against them to leave town as late as May, 
1955.32 
The most concerted demand of the NLM was for a federal system, 
in which presumably Ashanti would be free to set its own cocoa prices 
and the chiefs would remain unmolested in their comfortable positions 
within the traditional structure of society. Nkrumah in a radio broad-
cast December 30 contended, as he was to do many times in the future, 
that the Gold Coast was too small to support a federal 33 system. He 
said that the question of a second chamber for chiefs, which was 
demanded as a substitute for federalism, should be put off until 
independence was achieved. 34 
28 Bourret, �· cit., p. 188. 29Nkrumah, �· cit., pp. 216-218. 
3°Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 
3lx.ondon Times, January 8, 1955, p. 6 .  
32London Times, May 18, 1955, p. 10. 
33Bourret, 22..· cit., p. 188. 
1-8, 1955, p. 14455. 
34rbid. 
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Appa rently Nkrumah was reluctant t o  make any conce s s ions . This 
could be e xpected in view of his powe r position and his avowed pol it ical 
phil osophy ;  increased aut onomy for the regions or a house of chie fs in 
the l egisla ture woul d severe ly trunca te his own authority ,  and he wa s 
c onvinced tha t in the l ong run tribal ism and na rrow reg ionalism would 
35 
only damage the bes t  inte re s t s  of b oth the Gold Coast  and We s t  Africa . 
As oppos i tion cont inued , he made ge stures towa rd conc il iation,  but the 
NLM leaders were so certa in that  these we re ins incere tha t they repea t -
edly decl ined t o  meet  the Prime Minis ter and h i s  repre senta t ive s ,  even 
though invited to do so on a numbe r  of oc casions . 
The firs t invi ta tion was at  the conclus i on of' the radio broadcas t  
referred t o  and perhaps was re fused be cause of the vi rtual admis s i on by 
Nkrumah that  he was at  tha t time unwill ing to compromise on key issue s . 
A second invi ta ti on was is sued in April , 1 9 5 5 ,  when the Prime Minister 
app ointed a " Select Connnit tee" from the Legislative As sembly to s tudy 
the que s t ion of federal ism.  He t ol d  the Leader of the Oppos i tion tha t  
he would permit him to select five of i t s  twelve members ; the Oppos ition 
Leader cal led Nkrumah ' s offer " farcical"  and members of the legisla ture 
36 in opp osit ion re fused to pa rticipate . 
A few months late r the gove rnment reque sted the Brit ish Crown to 
send a cons titutional adviser to the Gold Coa s t  to try to devise a means 
for g iving a greater mea sure of autonomy to the reg ions without tak ing 
35 Nkrumah, �ci t . ,  p .  275 . 
36Nkrumah, op . cit . , p .  238 . 
---
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the drastic steps advocated by the NLM.37 The Crown sent Sir Frederick 
Bourne, who had had considerable experience in constitutional matters 
in India and Pakistan. The NLM refused to consult with him also, again 
with the explanation that Nkrumah's government had shown itself to be 
38 insincere in contemplating genuine concessions. 
Sir Frederick prepared his report without direct interviews with 
NLM leaders and advised against federalism, which he said was unsuitable 
for a country of Ghana's size.39 He recommended the creation of regional 
assemblies which would have primary responsibility in local matters but 
which would be without independent power; they would depend for their 
funds on the central legislative assembly and would lack the authority 
to legislate. The NLM rejected the Bourne Report and demanded a con-
40 stituent assembly as the only means of settling their grievances. 
Nkrumah refused to call a constituent assembly, but invited a 
number of organizations, including the NLM, to meet at Achimota College 
to consider the Bourne proposals. Again the NLM refused to participate; 
in explaining the reason why, it claimed that the conference was packed 
against it. A spokesman said that the government had invited 
bodies which did not exist and which had been created by the 
party in power in order that they might have majority support 
at that Conference. • • • Some of these bodies were the Moslem 
Council and the Brong/Kyempen Council; these bodies did not ex-
ist either in law or in fact. • The Government also invited 
rival bodie
� 
and left out those which did not agree with the 
Government. 1 
37Bourret, �· cit., p. 189. 
38Ibid. 39Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. 190. 
41Legislative Assembly Debates, (November, 1956), cols. 93-94, 
as quoted ibid. 
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The Achimota Conference generally accepted the Bourne proposals, includ­
ing the key ones relating to federalism and the regional assemblies.42 
The Attainment of Independence 
The Bourne consultations and Achimota Conference were not merely 
reactions to NLM demands, but were also calculated steps toward the 
achievement of full independence. Nkrumah's government had repeatedly 
requested that positive steps be taken to grant autonomy, and in May, 
1956, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced the readiness 
of the British government to take them. A prerequisite was that an 
indigenous government demonstrate its viability by winning a popular 
mandate for specific constitutional proposals.43 This was considered 
44 to be the only way to resolve the issue between the CPP and the NLM . 
Accordingly, in June the Governor dissolved the Legislative 
Assembly and declared a general election for July 12 and 17. The CPP 
campaigned on the basis of a platform calling for a unitary state and 
a parliamentary government. Regional assemblies would be created but 
would be subordinate to Parliament.45 On that platform, which was 
published in a white paper, the CPP won an overwhelming majority of 
46 seventy-one seats out of the 104 in the Assembly. 
It did not, however, gain a majority in all sections of the Gold 
Coast. It captured only eight seats out of the twenty-one in Ashanti, 
42Ibid. 43 Nkruma.h, 2£.· cit., p. 249. 44Ibid. 
45Ibid., pp. 264-265. 46 Bourret, op. cit., p. 196. 
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eleven out of twenty- s ix in the Northern Te rritori e s , and thre e ou t o f  
s ix in the Ewe region o f  Togoland . 47 Its sha re of the popular vo te in 
Ashan t i ,  the ba se o f  the NLM, wa s forty- three per cent . 48 Of the oppo-
s it ion group s ,  the National Liberat ion Movement won only twe lve seats ; 
the Northe rn Peop le's Party , fi fteen ; the Togoland Congre s s  Party , two ; 
the Moslem As soc ia tion Party , one ; and the Federa t ion of Youth Organiza -
t ions , one . Two seats  we re cap tured by independents , one o f  whom la ter 
49 
j o ined the CPP . 
Al though the Convent ion Peop le ' s Party had won an overwhe lming 
ma jority , it wa s concentrated in the Colony ,  and othe r regions had 
a c tually re jec ted Nkrumah ' s party and the uni ta ry cons titut ion it advo -
cated . This wa s an obvious argument in favor of federal ism, an argument 
50 which was ac tually used by Bus ia . To have granted federalism on tha t 
ba sis , howeve r ,  would have been to ignore the exp re ssed will of the 
ma j ority of vo ters in the country as  a whole .  
Repre senta t ive s o f  the NLM cont inued to at temp t to secure a 
federal form o f  government or,  in lieu o f  that ,  adequa te safeguard s 
aga ins t  dominat ion by the CPP . A delegat ion o f  them went to London for 
tha t purpose in Sep tember . It wa s s t il l wi thin the powe r of the Colonial 
O ffice to determine the p rovis ions of the forthcoming cons t itut ion . One 
of the de legate s ,  Bus ia , sa id tha t the delega tion ' s ob jective wa s "an 
agreed Cons titut ion tha t sa feguards the minority right s of the Northern 
47 Ibid . and Nkrumah, �· c it . , p .  272 . 48Nkrumah , �· cit . , p .  271 . 
49Bourre t ,  loc . cit . 5
0
Nkrumah , �· c it . , p .  252 . 
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Territories, respects the identity of the Ashanti nation, provides for an 
51 independent judiciary, and secures the legal freedom of every citizen." 
More specifically, the opposition continued to seek a special legislative 
house for chiefs, increased powers for the regional assemblies which would 
be established, and safeguards against unduly easy amendment of a consti-
52 tution which would contain those provisions. 
The proposals officially made to the Governor by the Legislative 
Assembly, however, were those contained in the CPP platform for the recent 
election. There was no compromise . The NLM together with the NPP (North-
ern People ' s  Party) thereupon sent a resolution to London threatening to 
secede if their demands were not met . 53 
At the end of January, 1957, only a little over a month before 
the date set for independence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
brought representatives of the NLM and CPP together and persuaded them 
to accept a compromise. According to Bourret, the government made the 
greatest concessions, but it appears to the present writer from Bourret's 
54 own account that the government made no effective concessions at all. 
Under the new constitution the legislature, which would be 
referred to as the National Assembly or Parliament, would still be uni-
cameral, and all of its 104 members would be popularly elected. There 
would be regional councils which would have responsibility for local 
government, but they would have only so much power as the National 
Assembly determined. The only significant gain which the NLM made was 
51Quoted ibid . from letter to London Times, September 2 2 ,  1956. 
52 53 54 Ibid. Ibid., p. 198. Ibid . 
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that appeals on decisions made by traditional authorities in local mat­
ters would be referred to higher traditional authorities rather than to 
secular ones.55 
The government was to be parliamentary in form ; effective execu­
tive power would be vested in a prime minister responsible to a majority 
in Parliament, which could terminate his appointment by a motion of no 
confidence. In turn, the prime minister would be empowered to dissolve 
Parliament and order new elections. Formal executive power would be 
vested in the Queen of England as represented by a governor-general; 
the latter would appoint and remove ministers and perform other duties 
on the advice of the prime minister.56 
As will be seen in the next chapter, the constitution did little 
to bar the CPP from promoting whatever measures it saw fit for hamper­
ing its opposition. As has been seen in this chapter, the CPP, with 
the backing of consistent majorities at the polls, never really compro­
mised with its traditionalisticly oriented opponents at any time. If 
some of them turned to violence, it may well have been a sign of 
desperation and an indication that Nkrumah's party was unwilling to 
respect the rights of the minority. 
Though it is the writer's contention that the CPP was intolerant 
of parochial values and that the violence directed against it might be 
blamed on its intolerance, it should be noted here that no value judg­
ment concerning the CPP's treatment of its opposition is being made in 
this thesis. Both the opposition's conservatism and the CPP's uncom­
promising radicalism had advantages and disadvantages, and no attempt 
55Ibid., pp. 199 -201 . 56Ibid., p. 199 . 
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is made to de fend e i the r .  If  i t  i s  rema rked that undemoc ra tic mea sures 
may have been jus t i fied under certa in c onditions , this does not nece s-
sarily mean tha t the pres ent writer bel ieve s them t o  have been jus tified 
a � olutely , but only tha t the wri te r  be l ieve s tha t such treatment would 
have been sympa thized with and supported by many Ghanaians. 
The Que s t ion of Togoland 
The divis i on of the former Ge rman Togoland be tween Grea t Brita in 
and France ha s al ready be en mentioned . Brita in and Fra nce both governed 
the ir territor ies  a s  mandates under League of Na t ions auspices ;  when the 
Uni ted Na t ions wa s crea ted , b oth Togoland s be came t rust territor ies 
under tha t organiza tion .  Up to 1957  Grea t Bri tain gove rned its  section 
with the same adminis tra t ive appara tus as  wa s used for the Gold Coas t ,  
and British Togoland was even t rea ted a s  an integral part of the Gold 
57 Coa s t . With the approach of independence for the lat te r ,  however ,  
Britain informed the United Nations tha t  it  intended to give up the adminis� 
t ration of Togoland a l s o. 
The General Assembly in deciding the fate  of  Brit ish Togoland 
was confronted with two choices : either t o  append the territ ory perma-
nently to the Gol d  Coa s t  or to e s tabl ish it  a s  a separa te enti ty pend ing 
58 
fur ther action .  It decided the que s ti on in the spring of 1 956 by 
c onduc t ing a plebiscite . 
57 Ib id. , p .  192 . 
58 Ib id. , p .  1 93 .  
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The resul t wa s an ove r-al l ma jority of fifty -e ight pe r cent in 
favo r of integ ra t ion wi th the fu ture Ghana . Much of this ma jority came 
from the northern part of Togoland , however; in the South ,  whe re Ewe s 
were numerou s ,  fi fty - five per cent voted aga inst integra t ion . On the 
ba sis  of the plebis c ite the Gene ral As sembly voted to append the ent ire 
territory to Ghana , thus including within the borde rs of the new s tate 
59 a large group who se members we re d i s sa t is fied . This  expla ins mos t  of 
the violence which later developed in the region aga ins t the Nkrumah 
gove rnment . Nkrumah argued immedia tely a fte r the plebisc ite that no 
ma t ter how the vo ting had gone the re would have been d i s sa t is fac t ion , 
for i t  is Lmpos s ible in Wes t Africa to draw any sa t i s fac tory bounda ry 
which does no t cu t acros s some tribal group . He contended tha t the 
p roblem in s outhern Togoland could be s t  be solved not by permit ting 
the Ewe s to uni te with French Togoland (now the Republ ic of Togo) , bu t 
by ge t t ing rid of na tional boundaries and crea t ing a s ingle Wes t  Afr i -
60 can pol itica l  unit . 
59
Ib id . 
60Nkrumah, �· cit . ,  pp . 260 -26 1 . 
CHAPTE R III 
INTOLERANCE : THE CPP IN ACTION 
Up to the grant ing of independence , the Nkrumah government wa s 
forced to conduc t  itself  with cau t ion . The firs t goal wa s to achieve 
independence , and Nkrumah wa s afra id to permit any thing to happen which 
might be used a s  an excuse for delay ing this .
1 
When it  finally came , 
on March 6 ,  1957 , he and his party moved fairly swiftly to enact  a 
serie s o f  laws , and in 1960 a cons t i tu t ion, which made e ffe ctive oppo-
s it ion to the CPP increa s ingly d i fficul t .  Some o f  the ins trument s 
d irec ted to that end we re put by the legisla ture into the hand s of 
Nkrumah , s o  tha t his personal powe r wa s gradually increa sed . But it is 
important to obse rve that  there wa s cons iderable jus t ifica t ion fo r the 
gene ral pol icie s  promulga ted , and i t  wa s cons is tent with e ffic ient 
government to put re spons ibil i ty for the ir implementa t ion in the hand s 
o f  the execu tive . 
The CPP wa s pledged to ,  and apparently seriously intent on , the 
cons truction of a uni fied na tion ou t of a highly pa rochial population , 
2 ninety pe r cent o f  which wa s ill iterate . The mas se s  we re unsophist ica ted 
and prone to violence , as  events cont inued to demons trate . The official 
opposition pa rt ie s themselve s  we re entrenched in pa rochial ism , and the ir 
leade rship was perhaps even less  demo cra t ic than that of the CPP . 3 S ir 
1 
Nkrumah , �· c it . ,  p .  216 . 2 Bre t ton, op . c it . , p .  53 . 
3K. A . Bus ia ,  The Pos it ion of the Chief in the Modern Pol itical 
Sys tem o f  Ashanti (London : Oxfordlcrnivers ity Pre s�l 951) , pp . 1 93 - 1 94 . 
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Sir Charle s Arden-Clarke , the Brit ish colonial gove rnor,  had been an ou t -
spoken opponent o f  the principal oppo si tion pa rty , the Na tiona l Libe ra t ion 
4 Movement . The a sp ira t ions o f  the va riou s opposition groups for a fede r-
al ized sys tem could be sympathized with to some extent , s ince ea ch wa s 
attempt ing to protect its  own special interes t s ,  bu t Nkrumah could argue 
convincingly that  Ghana wa s too smal l  and its population too l Lmited and 
uneduca ted to support several autonomou s uni t s . 5 Sir Frede rick Bourne 
concurred in th is view . 6 To the CPP a secula r ,  unita ry s tate wa s manda -
tory, and the ob jective s o f  the oppos ition group s se emed bo th sel fish from 
the point of view of the na t ion a s  a whole and shor t s ighted . The ir 
at ta inment could no t be permitted . 
The op inion tha t it  wa s dangerous to comp romise with the opposition 
wa s on occa s ion openly expres sed by Nkrumah, and de fended by out s iders who 
could have been expec ted to be more objective than he . Pe rhap s Nkrumah ' s  
mos t  cand id s ta tement wa s tha t "even a sys tem ba sed on social just ice and 
a democratic cons t itu tion may need back ing up , during the period fol low-
ing independence , by eme rgency mea sure s of a totalitarian kind . Without 
7 discipl ine true freedom can not survive . "  In the fal l  o f  1957 he wa s 
quoted as saying to a rally : 
Any Gove rnment mus t  rule and make the people l ive happ ily 
wi thout the fea r of be ing moles ted or int imida ted . We mus t  
e s tabl ish the princ iple o f  parl iamen tary democracy , and with­
in one year from now we shall  show our opponent s tha t  we mus t  
rule . 
4 
Angl in ,  op . cit . , p .  44 . 
6 sup ra , p .  28 . 
5Nkrumah, �· ci t . , p .  27 5 
7Nkruma.h , �· ci t . , p .  xvi . 
We know all the se things we are doing here will have reper­
cu s s ions all ove r A frica . Bu t  i f  we fa il to a ct and our inde ­
pendence goe s to the dogs ,  this same Brit ish people who are 
crit ici s ing us to -day will s it somewhere and laugh a t  the 
African . 
As for me , I am compe tent and cala .  I have big eye s and 
ea rs and shall cont inue to do ce rta in things in this country 
as Prime Minister because I see tha t as the OAly way by which 
I can put you on the pa th
· 
of true pa rl ia.Jaenta ry deaocracy . 8 
A non -Ghanaian, wri ting for the Yale J.eviev and u s ing Ghana a s  
his foremos t example ,  argued tha t 
• 
. • the typical new African country will not be able to a f ­
ford the luxurie s  of unfe t te red poli t ica l l ibe rty and of we s te rn 
mul t i -party Parl �entary democracy . The electora te lacks the 
educa t ion requ isite to intell igent pol it ical choice ; tribal in ­
flue nces and regional sel f-intere s t  inte rfe re with a uni fied 
na t ional outl ook ; mos t  African leaders - -whe the r in oppos i t ion 
or in powe r - -are not u sed to the re s t ra ints nece s sary to a 
sy stem which include s a 1 1loyal oppos it ion1 1 ; and such count rie s 
need a s table government which can encourage cap ital inve s t­
ment and carry out a concerted plan of development . 9 
The unwil l ingne s s  of the CPP to comproai se with the oppos i t ion 
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wa s mani fe s ted in a se rie s of mea sure s ,  some of them informal and illegal 
and sQJBe made legal by parl iamenta ry enactment , which made it more and 
more difficul t for the oppo s i t ion to a c t  e ffec t ively . Up to 196 0 ,  Nkru-
mah and othe r govermaent spoke smen cons i s tently just ified the use of 
such mea sure s by citing the violent , illegal , and de s tructive activi tie s 
of the oppos it ion and pointing ou t tha t the se presented problems un-
fa•il ia r  to de.ocrac ie s  l ike Grea t B ri ta in and the Uni ted Sta te s . 
��h a s  quoted in the London TL.e s ,  Oc tobe r 4 ,  1 9 57 , p. 8 .  
9Lawre!lce C .  McQuade , "The Showplace of Black Africa , "  Yale 
Review, XLIX (De ce•be r ,  1 9 59) , pp. 228�229 . 
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Inte rviews wi th members of Parl iament showed tha t they held s imilar sent i ­
ment s ; 10 pre sumably the se we re an important pa rt o f  the ir mo t iva t ion for 
enact ing that legisla tion reques ted by party l eaders which pos se s sed a 
somewha t to talita rian charac ter . 
Pol it ics by Violence 
The gove rnment wa s be se t by riot ing and subvers ion from the first 
day o f  independence . Five persons we re kill ed and twenty - three injured 
in Togoland during the Independence Day celebrations . The se dea ths and 
injuries re sul ted from dis turbance s which the government claimed were 
provoked in the hope of showing tha t  the union of Togoland with Ghana 
1 1  
was not viable . Pol ice found two mili ta ry training camp s and a quantity 
o f  ammuni t ion and other explosive s hidden in the bush .  The promo ters o f  
the consp ira cy we re found to b e  two oppos ition members o f  Parl iament , 
S . G . Antor and Kojo Ayeke . They were sentenced the next spring by the 
regular courts . 1 2  They appealed , however ,  and i t  may be s igni ficant that 
in June of 1958 the Ghana Court of Appeal reve rsed the ir sentence s on a 
technical point . 13 Almo s t  immediately a fterwa rd s the government intro-
duced and succeeded in having enacted legi slation ( the Prevent ive De ten-
tion Act) which would permit it to arres t  or deta in persons suspected 
lOBre tton, op . ci t . ,  p .  49 . 
1 1Kee s ing ' s , Ap ril 26 -May 3 ,  1958 , p .  16155 . 
13London Time s , June 28 , 1958 , p .  5 ;  We s t  Africa , November 18 , 
1 96 1 ,  p .  1 27 1 .  
3 9  
o f  engag ing i n  subve rsive activities without showing cause and without 
their having recourse to the court s . The revela t ion to the gove rnment 
o f  the uncertaintie s  o f  the court sys t em wa s no t the sole rea son for 
introduc ing that  b ill , since it  had announced it  wa s contemplat ing it  
a s  early a s  Oc tober ,  19 57 . Bu t it  can be seen a s  confirmation o f  the 
government ' s  content ion that dra s tic mea sure s we re nece s sary in the early 
s tage s of independence , particularly as Antor ,  at lea s t  according to later 
o fficial source s ,  cont inued to involve himsel f in trea sonous activites . 14 
The Prevent ive De tent ion Ac t will be further discus sed below .  
The type o f  opposit ion which the gove rnment had t o  deal with i s  
illus tra ted furthe r by the event s  o f  Augus t ,  1957 , centering around 
deporta t ion orders i s sued aga inst two lead ing members of the Mos lem 
As soc ia t ion Pa rty , Alha j i  Baba and Alha j i  tal emie . One o f  the first 
important acts o f  the Na t ional As sembly a fter Ghana had become independ -
ent wa s to prolong a Bri t ish colonial provision which had empowered the 
government to remove from the colony without showing cause any expa triot 
whose pre sence was cons ide red not conducive to the publ ic good . 1 5  The 
law was app l icable only to persons who could not show tha t they were 
Ghana ian cit izens ; that is , who could not show tha t they were of Gold 
Coa s t  or Ghana ian de scent . When the orders were is sued agains t Baba and 
Lal emie on Augus t 4 , the two men immedia tely appealed to the d ivis iona l 
14 Ghana Minis try of Info rma t ion and Broadca s t ing , "Sta tement by 
the Government on the Recent Consp iracy (White Paper No . 7/61) , Decem­
ber 1 1 ,  196 1 , p .  1 5 .  
1 5  
Kwame Nkrumah , f Speak of Freedom (New York : Frede rick A .  
Praeger,  196 1) , p .  113 . 
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court in Kuma s i  with the intention o f  proving cit izenship . The day they 
filed the ir writ s ,  Augus t  8 ,  " thou sand s" o f  their supporters demons trated 
ou t s ide the court ; they cla shed with supporte rs of the CPP , and seven 
persons were injured . l6 
The government ' s  reply to that  demons trat ion wa s d icta torial but 
ef fe c t ive . On Augus t 23 it  whipped a " Spe cial Deporta tion Bill" through 
Pa rl iament which would permit it to remove the two men wi thou t going 
through the court sy stem . 17 They we re flown to a town in Northe rn Nigeria 
and warned tha t the act  prov ided a penal ty of Lmp risonment for six months 
18 if they re turned wi thout the written pe rmiss ion of a de s igna ted minis ter . 
The court later re sumed hearings on the ir cit izenship , jus t as  though 
they had no t al ready been deported , bu t the counsel for the de fense 
asked tha t the ca se be adjourned . 1 9  
I n  announcing o n  Augu s t  21  the gove rnment ' s  intent ion o f  intro -
ducing the spe cial bil l , Nkrumah sa id tha t  because o f  the violence it 
would be impos s ible to hea r the ca se in Ashant i .  One of the members of 
the Crown counsel had been a s saul ted phy s ically ,  and ve rbal attacks had 
been made in the p ress  aga ins t the integr i ty o f  the jus t ice trying the 
case . 
If  there fore any o the r me thod of dispo s ing of deporta t ion orde rs 
can be found , the Gove rnment think it is right tha t Mr . Jus t ice 
Smith should not be sub j e c ted to the r isk of furthe r attacks , 
or cal led upon to ad judicate in a ca se whe re hi s good fa i th has 
been chall enged . 20 
He la ter said tha t the bill had been nece s s i ta ted be cau se " those  suppor t -
ing the ca se of the two men we re engaged i n  a sys tematic campa ign to 
16 
Kee s ing ' s ,  Sep tember 14 -21 , 1957 , p .  15760 . 
1 7London Time s ,  Augus t  24 , 1957 , p .  6 .  
18Kee s ing ' s ,  loc . cit . 19 Ib id . 
20�oted in London Time s ,  August  23 , 19 57 , p .  6 .  
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provoke violence , with the ob ject of coercing the government and bringing 
p re s sure to bear on the court . "  He claimed tha t the only alterna t ive 
to the special pa rl iamentary action wa s abandonment o f  the ca se by the 
gove rnment . He went on to say tha t in the older democracie s  the - oppo-
s ition wa s re s trained and could jus ti fiably be  permit ted to exercise 
its  normal functions , but the procedure s of his own oppos ition we re 
unre strained and improper,  making "unfounded and unwarranted at tacks" 
upon gove rnment o ffic ial s .  21 Thi s  his gove rnment would no t tolera te . 
Meanwhile , more violence rela ted to a d iffe rent i s sue was occur-
ring in Accra . On Augus t  20 , rioters s toned the cars of government 
mini s te rs , and in rio ts  the next day four pe rsons were injured . The 
blame fo r these dis turbance s was laid on the Ga People ' s  Assoc ia t ion 
{Ga Shifimo Kpee) , which Brit ish newspapers sa id wa s an openly t ribal 
organiza t ion whose purpose wa s to oppose gove rnmental acquisition of 
2 2  
tribal lands . O n  October 1 the gove rnment i s sued a n  orde r forb idd ing 
it to hold ral lies  in Accra . 23 
So fa r nothing but open rio ting had come to pub l ic attent ion . 
Now a new element was added . In a speech on Sep tembe r  2 1 ,  Interior 
Mini s te r  Krobo Edusei  al leged tha t membe rs o f  the oppo s i t ion we re 
a c t ive ly engaged in a plot to have the Prime Minis ter and members o f  
h i s  cabine t a s sa s s ina ted .
24 
He did no t indicate the source of his 
21 Nkrumah ,  quo ted in Kee s ing ' s ,  1oc . c it . , p .  1576 1 . 
22Kee s ing ' s ,  Octobe r 1 9 - 26 , 1957 , p .  1 5817 ; London Time s , 
August  21 , 1957 , p .  6 .  
23Kee s ing ' s , loc . ci t .  24Ibid . 
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information or p re sent any evidence to support his allega tion , bu t the 
fac t  tha t he made it i s  s ignificant in view o f  the Awha itey Affa ir which 
came to light in Novembe r o f  the next yea r .  I n  conne c t ion wi th the la t -
ter ,  a n  independent commi s s ion of inquiry found i n  pub l ic proceed ings that 
the re actually had be en such an a s sa s s ination plo t ,  conducted by two oppo -
s i t ion MP ' s , R .  R. Amponsah and M. K. Apaloo , i n  operat ion a t  least  as  
early a s  June o f  1958 . 25 The commi s s ion did  not learn when the plot  had 
originated ,  bu t i t  doe s not seem unl ikely tha t Edusei had some founda tion 
for his a s sert ions a s  ea rly as  the previou s Septembe r ,  part icula rly in 
view o f  the pa ra -mil i ta ry activitie s  d is cove red during the Independence 
26 
Day ce lebra t ions . The Amponsah-Apaloo plot involved a member of the 
Togole se l eg is lature . 
27 
A few days after his sta tement on the a s sa s s ination plot the 
Interior Minis ter  a s se rted tha t a s  soon as  any at temp t wa s made on the 
life of Nkrumah the gove rnment would become a dicta torship . He wa s quoted 
as saying tha t "The Constitu tion wil l be suspended and we will deal with 
them a s  we l ike . " 28 It wa s at thi s juncture a l s o ,  when violence had 
been exhib i ted and apparently an a s sa s s ination plot wa s su spec ted , tha t 
Nkrumah made his s ta tement de fend ing extraord inary mea sure s quoted on 
page s 36 and 3 7 .  Bu t he denied then tha t such mea sure s would lead to 
permanent totalitarianism: "To say tha t the Government of Ghana is 
25 Infra , p.  53 • 26 Sup ra , p .  38 . 
28London Time s , October 4 ,  1957 , p .  8 .  
27 Infra , p .  53 · 
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introducing dictat or ship is nonsense . After all , eve ry five yea rs we 
shall go to the pol l s  for the country to decide the next Gove rnment /f-9 
I t  is pos sible tha t  at thi s t ime Nkrumah actually did be lieve that  he 
could d is c ipl ine the opposition and s t ill maintain a meaning ful democracy 
by permitting the voters to give him a pe riodic vote of confidence . 
The Eme rgency Powers Act 
The mea sure s hinted at took the fo rm of an "Eme rgency Powe rs Ac t , "  
which wa s pa s sed by the leg i sla ture on De cember 12 and which gave the 
government the power to de clare a s tate  o f  eme rgency and make by procla ­
ma tion such provis ions as  it  cons idered to be ne ces sa ry . The exe cut ive 
wa s l Lmi ted , howeve r ,  in tha t any eme rgency regula t ions would lose the ir 
e ffec t  in twenty-e ight days if no t app roved by Pa rl iament . The l i fe of 
a given parl iament could not be prolonged , nor could the cons titut ion 
be suspended . It is noteworthy tha t this  act wa s me rely a mod ificat ion 
o f  a Bri tish law which had been in effe ct du ring col onial times , a s  wa s 
the Deportat ion Act be fo re i t . The Ghana ian ac t ,  as  a mat ter of fa ct , 
wa s somewha t l e s s  autocra t ic in one re spect , its  provis ion for the 
parl iamentary sa feguard . A total adap ta t ion of the Brit ish law would 
30 
have l e ft the executive unchecked . 
The legisla t ion wa s first appl ied to deal wi th d i s turbance s in 
conne c t ion with another cla sh be tween gove rnmental and pa rochial force s .  
The government had in Augus t deported the head o f  the local Moslem 
counnunity around Kuma s i  (the "Ze rikan Zongo") and le ft hi s po s t  officially 
29 Ib id . 30Kee s ing's ,  April 26 -May 3 , 1958 , p .  16155 . 
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vacant . Dis turbance s ensued while three men ,  one of them a membe r  of the 
CPP , contended for the po s t . A s tate of eme rgency wa s declared on De cem­
be r 30 . On January 8 ,  1 9 58 ,  the government o fficial ly recognized the CPP 
cand ida te , but re s i s tance , includ ing the firing o f  rifle shots  into the 
home o f  a reg ional commissioner,  cont inued . The s ta te o f  emergency a l so 
continued and wa s approved by Parl iament Feb ruary 19 . It  wa s made known 
to the public tha t thirty - s ix people had been' arre s ted Feb ruary 2 in 
conne c t ion with various  incident s ;  whe the r any o thers had been arre s ted 
be fore then was not revealed . 3 1  
The Prevent ive De tention Act 
Nkrumah introduced the prevent ive d e tent ion b il l , which would per­
mit the exe cut ive to deta in Ghana ian nat iona l s  without having to submit 
to court inquiry ,  to the Na t ional Assembly on July 14 , 1958 . He 
expla ined the government ' s  rea sons for s eeking i t s  enac tment by going 
all  the way back to the threa t s  of c ivil war in Ashant i  in the p re ­
independence period . He empha s ized the theme o f  subve r s ion- -a ttemp t s  
actually t o  overthrow the gove rnment ra the r than s imply t o  try t o  influ ­
ence it through regular elec toral proce s se s . The Prime Minister  told 
members o f  Parl iament tha t there we re many who were p repared to re sort 
to violent means if they we re unable to succeed in their  a ims by non­
violent one s . Ins tances cited included not only the threa t s  of c ivil 
war in Ashanti  but al so the semi - revol t in Togoland during the Independ ­
ence Day celebra t ions . The grea t danger in the se lay not s imply in 
3 1 Ib id . 
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dome s t ic opposition, but in the fa ct tha t the re we re fore ign powe rs and 
intere s t s  who did no t want to see a Negro republ ic succeed . They were 
generally looked to for a s s is tance by dome s t i c  organize rs of violence , 
and the danger wa s tha t dis turbances would be used a s  an excuse for 
inte rvening to such an extent tha t the government actua lly could be up -
se t .  The gove rnment wa s determined to b e  p re pared to hand le subve rs ion 
from wi thin or wi thout . 
He went on to say tha t it  wa s only tho se who would re sort to vio-
lence who needed to fear the b ill ; o the rs would be p rotec ted . One 
part icular service it would perform would be to enable the court s  to 
funct ion be t te r .  They could no t funct ion properly under the threa t o f  
violence ; in order t o  as sure due proce s s ,  a n  occa sional de tention might 
32 
be ne ce ssary . He did not expla in he re why the problem could no t be 
solve d by regular arre s t  followed by regula r court trial , bu t ob se rvers 
on . othe r occas ions have as se rted tha t in Ghana p e rsons could incite vio-
lence and othe r il legal ac tivi tie s  so  inconsp icuously tha t not enough 
evidence to convict them could be obta ine d ,  or else  they we re so 
33  
re crimina tory tha t witne s ses  were afraid to te stify against them. 
Al though Nkrumah did no t re fe r  to them speci fical ly , it seem s 
pos sible that the court -ordered relea se of Antor and Ayeke on June 27 
wa s at lea s t  part of the provo ca t ion for introduc ing the bill  only two 
32 Journal of the Pa rl iaments of the Commonweal th, XXXIX (Oc to ­
be r,  1958) , pp . 632-633 . 
33we s t  Africa ,  November 1 8 ,  1 96 1 ,  p .  1 2 7 1 . 
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and a hal f  weeks la te r .  By this time a l so the Awha itey plot  to a s sa s s i -
na te Nkrumah and two of his minis ters  had been se t in mot ion- -one o f  the 
consp irators had purcha sed mil itary equipme �t to be used in conne c t ion 
34 with it in June - -and the gove rnment may have learned of it by tha t time . 
I f  so,  it did not reveal its  knowledge and did no t arre s t  the conspira -
t o r s  until jus t be fore the intended culmination o f  the plot i n  November .  
I t  may have been aware only generally tha t there we re s ome subversive 
activit ie s  be ing perpetra ted by somebody , and may have been trying to 
prepare i t se l f  to deal with them when more details  we re d i scovered . 
In connec t ion with this it  should be noted tha t the gove rnment 
firs t used the Preventive De tention Act ( the PDA) in connec tion with 
the Awhai tey plot , and that tha t use wa s ba sed on evidence that tho se 
deta ined we re l ikely to be engaged in p repa ra tions to ove rthrow the 
government by violence . The view that the ev idence ava ilable imp l i ca ted 
all tho se arre s ted wa s shared by the independent commi s s ion which inves -
3 5  
t igated the inc ident . 
The PDA empowered the government to order the de tent ion of any 
person suspec ted of be ing a threa t to the security of the s tate . The 
a c t  l iterally ve s ted the powe r in the governo r-gene ral , a Briti sh sub -
jec t ,  bu t Nkrumah himsel f made it  clear later tha t th is was only a for -
3 6  
mality and that i n  p racti ce h i s  government was comple tely independent . 
34 
Infra , p .  53 
3 5  
In fra ,  p .  53 
36 speech in Na tional Assembly , in Ghana Today, III (January 6 ,  
1 96 0) , p .  1 .  
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No person wa s to be held for more than five years , and each de ta inee wa s 
to be given a� opportunity to make rep re senta tion in writ ing to the 
governor-general . As events developed , both the s e  provis ions were worth-
l e s s , for the execut ive wa s never required to make an accounting of those 
deta ined , and in la ter years did no t do so . 3 7  No r we re de ta inee s sue -
ce s s ful a fter Ghana became a republ i c  in 196 0  in communica t ing with the 
i i i ha f d . 38  m n s ter n c rge o e tent 1ons . The ac t wa s to cea se to have e ffe ct 
a fter five yea rs but would be renewable by Pa rl iament for three -year 
interval s . 3 9  After five years , howeve r, due to a new cons ti tut ional 
arrangement , Nkrumah wa s abl e  to renew i t  by leg isla t ive decree if ne ces -
40 
sary .  
The s igni ficant a spec t o f  the act , o f  course , wa s tha t it com-
pletely by -pa s sed the courts  and put the execu tive ' s  actions beyond the 
reach even o f  legisla t ive inquiry . 41 Obv iously , i f  he chose , Nkrumah 
could use i t  to cru sh any opposition movement e i the r out s ide his own 
party or within it  s imply by deta ining the movement ' s  key pers onnel . 
Members o f  the Uni ted Party during the debate s were care ful to point out 
that threa t ,  so  that the CPP ma j ority which approved it wa s we ll awa re 
42 
o f  i t . A discu s s ion o f  the pos s ible rea sons they vo ted for it  is  
37  
Parl iamentary Deba te s ,  XXVII (June 6 ,  196 2) , col . 56 5 .  
38Ib id . 
3 9  Journal o f  the Parl iament s , XXXIX (Oc tober ,  1958) , pp . 6 3 2 -633 . 
40 Infra , p .  6 6 . 
41Parl iamenta ry Deba te s ,  loc . c i t . 
42Journal o f  the Parl iament s ,  l oc .  c it . , pp . 633-6 34 . 
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conta ined in the final chap ter . I t  seems probabl e  tha t the mea sure wa s 
approved a t  lea s t  partly be cause o f  the threat of subvers ion and vio-
lence al luded to by Nkrumah and the need for the government to meet  it 
with firm and flexible action without the uncertaint ie s a s sociated with 
court tria l s . 
Gove rnmental Provoca t ion 
While the gove rnment had crea ted a new weapon for fight ing illegal 
p rocedure s on the part of the oppos i t ion , and wa s sub sequently able to 
boa s t  that it  had ac tua lly used them for tha t purpose , at the same t ime 
i t  was engaging increa s ingly in practices which made it impos s ible  for 
the oppo s i t ion to ope rate  by legal means . One o f  the al iens the govern-
ment had removed under the Deportat ion Act happened to be the deputy 
43 editor of Accra ' s  one independent newspape r ;  a fter tha t , a ccord ing 
44 
to one source , thi s  paper ' s  editoria l  vigor was somewha t d iminished . 
In the fall o f  1 957 the government had forced the opposition partie s ,  
all o f  which were regionally based , to come toge ther into a s ingl e  Uni ted 
Party , an act ion which wa s cons istent with Nkrumah ' s  conviction that  
reg ional i sm wa s del e te riou s  in  the long run to Ghana ' s  inte re s t s . But 
tha t  party wa s unable to make headway ; a ccording to one of i t s  l eading 
spoke smen, the gove rnment wa s sys tema tically hampering it by appoint ing 
43 Kee s ing ' s , Sep tember 14- 21 , 1957 , p .  15760 . 
44Leo M. Snownis s ,  "Democracy and Control in a Changing Soc ie ty , "  
the s i s  submit ted to the Depa rtment o f  Pol itical Science , Univers i ty o f  
Chicago ,  Novembe r ,  196 0 ,  bibl iographical note . 
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ex-convicts and other persons of doubtful antecedents to local courts 
trying cases fundamentally political in nature. He charged further that 
at the approach of by-elections in given localities the Minister of the 
Interior (Edusei) had been making a practice of touring the areas and 
45 voicing threats against those who would vote against the CPP. 
The government's responsibility for frustrating legal activity 
by the UP is indicated particularly clearly by events involving the 
regional assemblies, provision for which had been written into the 1957 
Orders-in-Council as a safeguard against undesired interference in local 
46 affairs by the CPP-dominated central government. The assemblies were 
extremely important and there is little doubt, judging from the returns 
of the last general election, that in 1956 the opposition under compe-
titive conditions would have won control of them at least in Ashanti 
47 and the Northern Territories. When general elections for the assem-
blies were held in October, however, the United Party, instead of 
contesting the elections, announced that it was going to boycott them. 
Observers have asserted that this was an extremely inept move, since 
the CPP captured all but a handful of seats and proceeded to vote the 
48 assemblies out of existence. What the boycott and its disastrous 
consequences for the opposition actually demonstrates is the truth of 
45 Journal of the Parliaments, loc. cit. 
46 F. M. Bourret, �· cit., p. 200. 47Ibid. and supra, p. 29. 
48Gwendolen M. Carter, Independence for Africa (New York: 
Frederick A .  Praeger, 1960), p. 137; KeesinSTS, March 7-14, 1959, 
p. 166 88. 
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the la t te r ' s  content ion tha t the CPP wa s making i t  impos sible for the 
opposition to work effe c t ively through democra tic p rocedure s .  
Nkrumah a t  thi s  t ime a t temp ted to ju s ti fy the repre s s ive mea sure s 
he and his party re sorted to a s  fol lows : 
I f  only they / the opposition/would act  the way I d id when I wa s 
in the oppos ition . I always made it clear tha t I would not re ­
sort to violence , and the Bri t ish could alway s  trust  wha t I 
sa id . The only time I went to pri son wa s be cause I had told 
them what I intended to do . But when I a sk the oppos i t ion to 
s it around the table with me and g ive me thei r  critic isms , 
they wil l no t do so . They organize in cel l s  and they pla� vio­
lence . Wha t can I do i f  they threaten to a ssa s s inate me? 49 
The crux o f  the ma t ter appea rs to have been tha t Nkrumah wa s deter-
mined to reta in powe r in his own hand s .  He wanted the oppos i t ion to come 
to the confe rence table and discu s s  the i r  problems with him.  They pre -
£erred to work through the poll s ,  but the CPP had made e ffe c t ive rep re -
senta t ion through thi s  channel �po s s ibl e . Judg ing from the over -all  
chara c ter o f  his gove rnment ,  there wa s no rea s on for the opp o s i t ion to  
a s sume that direct  confe rence s with Nkrumah would have been any more 
influent ia l  than electoral p rocedure s .  The re probably wa s good rea son 
for concluding tha t the only avenue real ly l e ft open wa s consp iratorial . 
The violent and subvers ive activi t ie s  o f  which Nkrumah compla ined we re 
pa rtly a consequence of his own gove rnment ' s  intolerance . But Nkrumah 
wa s working under d i fficul t c ircums tance s toward goa l s  which may have 
admi t ted o f  no compromise . He wa s comple tely commi tted to the ideal 
o f  rap id economic development and a unified We s t  Africa:,. for which the 
balkaniza t ion of his 
50 own country would have been disa s trous . I f  
tha t goa l and democra t ic principles  came into confl ict , h e  was forthright 
49Ibid . , p .  13 1 . 50 Nkrumah, Ghana , p .  2 7 5 .  
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in a ffirming tha t the la t ter  would have to give way . 51 Nkrumah had neve r 
made a secret  of his convictions in 19 56 ; s ince he had no t cont rol led the 
elect ion of tha t yea r ,  it could be a s sumed tha t he had re ce ived a manda te 
both from his own party and from the na t ion a s  a whole fo r attemp ting to 
act  on them . This could be a ssumed despite ob serva tions tha t elections 
in the Gold Coa s t ,  even when the Brit ish we re conducting them, tended to 
52 be fought on othe r than the real i s sues . 
The Awha i tey Pl ot 
Eduse i ,  in the fall o f  1957 , had alleged that the gove rnment 
pos ses sed information about a plot  suppor ted by fore ign capital to over-
throw the government by violence . Nkrumah made reference s to a s sa s s ina ­
t ion plots and subvers ion in his de fense o f  the Prevent ive De tent ion Ac t 
and other repre s s ive mea sure s .  The act ivitie s to which both he and 
Edu s e i  apparently re ferred came to a head in Novembe r and De cembe r of 
1 9 58 ,  when it wa s revea led that two ma j or officers of the United Pa rty 
had approached personnel o f  the Army for the purpose of d iscus s ing with 
them a coup d ' e tat .  The case wa s thrown open to inve s t iga tion by a 
publ ic court-martial and also  by an independent commi s s ion of inqui ry ,  
cha ired by an Engl ish Queen ' s  Counsel and including only one na tive 
Ghanaian . They we re unanimous in find ing tha t the lead ing members o f  
the Uni ted Pa rty in que s t ion had been engaged a t  least  s ince June , 1958 ,  
51 Ibid . ,  p .  xv i .  52 Infra , p .  121 . 
in a " consp iracy to ca rry out at  some future da te in Ghana an act for 
unlawful purpose , revolut iona ry in characte r . " 53 
52 
On November 10 the government had issued de tent ion orders aga inst 
forty - three persons , many of them members of the UP , on the ba s is tha t 
they we re involved in a consp ira cy " to a s sa s s ina te the Prime Minis ter  
and two of  his  Ministers and to overthrow the Gove rrunent . "54 The thirty-
e ight sub sequently a rre s ted included the a s s istant general se cre ta ry of 
the United Pa rty , the entire exe cut ive commi t tee o f  its  Accra branch, 
and several o f  its  publ ic ity and p ropaganda officers . On De cember 20 
the government deta ined the general secre ta ry of the UP , R. R. Amponsah, 
and M. K. Apaloo , one of 55 it s l e s ser execut ive s .  
The man whose name is gene rally used in re fe rring to the plot wa s 
an of ficer in the Army , cap ta in Benjamin Awha i tey .  He wa s tried by a 
court -martial  for having po sses sed wi thout immed iately report ing it  
" info nnation o f  a plot to kill or cap ture the Prime Minis te r . " 56 His 
trial revealed tha t he had been approached by Amponsah and a sked to cal l  
toge the r a g roup of  non-commis s ioned o fficers for the purpose of dis -
cus sing a coup d ' e ta t .  He wa s eventua l ly convic ted and su spended from 
57 
se rvice . 
53Quoted from Granville Sharp Report in Kees ing ' s , Augus t  1 5 - 2 2 , 
1959 , p .  16 958 . 
54Quoted in Kee s ing ' s , March 1 -14 , 1959 , p .  16687 . 
55tbid . 
56Quoted from o fficial proceed ings , ibid . 57 Ib id . 
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The independent commi s s ion which the gove rnme nt emp loyed to demon-
strate the va l idity o f  its  al lega t ions of subvers ion wa s compri sed of a 
former recorder of King ' s  Lynn, Norfolk (England) , Mr . Ju s t ice Granville  
Sharp ;  a former membe r o f  the Exe cut ive Counc il of the Gold Coas t ,  Sir 
Tsibu Darku ; and a senior mag istrate from Brit ish Guiana , Mr . M. A . 
Cha rl es . I t s  report said tha t Amponsah , us ing a p seudonym, purcha sed 
in June , 1958 , a quantity of mil ita ry clo thing and equipment from a 
London firm . He arranged for part of it  to be sent to a membe r of the 
legisla ture of French Togoland , which is signi ficant in view of the 
hidden mil itary tra ining camp s the gove rnment sa id it had found in its  
own Togoland in 1 9 57 . 58 The commis s ion a f firmed tha t ,  in light of the 
evidence ava ilable to the government at all ma terial times , all de ten-
59 tiona made we re fully jus t i fied . 
The commiss ioners we re unable to agree on the deta il s of the 
conspiracy , and the gove rnment used this as a jus ti fica tion for its  
subsequent employment o f  the Prevent ive De tention Ac t .  In a white paper 
pub l i shed in June it argued tha t the commis sion had de finitely shown 
the re wa s a consp ira cy bu t tha t ,  de spite the thoroughne s s  wi th which 
it conducted its  inquiry , 60 it s t ill  wa s unable to accumula te evidence 
which would make po s s ible a convic tion in court under the common law 
57 
Ib id . 
58 
Supra , p .  38 . 
59Kee sing ' s , Augus t  15-22 , 1959 , p .  16958 . 
60The commis s ion sa t for 29  day s ,  heard 97 witne s se s ,  and ex­
amined 108 p iece s of documentary evidence • . See " S tatement by the 
Gove rnment on the Re cent Consp iracy" (W . P .  No . 7/61) , �· �. , p .  6 .  
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Ghana had inherited . The rea son for this wa s tha t the common law required 
proo f of the exact na ture of the offense , which then had to be rela ted 
to a spe c i fic se ction of the crimina l code be fo re a convict ion could be 
ob ta ined . The gove rnment sa id tha t it would introduce legislation to 
make a court convi ct ion fo r trea son ea s ier,  bu t it s t ill ins is ted tha t 
under the unce rtain c ircumstance s exist ing in Ghana at  tha t time some 
kind o f  prevent ive de tent ion a l so wa s neces sa%y . 61 
The Na tional As sembly Disqual i fica t ion Ac t 
Both Amponsah and Apal oo  we re members of the Na tional Assembly 
as well a s  execu t ive s in the Uni ted Pa rty , and the CPP took advantage 
of the ir de tent ion fo r subve rsion by introduc ing , in March of 1959 , a 
Na t ional Assembly d isqua l i ficat ion bil l . This p iece of legisla t ion , 
ea s ily pa s sed by the CPP ma jority ,  conta ined one provis ion which wa s 
part icula rly advantageous to the Nkrumah gove rnme nt . 
It  disqua l i fied from Assemb ly member ship and provided for the 
replacement of any MP de ta ined under the Prevent ive De tent ion Ac t . This , 
of course , would no t only rid the legisla ture of Amponsah and Apalao but 
al so woul d disqual ify anyone e l se whom the gove rnment cho se to arre s t  
on " susp icion" of activit ie s  threa tening the state . The new law would 
not have prevented such pe rsons from running aga in fo r the ir sea t s ,  bu t 
i t  would have caused them to lose them in the firs t  pla ce and forced 
6 2  
them to wa i t  unt il the next regular election t o  contend for them again .  
6 1Kee s ing ' s , loc . cit . 
6 2Journal of the Pa rl iament s ,  XL (Sep tembe r,  19 59) , pp . 3 1 7 -3 18 . 
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The gove rnment ' s  os tens ib le rea son for favoring the legisla tion wa s to 
a s sure all  cons tituencie s of rep re senta tion. Bu t the di squa l i fica t ion 
bill , when it wa s enac ted , gave the gove rnment anothe r means for controll ing 
recalcitrant legislators - - the mere threat of a de tent ion which could not 
be checked by any jud icial inqu iry . The re is no speci fic ev idence tha t 
such a threa t wa s eve r re i fied fo r the me re purpose of removing a 
troublesome opponent ; neve rthele ss , the threa t wa s the re , and it mu st 
have made oppo s i t ion membe rs- -and perhap s some members of the CPP al so- -
somewha t le ss  t renchant in the ir critic ism of Nkrumah than they would 
have been o the rwise . There is no good evidence tha t any Assembly member 
belong ing to the CPP in 1 9 59 bel ieved tha t the legislat ion he wa s app rov-
ing might someday be used aga ins t h�. As la te a s  Augus t ,  1960 , one of 
the mos t  p rominent CPP membe rs , who later be came an ou tspoken critic of 
Nkrumah ' s  ta ctics , argued tha t legisla t ive Lmmuni ty should no t be per-
63 mitted to cloak an MP who threa tened the security of the sta te . 
Al though it  appears probable that the principal rea son for CPP members ' 
read ine ss  to vote fo r the bil l  wa s a will ingne s s  to hamp er .the oppo s i -
tion further ,  i t  is  pos s ible tha t this wa s combined with a fear of 
pol it ical re ta l ia t ion when the CPP execut ive selec ted its  official 
cand ida tes fo r the next election . This comb ina t ion of mot ive s will be 
d iscus sed fu rther in the final chap ter . For the pre sent wha t is important 
is to no te tha t members of Pa rl iament we re continuing to grant the exe cu -
tive branch , headed by Nkrumah, power which eventua lly could be used 
agains t them . Al though the Chie f Executive already pos s e s sed the weap on 
63P .  K. K. Quaidoo , in Pa rl iament , Augus t  24 , 1 960 . Quoted in 
Pa rl iamenta ry Deba tes , XXV (October  18 , 1 96 1) , col s . 115 -116 . 
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of the Preventive De tent ion Act , it would have been d ifficul t for him to 
use it aga ins t membe rs of his own party at  thi s  t ime wi thout running the 
risk o f  a rou s ing se rious opposit ion to himsel f from within hi s own ranks . 
He could not ye t have depended on control l ing such oppo s i tion . The ove r-
all  pol i tical s i tua t ion in  Ghana wa s such a s  to encourage an increa se in 
Nkrumah ' s  coercive power without forc ing him to re sort to coe rcive or 
illegal means to achieve i t . 
Cont inued Unre s t  
Rio t s ,  pol i tical murders , and allega t ions of intrigue cont inued 
to occur throughou t the next twelve months . By -elect ions in Oc tober 
led to riot ing in whi ch three CPP supporters we re killed . 64 On the 
o the r hand , Dr . J. B . Danquah, the fo rmer a s socia te of Nkrumah during 
the 1940 ' s and now one of the mo s t  prominent UP leaders , a s serted in 
May , 196 0 ,  tha t there had been "ce rta in flagrant brea che s of the elec-
toral laws re sul t ing in the vic timizat ion o f  many members o f  the 
United Party and a gene ra l  reign o f  terror imposed upon the country by 
certa in leaders and members o f  the party in power . "6 5 Bo th s ides  
we re cont inuing to provoke the o the r .  
The government s t il l  cla imed tha t i t  wa s being threa tened from 
Togolese soil . In Ma rch o f  1960 it sent a telegram to the French 
government , which up to April , 196 0 ,  held hegemony over the area , s ta t -
ing that it  posses sed a document purporting t o  b e  the future constitu -
t ion o f  a Republic o f  Togoland with boundarie s includ ing a pa rt o f  
64 London Time s ,  Novembe r  13 , 1959 , p .  10 . 
6 5London Time s ,  May 5 ,  1960 , p .  1 2 .  
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Ghana . I t  al so sa id tha t it bel ieved tha t some o f  those involved in the 
p re sent plot  we re the same a s  those who had been connec ted with the d i s -
turbance s and subvers ive ac tivities  o f  the spring of 1 9 57 .  Both the 
colonial Togole se government and the French government denied all  allega -
6 6  t ions . The Ghanaian government cont inued t o  ins i s t ,  howeve r ,  tha t i t  
pos se s sed info rma t ion about the activitie s and plans of the accused in 
considerable deta il . It sa id tha t twelve men in Togoland toge the r with 
fourte en othe rs in Ghana (al l o f  whom the gove rnment had by then detained) 
were planning to bring about such a breakdown of order in the Vol ta re -
gion (northe rn Togoland) as  to jus tify the ir cla ims that the p re s ent 
borde rs were unsa t is factory and would have to be redemarca ted . Part  
of the alleged plan included the revival o f  the "underground army" which 
wa s said to have exi s ted jus t be fo re independence in 1957 . 6 7  
66Kee s ing ' s ,  April 9 -16 , 1 960 , p .  173 57 . 
6 7 London Time s ,  March 21 , 196 0 ,  p .  9 .  
C�P�R IV 
TRANSITION : THE 1960 CONSTITUTION 
Eve r s ince the a t ta inment of indep endence Nkrumah had practiced 
a cons is tent pol icy of  hampering the abil ity of the parochial opposi-
t ion to  oppose his  own CPP e ffe ctive ly . In thi s he had the cons is tent 
support of party members in the legislature , who constituted an over -
whe lming majority . Thi s  wa s e s s ent ial , for under the Orders- in-Counc il 
1 imposed by the Br it ish, Parl iament wa s in u l t imate control . It  could 
have either fa iled to enact  his legislative p rogram or unseated his 
gove rnment by a vo te of no confidence . 
Probably up at  lea s t  until 1960 to have fa iled to support Nkru -
mah would have been pol it ica lly d isa s t rou s for CPP members . The Prime 
2 Minis ter  had the powe r to dis solve the Nat ional Assembly . He a l so ,  
according t o  ob servers , e ffe ctively control led the Convent ion Peopl e ' s  
3 Party . MP 1 s  who voted aga inst him would have failed to rece ive pa rty 
support in the ensu ing elect ions and p robably , whether they s tood a s  
independent s ,  organized a new pa rty ,  o r  j oined the UP , they could not 
have won without it . Tha t suppos i t ion s tems primarily from the fac t  
tha t no CPP membe r o f  Parl iament did revol t ,  s o  far a s  is  known t o  this 
writer . 
1 
Bourre t ,  �· cit . , p .  199 . 
2 
Ibid . 
3 
Supra , p .  13 . 
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Mea sure s promulga ted to control or hamper the oppo s it ion we re 
advantageous to bo th the legis lators and the Prime Minis ter .  They 
we re de s irable from the po int o f  view o f  the former because they re ­
duced the threa t o f  the oppo s i t ion to the CPP program o f  building a 
unified and socially and economically p rogre s s ive s tate ,  and they 
increa sed the chance s tha t government supporters would keep the ir 
sea t s  in the l eg i s la ture . They were des irable to Nkrumah in tha t 
they not only gave him tools  to help de fend his pa rty ' s  prog ram and 
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to a s sure the ava ilab il i ty of legisla t ive sea t s  for adhe rent s to it , 
but a l so they were framed in such a way that  he could d irec t  them 
aga ins t anybody , includ ing persons nominally in his own party . This 
wa s particularly true o f  the Prevent ive De tent ion Ac t and the Na t ional 
Assembly Disqualifica tion Ac t ,  which ,  used in conjunc tion wi th the 
PDA , could rid the As sembly o f  a re calcitrant legisla tor . But ,  while 
the legislature had g iven Nkrumah cons ide rable l egal discre t ion, as  
the supreme governmental organ ,  i t  s t il l  had an ul t imate che ck on him . 
In 1960 Nkrumah began a campa ign to rid himse l f  of that  re s t rict ion . 
The campa ign consis ted o f  advoca t ing a new republ ican cons t itu­
t ion which would make him independent of the l eg isla ture . This 
strategic move on his part has been given too little at tent ion by 
s tudent s of Ghana , for it wa s absolutely e s sent ial in the buildup 
of Nkrumah ' s  ul t imately unre s tricted powe r .  A care ful s tudy of the 
p rovis ions o f  the cons t itut ion and the way the gove rnment went about 
get t ing them adop ted sugge s t s  tha t  1960 wa s a crucial period in the 
evolut ion o f  Nkrumah ' s  powe r ;  if  its development wa s ever to be 
hal ted , this would have been the mos t  fea s ible time . I t  appears tha t 
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Nkrumah ' s  public  support was waning , so tha t he  would not have had the 
same pol it i cal power ove r CPP members as he had had before . Since the 
gove rnment wa s s till parl iamentary in form, he d id no t have ul t ima te 
control over the ins t ruments with which he could have appl ied coerc ion 
e i ther . 
Nkrumah u sed the Na t ional Assembly a s  a cons t i tuent a s sembly and 
succeeded in securing a favo rable vote on all his propo sa l s . The develop ­
ment o f  la ter event s demons trated that  app rova l o f  them wa s a s t ra tegic 
error from the point o f  view o f  the legislature , for they gave Nkrumah 
powe rs which in e ffec t  we re unl imi ted . He eventually used the se powers 
to e s tabl i sh a pol ice s ta te ,  and he controlled pol icy s o  rigidly tha t 
even some o f  his own mini s ters apparently began t ry ing to combat him by 
subvers ive means and had to be detained . 4 
It  should be noted that  up to 1960 one ma in argument had been 
used in ju s t i fy ing repre s s ive mea sure s :  tha t subvers ive activit ie s  and 
threa t s  o f  violence made them manda tory in the inte res t  of the na t ion 
as a whole . In advoca t ing the 1 960  constitu tion , Nkrumah dropped tha t 
a rgument . Even though the cons t i tution ' s  provis ions cons ide rably 
inc rea sed Nkrumah ' s  power and made it much ha rder for any re s tric t ion to 
be placed on him,  this  fac t  wa s deempha s iz ed . Tha t i t  should have been 
is  d if ficul t to unders tand a t  fir s t ,  for the danger o f  subve rs ion and 
parochially inst iga ted violence had not yet sub s ided . The only reason 
tha t  can be d i sce rned for Nkrumah ' s  having changed his ta ctic is tha t 
the cons t i tu t ion needed to be app roved not only by the Na t ional As sembly 
4chap ter VI , pp . 9 1 -117 . 
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s i t t ing as  a cons tituent a s sembly , bu t by a publ ic pleb isc ite a s  we l l . 
He mis repres ented the cha racter of the cons titution, and did so appa rently 
be cau se he wa s a fra id tha t if he wa s cand id in admi tt ing the extent o f  
the powe r which the document would give him, a succe s s ful campa ign 
aga ins t its  adop t ion could have been mounted . 
The gove rnment ' s  avoidance of di scuss ing the cons titution ' s  true 
imp l ica tions wa s mani fe s ted primarily in three ways : the rea sons it  
gave for promoting the document we re so vague as  to be meaningle s s ;  i t  
empha s ized tha t the protection of fundamenta l right s wa s written into 
the do cument so tha t  they could no t pos sibly be viola ted , even though 
it wa s manife s t  to a l iterate person that thi s wa s unt rue and even though 
the gove rnment re fu sed to permit the cons titu t ion to be rewr it ten so 
tha t tho se rights really would be protec ted ; and it appended an article 
a fte r the dra ft had been submi t ted to pl eb isc ite which cl ea rly made 
Nkrumah superior to legisla tive control . 
The Offic ial Jus t i fica t ion 
The firs t publ ic re fe rence to a new cons t i tut ion wa s made by 
Nkrumah himsel f and came in conne c t ion not wi th any pos itive need s of 
Ghana but with wha t Nkrumah ca lled a misunders tand ing on the pa rt of 
some people a s  to whe the r the na tion rea lly wa s independe nt or no t .  
He a s se rted tha t it wa s independent , but tha t perhaps  some o f  the 
mi sunde rs tand ing arose from the fa ct tha t the pres ent cons titution 
wa s imposed by the gove rnment of the United Kingdom.  He then went 
on to say (he wa s speaking in the Na t ional Ass�mbly) : " I  am sure tha t 
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the whole Hou se wil l agree with me tha t the t ime ha s now come for the 
people of Ghana to devise for themselve s a new Cons titution bes t  suited 
to the needs  of Ghana . The te chnica l  work on thi s ha s al ready com-
menced . .  
In his o ffic ial announcement o f  the new p roposa l s , Nkrumah said 
tha t the gove rrnnent 1 s  rea son for making them wa s tha t " there has for 
some time been a grea t de sire by many o f  us tha t Ghana should adopt a 
Republican fo rm of Gove rnment . "  It wa s al leged tha t authority would be 
based on the principle of "one man- -one vote" and tha t the sepa ra tion 
o f  the func tions of head of government from tho se of head o f  sta te wa s 
contrary to the tradit ions and cha racte r  of Ghana . 6 It  should be noted 
tha t Nkrumah and the CPP are gene rally rega rded as highly anti - t rad it ional . 
The new ident ity o f  the head o f  gove rnment and o f  sta te wa s la ter used 
a s  the ba sis  fo r a law forb idd ing the cri t ic ism of Nkrumah , even in Par-
7 l iament .  Nkrumah sa id tha t the new cons t itut ion would ful fill the 
general de s ire s o f  the people for unive rsal su ffrage and for a re turn 
to one form of trad it iona l i sm ,  and tha t  furthe rmore it would encourage 
the organizat ion of pol it ical part ies  on a na t ional ba s is . 8 
One othe r s ta tement add re s sed to the general public  purported to 
g ive the reasons fo r the constitut ion . It took the fo rm of a pamphle t  
publ ished by the gove rnment t o  answer those que stions about the document 
5Quo ted in Ghana Today , III (Janua ry 6 ,  1960) , p .  1 .  
6Ghana Today, IV {Ma rch 16 , 1960) , p .  2 .  
7 Infra , p .  87 . 
8chana Today , loc . cit . 
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which would be mo s t  l ikely to arise . I t s  answe r to the que s t ion "Why 
is a new cons titu t ion cons ide red ne ce s sary? " wa s not informat ive : 
A . - -The pre sent Cons titution is ba sed in many way s on an 
alien and European cul ture . It is intended in the draft Con ­
s t itu t ion that the be s t  and mo st naturally a s s �ila ted ele ­
ment s in this will be re taine d ,  whil s t  the feature s al ien to 
Ghana ian nature and personal ity will be discarded , no tably 
the mona rchical sys tem . The p roposed Cons ti tution is de s igned 
speci fical ly to me e t  Ghana ' s  own de s ires and p roblems and is a 
copy o f  no o ther in the world . 9 
Al though othe r reasons may have been given in speeche s and l i ter-
a ture no t available to this write r ,  it is s triking tha t such meaningle s s  
one s were cited in the s ta tements specif ically purporting t o  speak o ffi -
cially for the gove rnment . 
Fundamental Aight s 
In l ieu o f  a fo rmal b ill of rights , the cons t itut ion prov ided 
that upon taking o ffice the pre s ident would declare his adherence to 
ce rta in principle s ,  those pe rta ining mos t  closely to fundaaental rights 
be ing as fol l ows : 
Tha t  no person should suffer disc rimina tion on ground s of 
sex, ra ce , tribe , re l igion or pol it ica l  bel ie f .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tha t subject to such re s t ric t ions a s  may be nece s sary for 
pre serving publ ic order, moral ity or heal th, no person shoul d 
be deprived of freedom o f  rel igion or speech ,  of the right to 
move and a s semble wi thou t hi�drance or of the right of acces s  
to court s of law . 10 
9Ghana Minis t ry  of Educat ion and Information , Ghana as a Republ ic;  
� Que s t ions Answe red (Accra : Ghana Informa t ion Services-;-1960) , p .  5. 
10.Art icle Thirteen, quoted in Le s l ie Kubin and Pauli Murray , The 
Cons titut ion and Gove rnment of Ghana (London : Swee t  and Maxwell Limited , 
1961), p .  253:--
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Nkrumah himsel f specifically a s serted to the public tha t the docu-
ment a s  i t  s tood wa s writ ten so a s  to p revent any pre sident from exercis ing 
arbitra ry powe r :  
The proposed Cons t i tu t ion . • • guarantees  the exi stence and 
the judicial powers  o f  the Sup reme Court and the tenure o f  o f­
fice of judge s .  • • • The Constitution i s  ba sed firmly on the 
rule o f  law and leave s no scope for arb itra ry action or for 
discriminat ion agains t any ind ividual or community .  
Thi s  i s  underl ined by the requirement which i s  conta ined in 
the p ropo sa l s ,  that a new Pre s ident mus t  declare his adherence 
to certa in fundamental p rinc iples  which recognize the ul t ima te 
au thority o f  the people and the need to pre s e rve freedom and 
jus tice . • • . The se fundamental principle s al so re cognize 
the right o f  eve ry citizen to • • • freedom from unjus t inte r­
fe rence wi th his p rope rty and his  ba sic  rights a s  a c i t izen . 1 1  
Thi s  pos i t ion, tha t arbitrary act ion would b e  prevented by the 
P re s ident ' s  declara t ion, though a weak one wa s cons i s tently ma inta ined 
by the gove rnment . The government ' s  ma jor document purport ing to expla in 
the speci fic provisions of the cons t i tut ion wa s in the form of a white 
paper which wa s made ava ilable to the publ ic . Tha t document s ta ted 
tha t  the cons t i tu t ion wa s "ba sed upon Freedom and Jus t ice , "  provisions 
regard ing which were wri tten into the declara t ion of princ iples  re fe rred 
to . 1 2  Ghana � �  Republ ic ,  the pamphlet  already c i ted , cla imed tha t the 
"rights of the people" we re " firmly entrenched in the Cons titu t ion and 
13 in pa rticula r a t" the decla ration .  
1 1  Broad ca s t  by Prime Minis te r  Nkrumah over Radio Ghana , March 6 ,  
1960 . P rinted in Ghana Today , IV (March 16 , 1 960} , p .  3 .  
1 2  "Gove rnment Proposal s for a Republ ican Cons titut ion . "  Pub -
l i shed i n  Ghana Today , loc . cit . ,  p .  10 . 
l3page 5 .  
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All the major governmental sources contended that fundamental 
rights were protected by the constitution and that the major instrument 
for protecting them was the President's declaration, contained in Arti-
cle Thirteen of the final draft. A vigorous effort was made by the 
United Party to have the declaration changed into a formal bill of rights 
definitely enforceable by the courts, but the CPP majority in the National 
14 
Assembly (constituent assembly) refused to consider the proposal. 
The opposition's fears about the inadequacy of the article were 
confirmed by a Supreme Court decision in 1961. That body declared that 
it 
is in the form of a personal declaration by the President and 
is in no way part of the general law of Ghana. In our view 
the declaration merely represents the goal to which every 
President must pledge himself to achieve /sic7 • • • • The 
people ' s  remedy for any departure from the-prin�iples of the 
declaration is thro�§h the use of the ballot box, and not 
through the Courts. 
The First President's Special Powers 
At the same time that the draft constitution was submitted to 
plebiscite, in April, 1960, voters were also given an opportunity for 
electing the first president to serve under the constitution assuming 
it should be ratified. According to official returns, Nkrumah won, by 
14 Journal of the Parliaments, XLI (July, 1960), pp. 23 8 -23 9 .  
15Journal of African Law, V (Spring, 1962), p. 64. 
6 6  
a rema rkable ma j ority o f  1 , 016 , 076 to 1 24 , 6 23 (his opponent was Dr . J . B . 
16 
Danquah) . It  wa s a fter this that spe c ial powe rs for the Firs t Pre s i -
dent were provided . 17  The se we re appended to the re s t  o f  the constitut ion 
a s  a new Article Fifty- five , which read a s  fol lows : 
Specia l  Powers for the Firs t Pre s ident 
55 . (1) Notwiths tand ing anything in Art icle Twenty of the 
Cons titu t ion, the person appo inted as firs t Pre sident of Ghana 
shall  have , during his initial period o f  o ff ice , the powers 
confe rred on him by this Article . 
( 2) The firs t Pre s ident may , whenever he cons iders i t  to 
be in the na t ional inte re s t  to do so ,  give direc t ions by leg is ­
lat ive ins trument . 
(3) An ins trument made under this Art icle may a l ter (whether 
expre s s ly or by impl ica t ion) any enactment othe r  than the 
Cons t itut ion . 
(4) Se ction (2)  of Article Forty -two o f  the Const i tution 
shall  apply in re la t ion to the powe rs confe rred by this Art icle 
a s  it  app l ie s  in relat ion to the p owe rs conferred on Pa rl iament .  
( 5) For the purpose s o f  the Art icle the firs t Pre s ident ' s  
init ial period o f  o ffice shall be taken to cont inue unt il 
some o ther pe rson a ssume s office as Pre s ident . 
(6 ) The power to repeal or al ter this Article during the 
first  Pre s ident ' s  initial period o f  office is re served to 
the peopl e . l8 
The Art icle Twenty re fe rred to was the one which e s tabl ished the 
powers of Pa rl iament .  I t  s ta ted that that body wa s sup reme : "No person 
or body othe r than Pa rl iament shall  have power to make p rovis ions having 
the fo rce o f  law excep t under authority confe rred by Act o f  Parl iament . " 19 
I t  wa s not an act o f  Parl iament which gave Nkrumah the powers del inea ted 
in Article Fifty - five , but an act o f  the cons t ituent a ssembly , which, 
16 Rub in ,  �· c it . , p .  9 .  17 Ibid . , p .  26 . 
18  Quoted ib id . , p .  266 . 
19Art icle Twenty , Se ction Five , quoted �. ,  p .  2 56 . 
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once i t  had conferred them, coul d not re trieve th�m, even fo r itsel f s i t ­
t ing a s  Parl iament i n  the future . Tha t the CPP members who voted for the 
mea sure we re will ing to grant such powers even to the ir own party leade r 
20 wa s ill - cons idered , as sub sequent events bore out .  
Section TWo o f  Article Forty - two did not pla ce an e ffec t ive 
re s triction on the Pre s ident . I t  s ta ted tha t the Sup reme Court should 
be empowered to decide whe the r any power exe rc ised by Parl iament is  in 
exce s s  o f  tha t p rovided by the cons t i tut ion . What Art icle Fifty - five 
d id ,  of course , wa s to remove the legi slature a s  an e ffec t ive check on 
the Pre s ident . Nomina lly the judiciary wa s s t il l  to exe rcise tha t func ­
t ion . But i t  wa s the Firs t Pre s ident himsel f who wa s empowered to 
appoint the jus t ice s o f  the Supreme Court . 21 Rub in and Murray pointed 
out tha t the provision wa s made even more worthl e s s  in that the Firs t 
Pre s ident wa s granted unl imited powers by the cons t i tution unl e s s  he 
contrad icted its  p rovis ions outright , which he would not be l ikely to 
need to do , or  else a t tempted comple tely to repeal a legisla t ive enac t ­
ment , which again would not i n  all  probab il i ty be nece s sa ry . 22  
As might be expected , cons ide rable criticism wa s leveled aga ins t 
the gove rnment for having wri tten an ins trument o f  thi s  na ture into the 
fundamental law, part icularly without having submit ted i t  to a pleb i s ci te . 
Kofi Baako , one o f  Nkrumah ' s  chie f l ieutenants ,  repl ied to such a crit i ­
c i sm i n  Parl iament by contend ing tha t it  had been "clea rly s tated" tha t  
the re ferendum o n  the cons t i tu tion wa s to take o n  a l s o  the " colour" o f  
2 0  
Chap ter VI . 2 1  Rub in , op . c it . , p .  189 . 2 2  Ib id . , p .  109 . 
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a gene ral election; any MP who se cons tituency approved the dra ft cons t i -
tut ion would b e  as sumed t o  ca rry a mandate t o  make al tera t ions cons is tent 
with the sp irit of tha t document . Art icle Fi fty- five , of  course , wa s no t 
23 cons is tent wi th its  spir i t ,  bu t this wa s no t admitted . 
The Change in App roach 
While the des igns o f  the gove rnment app ea r obvious , its  reluctance 
to u se the same ju s t ifica t ion for ext raord ina ry powe rs it had used in the 
pa s t--tha t is , violence and subve rsion s temming from pa rochial source s - -
require s explana t ion. It  appears that Nkrumah wa s genuine ly a fra id of 
u s ing tha t ra tionale when conduct ing a plebisc ite . He wa s able to use 
i t  earl ie r when de fending the pa s sage o f  statutes be cause vo ters would not 
be ab le to register  the ir ob j ections for seve ral years , by which time he 
could expect to have comp letely elimina ted the oppo sition . As will be 
no ted in the following chap te r s ,  this wa s the pa t te rn which devel oped . 
I f  in 1960 Nkrumah had fought a campa ign on the issue of the ne ce s s ity 
of re stric tive mea sure s to control viol ence and to de fend the state 
aga ins t pa rochial ism, the UP, al though even by then seve rely hampere d ,  
might have waged a succe s s ful campa ign agains t him on the content ion tha t 
the ma j ority of  the people , s ince all we re members of minority group s of 
24 
some kind , might want in the fu ture to p rotect thems elve s fo r some rea -
son aga ins t too much au thority in the central gove rnmen t .  Tha t such a 
feel ing al ready wa s growing ha s been sugge s ted . It would have seemed 
sa fer to make a ge s ture towa rd the pro tection of fundamental right s and 
23 
Parl iamentary Deba te s , XXV (October  13 , 1 96 1 ) , col . 29 . 
24 Sup ra , pp . 5 -7 . 
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fog the is sue . Such a course would have seemed part icularly a t tractive 
in view o f  the high ill iteracy ra te , probably over e ighty pe r cent , com­
b ined with univers�l adul t suffrage . 25 A contention tha t ext raordinary 
powe rs were be ing reque s ted for use in prevent ing persons from cl ing ing to 
the ir tribal ways if they appeared to s tand in the way of secula r progre s s  
would have been re ce ived with cons iderable uneas ines s  by tho se who s t il l  
were i n  the trans it ion s tage from tribal i sm .  Even the mo s t  sophi s ticated 
c i t izens o ften ma intained some o f  the ir old t radi t ions . 26 
The Government ' s  Practices Under the New Cons titut ion 
The cons titut ion, whi ch became effe c t ive July 1 ,  had pledged the 
Pre s ident to a policy of non-discrimina t ion . The worthl e s sne s s  of the 
pledge wa s illustrated fa irly quickly , when a by -election wa s hel d  the 
next month . The then chairman o f  the United Party , a Mr . Solomon 
Adamtten, wi thdrew his candida ture for the legisla t ive sea t from Accra 
with the s tatement tha t 
1 .  The pol ice had withdrawn permi t s  for the UP to hold public  
mee tings or to use loud speake r vans . 
2 .  The cha irman of the Accra branch o f  the UP and three l ead -
ing members who were in charge o f  Adamtten ' s  campa ign 
27  
were currently under de tention . 
Wi thout publ ic mee t ing s and loud speaker vans in pa rt icula r ,  he could not 
pos s ibly have won the conte s t . 
25 Journal of the Parl iament s ,  XLI ( July, 1 960) , p .  23 9 .  
26 Ap ter ,  Gol d  Coas t  in Trans i tion, p .  2 7 5 . 
27 Kee s ing ' s ,  October 1 -8 ,  1 960 , p .  176 7 1 . 
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The gove rnment laid the founda t ion for hampering the oppos i t ion 
s til l more by the pa s sage o f  a censorship act  on Augus t 23 . I t  empowered 
the P re s ident to impose censorship and re s trict the importa t ion of publ i -
ca tions which might be contrary to the publ i c  intere s t .  O n  Septembe r  3 
he employed i t  by ordering tha t no i s sue o f  the opposition Ahanti Pioneer 
should be pub l ished withou t the p rior app roval o f  a censor ; this pe rson 
acted by preventing any is sues  at all from appea ring . 28 In introduc ing 
the b il l ,  one of Nkrumah ' s  minis te rs had sa id tha t the re wa s an element 
in Ghana pers i s tently bel ittling the government and that it  would no t be 
right for the gove rnment not to take action against it when it wa s appar-
ently engaging in a del ibera te campa ign against  order and the nat ional 
29 e conomy . 
The government al so announced a t  about the same t ime tha t from 
then on membership in a t rade union would be neces sary for ob taining a 
job . All hiring would have to be done through government - sponsored 
employment centers . 30 The potent ial threa t of thi s  measure to anyone 
p rovoking the displea su!e of the government is too obvious to dwell 
on . 
30Accra Da ily Graphic , Augu s t  26 , 196 0 ,  a s  reported in A frica 
Dige s t ,  VIII (Octobe r ,  1 960) , p .  7 5 .  
CHAPTER V 
THE PRACTICE OF POWER: THE AUSTERITY BUDGET 
AND ERSUING EVENTS 
Even wi th Article Fifty-five of the cons t i tu t ion in hand , Nkru­
mah cont inue d to seek and to secure official legisla t ive sanct ion for 
major legisla t ion . At the same t �e he pra.ulga ted mea sure s which
.
had 
the e ffec t  o f  making it ea sier for him to s top the growth of oppo s i tion 
to ht.sel f be fore it could become genuinely threatening . The legisla ­
ture d id not oppose h�. By the end of 1961 his pe rsonal cont rol wa s 
virtually complete and was ope�ly demons tra ted . But in 196 1 Ghana 
pa s sed through a ma j or c riJi s ,  and it could be argued tha t circums tance s 
were forcing Jkrumah into u s ing dicta torial practice s and we re persuad ­
ing legi sla tors not to oppose the ir adoption . The val idity of such an 
argument and the extent to which the active consol ida t ion of Nkruaah ' s 
powe r can be laid to the la t te r ' s pe rsonal aabit ion and the coercive 
inst rument s he pos se s sed already are the subjects of thi s  chap ter and 
the next . 
The Aus te rity Budge t and the S trike o f  1 96 1  
I n  the summer o f  1961 the government announced that it wa s running 
into financial difficul t ies . 1 For the fiscal year end ing June 30 , 1 96 1 ,  
a budg eta ry  surplus o f  �3 . 7  ail l ion had been expected , but pred ictions 
now we re tha t the budget would suffer a de fic it of bG6 mil l ion . The 
1Parl iamentary Deba te s ,  XXIV ( JUly 7 ,  196 1) , col . 1 18 . 
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7 2  
anticipa ted deficit wa s traced by the government t o  two caus es : a wage 
increa se which had been granted by it the p revious spring and a fall in 
2 the world price o f  cocoa . Ra ther than borrowing , the gove rnment p ro-
posed to make up the d i ffe rence by having Parl iament ena c t  the se mea sure s :  
1 .  Levying export , import , and exc ise taxe s .  
2 . Levying a purcha se tax on some durabl e  good s . 
3 .  Increa s ing vehicle and drivers l icense fee s . 
4 .  Widening the definition o f  taxable income and t ightening 
p rocedure s for col le c t ing income tax .  
5 .  
6 .  
Levying a new tax on urban p ropertie s .  
3 Ins t i tu t ing a compul sory savings s cheme . 
The new revenue mea sure s took bo th the Nat iona l  A s sembly and the 
public by surprise , and there wa s a particula r ou tcry aga ins t  the changes 
in the income tax and the compul sory savings s cheme . Up to tha t time a 
tax had been charged only on incomes over �G7 50 , and then collect ion 
wa s haphazard ; under the new leg isla t ion it would be col lected on all 
income over �G450 and col lec ted more e f ficiently .4 The compul sory 
savings s cheme would require the spend ing o f  f ive per cent o f  wages or 
salarie s and ten per cent o f  o the r types  o f  income on government bonds 
carrying an intere s t  ra te o f  two per cent per annum and repayable in 
ten years . 5 
3 Ib id . , col . 1 2 1 . 
4Frank Pilgrim a s  quo ted by Africa D ige s t ,  IX (Oc tobe r,  1961) , 
pp . 6 3 -64 .  
5"Budge t Sta tement" pre sented to Parl iament by Mr . F .  K.  D . Goka , 
Mini s te r  o f  Finance , on July 7 ,  1 96 1 . In Supp lement with Ghana Today, 
July 1 9 ,  1 96 1 ,  p .  16 . 
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This "aus terity budge t , "  which wa s duly adop ted by the legisla -
ture on July 1 1 ,  i s  o f  some �portance , for i t  wa s a ma jor cau se of a 
s tr ike which occurred the following Sep tembe r,  which in turn wa s a ma jor 
cause  of the institu t ion of mea sure s by the gove rnment somewha t more 
rep re s s ive than any which had been employed be fore . It is p o s s ible tha t 
the gove rnment would have enforced the mea sure s anyway , bu t the s trike 
with its  particula r background provided a convenient ra t ionale and a 
pa rtial excuse . According to the government ,  the aus terity budge t  trig-
gered the s trike , bu t subve rs ive group s a t temp ted to exacerba te it  and 
6 d irec t  i t  in such a way a s  to bring about the col lap se of the government . 
A gene ral s trike o f  all  the workers  o f  Ghana wa s declared on 
Sep tember 4 , but the only one s who s tayed away from the ir job s more 
than one or two days were the highly e s sential ra ilway and dock workers , 
the forme r numbering a round 1 , 000 and concentra ted in the Kumas i  area 
and the lat ter numbering 3 , 000 or 4 , 000 and concentra ted in the twin 
port towns of Sekond i-Takorad i . 7 About 5 , 000 mare were idled involun-
tarily . Ghana ian law made seve ral provis ions regarding s trike s whi ch 
the government sa id we re viola ted by those part ic ipa t ing . The se were 
rea sonabl e  enough by We s tern s tandard s :  they provided that  e s s ential 
services  should not be s t ruck ;  tha t  be fore a s trike peace ful a t temp t s  
6 " S ta tement by the Government on the Recent Consp ira cy , " op . c it . , 
p .  10 . Here ina fte r re fe rred to a s  "White Paper . "  
7London Time s ,  Sep tember 1 1 , 196 1 ,  p .  9 .  
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mus t  be made through es tabl ished channel s  to redre s s  grievance s ;  and tha t 
advance not ice of an impend ing s trike mu s t  be given . 8 
Nkrumah ' s  Reac t ion 
P re s ident Nkrumah at the t ime the s trike wa s declared was out of 
the country .  His a s s is tants in his absence declared , on Sep tember 1 0 ,  
a l imited s ta te o f  emergency and announced tha t the government would 
hold up to seventy - two hours any worker even suspec ted of a t temp t ing to 
9 hampe r  ant i - s trike activi t ie s . 
Nkrumah re turned on Sep tember 16 , immedia te�y canceled the s ta te 
o f  emergency , and ordered the relea se o f  all pe rsons held in connec tion 
with the s tr ike . At the same time he cal led for an end to i t  and fol lowed 
up this ine f fectual plea on Septembe r  20 with a b roadca s t  to the na t ion . 10 
In it  he blamed the s trike on the aus terity budge t but de fended the bud ­
get , a s serting that i t  wa s neces sa ry for a p rogre s s ive economy . 1 1  Two 
days la ter,  fol lowing a regular na tional hol iday , there wa s a general 
1 2  re sump t ion of work. 
The Pre s ident had clearly been shaken , however ,  and in quick suc ­
ce s s ion he took a number o f  s teps to consol idate his pos it ion . The same 
day that work was generally re sumed , Sep tember 2 2 ,  he no tified Ma j or ­
General H. T . Alexander,  a Brit ish sub j ec t ,  tha t he wa s be ing d ismi s sed 
Bwbi te Paper , P •  1 9 . 
lOWhi te Paper , p .  1 7 . 
1Zwhite Paper ,  loc . cit . 
9London Ttme s , loc . �· 
1 1A frica Dige s t , IX (December ,  1961) , pp . 95 -96 . 
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from his pos ition as  Chie f of the De fense S ta f f  o f  Ghana . A Ghanaian ,  
S . J. A . Otu ,  took over Alexander ' s  adminis t rative dutie s ,  and Nkrumah 
13 himsel f  kep t close pers onal control . 
On Sep tembe r 28 two cabine t ministers , K .  A. Gbedemah and Ko jo . 
Botsio ,  bo th of whom formerly had been among Nkrumah ' s  close s t  as soci­
ate s , and three other high-ranking officia l s  we re asked to re s ign . 14 
On Octobe r 1 the las t  Bri ton in any pos i t ion of powe r ,  At torney General 
1 5  Geo ffrey Bing , wa s replaced b y  a Ghanaian, G .  C . Mil l s  Odoi . 
While move s such as the se might have a roused the susp icion o f  
democrats , they would have caused l it tl e  alarm i f  the re had been a n  a s sur-
ance that the government rema ined ul t ima tely re sponsive to democratic 
control . On October 3 ,  however ,  Nkrumah began a serie s of s teps which 
would remove the ab il ity of the public to organize even pa s s ive re s is t -
ance t o  him.  Orders we re is sued unde r the Preventive De tention Ac t for 
the arre s t  of fifty pe rsons , includ ing Dr . Danquah , the oppos it ion leader 
who had run aga ins t Nkrumah in the election of 1 960 ; P . K . Qua idoo , the 
fo rme r minis ter who had made the · a s tonishing a t tack on the Pres ident the 
16 p revious  spring ;  and three othe r members of Parl iament . No formal 
charge s were brought agains t them and no opportunity wa s ever given them, 
during the ir de tention, for de fend ing themselve s publicly . 
13  
Ghana Today, VI (Oc tober 11 , 196 1) , p .  1 .  
14
London Time s ,  Sep tember 29 , 1 96 1 ,  p .  13 . 
1 5na ily Graphic (Accra) , October 2 ,  196 1 ,  p .  1 .  
16New York Time s ,  October 4 ,  196 1 ,  p .  1 .  
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In accordance wi th the p rovis ions of the Na t ional Assembly Dis ­
quali fica tion Act , the arre s ted MP ' s los t  the i r  sea t s . 17 A few membe rs 
of the Uni ted Party s t ill remained,  but Pa rl iament proceeded to enact 
by ove rwhelming ma j oritie s two bills po tent ially crippl ing to any future 
a t temp t at oppos it ion . One pas sed Octobe r 17 made it il legal re troactive ly 
to commit an act "with intent to insul t or bring the Pres ident of the 
Republ ic of .Ghana into ha tred , contemp t ,  or ridicule . . • "18 The othe r,  
pas sed Oc tober 30 ,  created a spec ial court to  deal with treason, sed i tion , 
riot ing , and unlawful as sembly . It would have three judge s ,  selected by 
the Pre s ident , and no more than a ma j ority would convi ct;  no minority 
op inion would be d isclo sed , no appeal would be allowed , and sentence s 
would range to death . 19  On Novembe r 3 the "disre spec t bill" wa s extended 
to persons l iving in exile . 20 
Ghana at this  time pos s e s sed four daily newspaper s . The oppos i-
t ion Ashant i Pioneer had already been subdued ,  and its editor wa s among 
those de ta ined on Octobe r 3 . 21 Examina tion of the independent Da ily 
Graphic ind ica ted tha t it wa s unwil l ing to publish a trace of criticism 
o f  wha t the gove rnment wa s doing . The paper ra re ly ca rried an editorial . 
When it  did ,  it  wa s about an inno cuous sub je c t . The middle of the next 
1 7� York Time s ,  October 1 5 ,  1 961 , p .  23 . 
18Bla ine Littell , " Big Bro the r in Ghana , " The Reporter , XXV 
(November 9 ,  1961) , p .  3 7 . 
19New York Time s , October 31 ,  196 1 ,  p .  3 .  
20New York Times ,  November 4 , 196 1 ,  p .  3 .  
21Kee s ing ' s ,  November 4 -11 , 1 961 , p .  18410 . 
22na ily Graphic,  July 9 ,  1962 . 
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yea r ,  on July 9 ,  the Da ily Graphic wa s sold to the government .
22  Foreign 
newsmen were accused of mis repres enting event s  in Ghana , and in Novembe r 
28 of 1961  a number of the se were expell ed . 
Around the firs t o f  December the s tudents o f  the univers ities  
were censured by a government spoke sman for thei r  "unbridled pompos i ty ,  
academic arrogance , impudence , • • •  ind i s c ipl ine , and di sre spec t  for 
Pre s ident Nkrumah . "24 The Educa t ion Minister sa id that d ra s tic mea sure s 
would be taken aga ins t  inst i tu t ions cul t ivat ing hos t il i ty ,  d isre spect , and 
indi f fe rence toward the ir elders ,  particularly toward the Pre s ident . 25 
The Minis te r  o f  Info rma t ion wa rned s tudent s tha t the government would 
"deal ruthl e s sly with • • • evidence o f  subver s ion and react ion" among 
them, and the government announced the impend ing d i smis sal o f  "rea c ­
t ionary lecturers"  who were "poisoning" the mind s o f  s tudent s . 26 
The Government ' s  Ju s t ifica t ion 
Brit ish newspape rs were in gene ral agreement tha t the plot  aga ins t  
the gove rnment subs equently described actual ly d id exis t  i n  some form, 
al though they we re uncerta in tha t al l the de tail s had been as al leged . 2 7  
The " S ta tement b y  the Government o n  the Re cent Consp iracy , " published 
December 1 1 ,  wa s the major jus t ificat ion for the se rie s of repre s s ive 
mea sure s taken; there fore i t  i s  wo rth c i t ing in some de ta il . 
22
naily Graphic , July 9 ,  196 2 .  
23New York Time s , November 29 , 1 96 1 ,  p .  2 .  
24Quo ted in Africa Dige s t ,  IX (February , 196 2) , p .  131 . 
25Ibid . 26New York Time s , De cember 3 ,  196 1 ,  p .  27 . 
27Africa Dige s t ,  loc . c it . , p .  13 0 .  
Accord ing to the S ta tement , the ob ject  of the plot 
wa s to crea te a s ta te of chaos and confus ion in the country 
so tha t firs t an appeal could be made for fore ign a id and 
tha t then the Army could be p ersuaded to enter pol i t ic s  on 
the p re text of re s toring order and p reserving na t ional inde­
pendence . The consp ira tors hoped by thi s  to overthrow the 
Cons t itution ,  s ilence Parl iament and remove all  tho se o f  
progres s ive ideal s from powe r,  eithe r by a s sa s s ina tion or 
arre s t ,  and , in the ca se o f  the Pre s ident,  if public opin­
ion would no t s tand for thi s ,  by relega t ing him to some 
high bu t meaningle s s  o ff ice . The price which the conspira ­
tors  we re p repared t o  pay wa s the partia l  dismemberment o f  
the country and the ced ing ,  to the Republ i c  of Togo , o f  the 
former Bri t i sh Trus t  te rritory o f  Togoland now incorporated 
a s  an integral part o f  Ghana as  a re sul t o f  a p leb iscite 
under United Na t ions ausp ice s . The Republ ic of Togo , and , 
to a les se r  extent , othe r ne ighbouring African territorie s 
were u sed a s  ba ses  by the consp irators . 28 
The S ta tement went on to po int out tha t a number of heads of 
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s ta te and cab ine t members in o the r newly - independent na t ions had been 
murdered . I t  argued that consp iracy tends  to breed counter -conspiracy , 
so tha t nothing bene fic ial  in the long run could be expec ted to come 
ou t of the pre sent plot . 
The Ghanaian government had had to contend with organized vio -
lence s ince 1954 ,  it  sa id , al though s ince 1 957 such violence had 
largely gone underground . Colonialism had bred a small "el i te" which 
was 
drawn from the p rofe s siona l  classes  and the agent s and senior 
employee s of the grea t merchant hou s e s  and educa ted to look 
at eve ry social  problem from an e s sent ially colonial s tand ­
point . They hoped on Independence to s tep into the shoes  of 
the forme r  colonial rulers but they had no intention o f  al ter ­
ing the social sy s tem which they hoped to inhe ri t . 29 
The pre sent plot wa s the re sul t of coopera tion between the el ite and 
other unprinc ipled sel f - seekers . 
2Bwbite Pape r ,  p .  1 .  29Ib id . , p .  3 .  
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Terrorism had been introduced by persons as socia ted with the 
Na tional Libe rat ion Movement (1954) , who p robably were encouraged by 
the fa ct tha t  the British had �posed on Ghana a federalist  cons titution 
(which they had sought)  even though such an arrangement had been re jected 
overwhelmingly at the pol l s . Persons who had figured prominently in the 
Togoland plot of 1 9 57 and the Awha itey incident of 1958 ,  includ ing the 
de ta ined oppos i t ion MP ' s , al so figured prominently in the present con-
spiracy . They worked in loosely cons t ructed groups with othe rs who had 
only re cently become dissatis fied , becau se o f  the aus terity mea sure s ,  
to c reate di sorder by seve ral different means . The ir favorite me thod wa s 
to re sort to the type of bomb ings  which had been used succe s s fully dur-
ing colonial day s . There wa s some evidence tha t K .  A .  Gbedemah, the 
former Finance Minister,  might be impl icated in the se activitie s :  
The ir princ ipal agent i n  this wa s Victor Yaw de Grant 
Brempong who at all material t imes had been Personal As s is ­
tant t o  K. A . Gbedemah , both when the la t ter  wa s Minis ter  
o f  Finance and later when he wa s Minis ter  of Hea l th .  A 
Mini s ter ' s  Pe rsonal As s is tant is an of ficial in the Publ ic 
Service paid by the State but chosen persona lly by the 
Mini s ter  whom he serves . He i s  the head of his priva te 
offi ce and can have acce s s  the re fore to all of his mo s t  
confidential papers . De Grant Bremp ong had thus the oppor­
tunity o f  see ing not only document s re la ting to the Minis ­
tries in which he served , bu t also ,  if his Minis te r  allowed 
it Cab ine t Papers c ircula ted to K. A. Gbedemah . When during 
the Pre s ident ' s  absence on his Ea s te rn tour K. A .  Gbedemah 
wa s a member o f  the Pre s iden tial Commis s ion, de Grant Brem­
pong had access  to all  confident ial mate rial which wa s 
submit ted to the P re s identia l  Commi s s ion . 30 
The connec t ion o f  Gbedemah with a plotte r  i s  important and wil l be t rea ted 
in the next chap te r .  Brempong ' s  chie f funct ion wa s to make contacts with 
the Army ,  making use  o f  the fac t  tha t he wa s an Ewe , a s  we re many o f  the 
Army personne l . 
30 
Ib id . ,  p .  10 . 
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Simul taneous ly with pol itical d i s turbance s the group s were plan-
ning also  industrial d i s turbances .  The man in charge of p rovoking them, 
I shma ila M. Annan, wa s not a union member or o fficial , but had been an 
executive of the Moslem As soc iation Party which ,  as the independent 
Sarkodee Addo Commis s ion had showed , "had been deeply involved in the 
organiza tion o f  violence throughout Ashant i  and , in part icular ,  the 
recruitment o f  non-Ghana ians to carry ou t a c t s  o f  terrorism and 
hool igani sm .  n3 l 
The s trike wa s firs t declared by bo th the consp ira tors and genu -
ine union leaders , but by Sep tember 12 o r  s o ,  the UP was in comp l e te 
control . "The Nat ional officers of the Ra ilway Union in Sekond i� 
Takorad i ,  becau se o f  the ir earl ier a s socia t ion with the Uni ted Party , 
were unable to give any dec i s ive l eadership and they soon lost  any con­
trol which they had had ove r events . "3 2 J. E .  App iah of the UP proceeded 
to send in the name o f  variou s Ghana ian trade unions a serie s  o f  tel e -
grams t o  fore ign unions , asking for a id and reque s ting t ha t  repl ie s b e  
sent t o  a po s t -o f fice box numbe r  which the o ffic ial regis te r  showed to 
be in the name of I . M. Annan . A copy of one of the telegrams wa s 
rep roduced in the appendix, a s  wa s the port ion o f  the register showing 
the name o f  Annan conne c ted with his box number . The o fficia l s  of the 
trade unions in whose name s the telegrams we re sent d id not repudia te 
them, howeve r . 33 
3 1  Paraphrased ibid . , p .  1 1 . The "Sarkodee Addo Report" was pub -
l ished in September ,  1958 ,  and is  printed in the Da ily Graphic,  Sep tem­
ber 4 , 1 9 58 , p .  5 .  
3 2rb id . , p .  14 . 33 Ibid . , pp . 1 5 -16 . 
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Pre s ident Nkrumah ' s  conc il ia tory ge s ture toward the s trike rs ha s 
already been ment ioned . Accord ing to the S ta tement , one of the union 
leade rs , W. N. Grant , on Sep tembe r  18 pe rsuaded the worke rs not to re -
spond ; he reported this act ion to Dr . J. B . Danquah and other  UP leaders 
and re ce ived the ir approbation . 
There wa s a series o f  acts  of sabo tage . They can be traced to 
inflamma tory speeche s ,  which not only urged such acts bu t al so con-
tained s tatements which were openly sed itious . W . N.  Grant s tated that  
the worke rs would close down Parl iame nt by force if necessary ,  and an-
other  union o fficial said tha t "The s t ruggle in which we are engaged 
is no t a s tra ight forward one . It  i s  mixed up with rough-hou se ta ctics , 
but i f  in /the7 future we win, we shall become the ma s ters of the coun-
t ry . "  It seems noteworthy to this writer tha t the only persons the 
gove rnment could find to quote as having made sed itious s ta tements 
were genu ine union official s and not UP leade rs . 34 
Dr . K .  A .  Bus ia ,  the forme r leader o f  the oppos i t ion who had 
fl ed the country ju s t  be fore the publ icat ion of the Granville Sharp 
repor t  in 1959 , me t in Lome , Togo , on Octobe r 14 with several consp ira-
tors who had not been de ta ined . Mr . Sylvanus Olymp io , the Pres ident 
of Togo , wa s pres ent also . Bus ia disclosed tha t he had been offe red 
the sum of �50 , 000 s terling for fight ing the Nkrumah gove rnment ( the 
source is not mentioned) , and he offe red pa rt of it  for use by the 
35 Togo gove rnment in organiz ing anti -Nkrumah personne l . 
34Grant , ib id . , pp . 11 -1 2 ; J. R. Ba iden,  ib id . , p .  22 . 
3 5  Ibid . , p .  23 . 
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Serious at tempt s  we re made to carry ou t a program of dynamiting , 
but they were foiled due to the d if ficul ty of ob taining explosive s the 
origin o f  which could not be traced . The n Brempong attempted to app roa ch 
mil itary pe rsonne l ,  offering them payment of bl , OOO for the succe s s ful 
comple t ion of any of va rious dynami t ings . Some of the pe rsons app roached 
informed the gove rnment , which arranged fo r an agent to pose as a s tore 
man in an Army explosive s s tore . Brempong approached him and actually 
wro te him a che ck , which wa s produced in facsimile as part of the 
S ta tement . 36 
The gove rnment empha s ized in its  S tatement the threa t of ou ts ide 
interfe rence , a s se r t ing tha t "neo- colonialis t s" could not tolerate the 
succe s s  of  Ghana , par ticularly i f  promo ted by tax mea sure s unfavorab le 
to them, for if Ghana wa s succe s s ful it would encourage revolut ions 
e l sewhe re and pu t an end to p ro fi table bus ine s s e s . 3 7  
Finally ,  the Whi te Pape r  endeavored t o  de fend the use of the 
Preventive De tent ion Act as opposed to control o f  subve rs ive activities 
by a sys tem ba sed on the court s .  I t  did so by arguing tha t de tention 
wa s pra c ticed for the deta inee s ' own good , in tha t the executive b ranch 
wa s more flexible  and lenient than the judicial • .  The . judicial branch. 
it imp l ied , would have a powe r ful tendency to impose the har she s t  penal­
tie s ,  even the dea th sentence , even when this wa s no t neces sa ry :  
de ta inees might be re cla imed ,  and mos t  p robably could be . Nor would 
such penal t ie s  be ju s t ,  fo r tho se who we re apprehended by the legal 
au thoritie s  were me rely tool s in the hands o f  leade rs about whom enough 
38 evidence for convic t ion could neve r be ga the red . 
36 Ib id . , p .  2 5 . 3 7  Ibid . , p .  26 . 38 Ib id . , pp . 34 -3 5 . 
The Va l idity of the Gove rnment ' s  Explanat ion 
The government did not de fend any of its  spe cific actions in 
terms of the a c t ivities of  the consp irators . It  intended tha t the 
Whi te Pape r  should serve a s  a gene ral exp lana t ion of all the steps 
which the government had obviously taken to p ro tect i tse l f: 
This Whi te Paper  is  publ i shed for the people o f  Ghana to 
know the rea sons which led the Gove rnment to take the action 
which it has taken in conne ction with the recent consp iracy 
a imed at  a coup d ' etat  and the actions it wi ll take in the 
future to sa feguard the security of the Sta te . It is al so 
hoped tha t it wil l prove of value to all emergent countries 
as  illustra t ing the type of inte rnal subve rsion aga ins t which 
any p rogre s s ive government ba sed on ma s s  support should gua rd 
against / s i£7. 3 9 
83 
The government ' s account of the activitie s  of the s t rike rs and 
the conspira tors appea rs to have been rea sonably accura te . Appa rently 
attemp t s  we re be ing made to ove rthrow the gove rnment by violent means ,  
and i t  wa s emp loying rep re s s ive mea sures at  lea s t  in pa rt for the pur -
pose of  protecting i tsel f .  But the promulga tion of  the rep re ss ive 
mea sures appear s  to have had ano the r purpose al s o ,  which wa s not admi tted 
by the gove rnment . Thi s  purpose wa s the suppre s s ion of all oppo sit ion 
to Nkrumah, and it wa s to be achieved in pa rt by ins t rument s set up 
o stens ibly in response to the exigent circums tance s surrounding the 
s trike . Thus the consp iratoria l  activit ies depicted in the White Pap er 
served a s  a convenient ra t ionale for actions which could be used to 
control not only them bu t also activitie s origina t ing within Nkrumah ' s  
own pa rty and among his own forme r  supporter s . 
3 9Ibid . ,  p .  1 .  
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The Use of the P reventive De tent ion Act 
The government ' s  de fense of the u se of the Prevent ive De tent ion 
Ac t is somewha t d i fficult  to accep t in view of i t s  abil ity ,  if i t  
wi shed t o  a c t  in this manne r, t o  ins truct court s ,  by law i f  neces sary ,  
t o  follow the re commenda tions o f  the prosecut ion when fixing se ntence s 
o f  convic ted subvers ive s .  If  such a procedure had been fol lowed , the 
gove rnment could have a ttenua ted pena l ties  at  the same t ime tha t it 
a s sured its  cit izens o f  the right to be hea rd and to de fend themselve s 
aga ins t poss ibly fal se accu sa t ions . This the government wa s unwill ing 
to do . 
It s  se cond ra t ionale for the PDA , having to do with jus t ice , 
p robably came closer to be ing genuine . The gove rnment knew app roxi ­
mately who its  enemie s we re and probably really wa s unable to p rove 
sat i s factorily , for legal purpose s ,  tha t oppos it ion leaders were ins t i ­
ga t ing violence . It wa s iroportant,  however ,  that they no t b e  untou ched 
by the law s imply be cau se they we re encouraging illegal activitie s 
ra the r than taking pa rt in them d irec tly; for many of the persons 
who carried out the ac t ivit ie s  they inc ited were l ikely to be il l i ter­
ates or poo rly educated people who could not  be expec ted to unders tand 
the i s sues they were involving themselve s with . 
Nkrumah and his a s sociate s were a t temp t ing to dr ive Ghana ians 
toward a goal which requ ired a certain amount o f  sacrifice for the 
p re sent but which they expec ted would be bene ficial for all concerned 
in the fu ture . Those  behind the viol ence we re the pa rochial s .  S ince 
the gove rnment wa s not will ing genuinely to compromise  with them, from 
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its  own point o f  view for jus t i fiable rea sons , and s ince the parochial s 
continued to be determined in the ir oppos it ion, it  wa s almos t na tural 
tha t they should turn to subvers ion . Evidence that some of them actu -
ally engaged i n  i t  wa s c ircums tant ial , bu t a s trong suspicion d id not 
have to be re inforced very much by other indirect evidence , such as 
a s sociat ion wi th proved subve rsive s and sed itious or threatening sta te-
ments in public mee t ing s ,  for the conclus ion of guil t to be arr ived a t . 
The procedure s fol lowed we re no t particularly democra t ic , and Nkrumah 
admit ted it , bu t in exigent circums tance s they we re nece s sary . I f  
s ome innocent persons we re deta ined by mi stake , it wa s better than 
hav ing the gove rnment ove rthrown . 
There ha s been no evidence tha t  the detainee s  of 196 1  we re 
treated harshly , and in the spring and summer of 196 2 a great many 
we re relea sed . Among the se we re Quaidoo , Danquah, J. S .  App iah, and 
Victor Owusu , who had been one of the more out s tand ing spoke smen for 
the UP in Parl iament . 40 The comb ined l i s t s  of those re lea sed con-
ta ined ove r three hundred names , but whe the r this included all who 
41 
had been de ta ined not even party MP ' s  were able to learn .  No 
offic ia l  explanation accompanied the gove rnment ' s action . 
Nkrumah had a law on the bas is of which he wa s able to order 
the de tent ions himsel f .  He probably used it aga ins t persons whom he 
had some ba sis for be l ieving condoned or supported the overthrow of 
his gove rnment by violence . Thu s he wa s protecting both his personal 
40Ghana ian Times (Accra) , June 7 ,  196 2 ,  p .  1 ,  and June 21 , p �  1 .  
4 lparl iamentary Deba te s ,  XXVII ( June 6 ,  196 2) , col s .  56 5-566 . 
position and the established, nominally legitimate, government. The 
actions which he took against the newspapers and universities can be 
seen in somewhat the same light. Both selfish and benevolent motives 
could have been operating . 
The National Assembly and the Disrespect and Special Courts Bills 
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A CPP majority in Parliament, however, enacted two new laws, the 
disrespect and the special courts acts, which gave even more power to 
Nkrumah . such laws might in the future have been used against them . A 
difficult problem therefore arises in inquiring into the motives of the 
MP ' s  who supported them. 
It will be remembered that the disrespect bill made it illegal to 
say any thing with intent to "bring the President of the Republic of Ghana 
into hatred, contempt, or ridicule • • . •  " The bill gave Nkrumah a potent 
tool if he wished to use it for controlling statements against him without 
the necessity of resorting to detention . The special courts bill was · 
designed ostensibly to deal with the same sort of offense that the Pre ­
ventive Detention Act presumably was, but would permit the government 
to maintain an air of legitimacy and to demonstrate its case in public 
while being certain of the outcome. Although up to the present time ( July , 
1963)  there has been no indication that the disrespect law has been used 
at all or that the courts law has been used to determine the outcome of 
a case, both could easily be misused and could be employ ed as further 
aids in protecting Nkrumah ' s extraordinary power . 
87 
The disrespect bill . If one had been seeking to demons trate on 
the basis of evidence brought forth by proponents of the disrespect bill 
that it was needed for the benefit of Ghana, one would have been frus ­
trated . No such nece s sity was cited . The minis ter introducing the bill 
said it was needed for the following three rea sons: 
Firstly , it would be a continuation of an act under the British 
forbidding a show of disrespect to the Queen . Secondly , it would be in 
line with a section of the constitution (Article Eight) proclaiming that 
the President was the "fount of honor." Thirdly , since there was 11posi­
tive11 evidence that Nkrumah 1 s people every where loved him and regarded 
him as the Hfons � origo11 of Ghana, it would only s tand to rea son that 
any act nby any unscrupulous person to bring his honor and dignity into 
contempt and ridicule should be made an offence . 1142 
The entire debate was marked by the absence of genuinely cogent 
reasoning . The provisions of the act were no t related by its defenders 
to the needs of Ghana as a na tion. No effective reply was made to the 
opposition 1 s contention that the bill could be used to s tultify even 
well-intentioned and constructive criticism . 
United Party leaders, with K. A .  Gbedemah now added to their 
ranks, did not at tempt to defeat the bill completely . They did, however, 
try to secure the adoption of an amendment which would permit criticism 
of the President as head of government even while protecting him as head 
of s ta te . A CPP representative replied that the two aspects  were not 
differentiable either actually or cons titutionally , and that the opposi­
tion was simply try ing to make it permis sible to bring the President 
42 Parliamentary Debates, XXV (October 13, 1961) ,  cols. 22 -23 . 
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into contemp t .  He also made it clear  tha t de tracting s ta tements we re no 
more permis sible ins ide Parl iament than anywhe re else . 43 With no further  
a rgument , the amendment wa s voted down . 
The dominant imp re s sion one re ce ive s from read ing an account of 
the debate is that no genuine e ffort wa s made to secure the bill ' s  enac t -
ment on the ba sis  o f  its  bene fit t o  Ghana a s  a na t ion . It is impo s s ible 
to explain the vo ting in terms of a ne ce s s i ty which members recognized 
and demons t ra ted in Parl iament :  the deba te seemed a rt ific ial and the 
pa rticipant s uninte re s ted in evalua ting the merits  of the positions they 
were taking . Influence s other than the ir convic t ions conce rning the 
worth o f  the b ill apparently we re at  work on the members . 
The se influences  were es sent ially coercive , in the sense tha t 
they stemmed not from considerat ions of wha t the consequence of pa s sage 
would be on the legi sla tors ' cons t i tuent s ,  bu t wha t they would be on the 
legisla to rs themselve s .  In this sense legis lators ' votes  in a grea t 
many situa t ions in na t ions eve rywhe re are coe rced . But the evidence 
ava ilable sugge sts  tha t in Ghana the coe rcion had an e s sent ial character-
i s tic about it  no t found in all parl iamentary nat ions : it  was a re fle c -
t ion no t o f  the vote rs ' e s t imat ions o f  the ir own intere s t s ,  but o f  
Nkrumah ' s  e s t ima t ion o f  the ir intere s t s  and o f  his own . The variables 
which determined the vot ing o f  leg islators in Parl iament we re not op in-
ions articula ted by cons t ituents , but opinions articula ted · by Nk rumah 
o r  the ministers repre senting him . In the event of a di ffe rence of ou t -
look be tween a n  MP ' s  cons t i tuents and Nkrumah ,  i t  wa s the la t te r ' s  
43 Loc .  c it . , col . 30 and Journal of the Pa rl iaments ,  LIII (April , 
196 2) , pp:-16 9 -1 70 � 
viewpoint which members of Parliament reacted to. That the nature of 
Nkrumah ' s  influence even within his own party by the fall of 1961 was 
essentially coercive in this sense is the theme developed in the next 
chapter . 
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The special courts bill. The most questionable aspect of the spe ­
cial courts bill was that it provided for the selection by the President 
of both the judge and the jury for specific , individual cases arising 
from crimes which might have been committed essentially against him. 
Some CPP members argued, apparently with conviction, that extraordinary 
measures were necess�ry to meet extraordinary conditions and that even 
if the rights of a minority might be jeopardized the bill was in the 
interest of  the ma jority . One such person remarked that the interests 
of the many as well as the few had to be protected.44 But the crucial 
question of why the selection of the special courts should be left 
entirely to the President was not answered during the debate on�the 
proposal . 
In the debate there were signs of genuine conviction on the part 
of some of the participants that special measures were necessary , but 
there was no expressed rationale for the particular special measures 
which were adopted. The same kind of influence which was discussed in 
connection with the disrespect bill appears to have been operating in 
regard to this one also. A further discussion of its speci fic character 
is contained in the final chapter. 
4�oc . cit., cols. 107 -114. 
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Two Othe r We ll -Known Legis la t ive Enactments 
In the fa ll of 196 2 the Na t ional Assembly expre s sed its app rova l 
of the extens ion o f  Nkrumah 1 s  p re s ident ial term to l ife and of the crea ­
t ion of a one -party sy s tem . Unfo rtuna tely , the p re sent wr ite r wa s unable 
to obta in primary ma terial on eithe r action . It is inte re st ing to note , 
howeve r,  and not wide ly known , tha t Nkrumah decl ined the offer of the 
l i fe p re s idency . He cla imed tha t he would cont inue to seek re elect ion 
at the poll s . 45 At the time the mot ion seeking to e s tablish a one -pa rty 
sy s tem wa s vo ted , there wa s some que s t ion about whe the r such an enactment 
would be cons titut iona1 .
46 This wr iter has neve r been ab le to learn 
tha t Ghana ha s been formally procla imed a one -pa rty s tate . At the time 
o f  the legisla t ion, it wa s not so proclaimed . 47 
45Ghana Today, VI (October 1 0 ,  196 2 ) , p .  1 .  
46London Time s ,  Sep tember 13 , 196 2 ,  p .  6 .  
47 Ibid . 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CHARACTER OF NKRUMAH I s  RIJLE 
Almo st immediately following the e s tabl ishment of the republ i-
can const itut ion in July , the gove rnment had banned the use of the 
te rms "Gove rnment Side" and 1 10ppos it ion Side" in Pa rl iament . A corre -
spondent for We s t  Africa , interpre ting th is as ano the r s tage in the 
advancement towa rd a one -par ty sys tem, de fended tha t sys tem with the 
argument tha t in Ghana democracy exis ted wi thin the Conve ntion Peop le ' s  
Party ra ther tha n be tween it and the United Pa rty . He contended tha t 
the CPP back benchers had long given the government mo re trouble than 
did the oppo s i tion and tha t ' ' ' The Qove rnment Pa rty has always indulged 
in l ively interna l deba te on almost  all important ma t ters . 
The events of the following yea r ca st  some doub t on the ve racity 
of the journal ist ' s  report,  or e l se they ind icated tha t cond itions 
wi thin the CPP had undergone a change . He wa s correct  in no t ing tha t 
the gove rnment pa rty wa s increa s ingly intolerant of genuine chall enges 
to its  prog rams from the oppo s ition . During the course of 1961 i t  be -
came apparent tha t Nkrumah wa s no t wil l ing to tol erate any genuine 
oppo s ition from wi thin hi s own party e ither . No t only wa s he unwill -
ing to permi t  fo rmal ins trument s to exist  which might place any stric -
ture on his freedom of action ; even on an in formal ba sis  his close 
as sociates found it  impo s s ible to in fluence his pol icy -making signi fi -
cantly . Nkrumah wa s so inflexible and so ins i s tent on the superiority 
lwe s t  Africa , July 9, 1960, as quoted in Africa Dig� st , VIII 
(Augus t ,  1960) , p .  3 5 .  
91 
9 2  
o f  h i s  own point o f  view tha t during the course o f  196 1  and 1 9 6 2  even 
long - t ime as sociates who had in the pa s t  been in close -enough agreement 
with him to attain the rank of cabine t minis te r  tu rned aga ins t him . 
The First  Signs o f  Intra -Party Oppos ition 
On March 2 ,  Nkrumah announced tha t his party ' s  central commit tee 
had "decided" to give him 1 1execut ive d irec t ion" of the party by making 
him its  general secretary and cha irman o f  the Central Commi t tee . 2 No 
rea sons we re given a t  the t ime in the party newspaper which made the 
announcement , but on May 1 ,  when the change formally became e ffec tive , 
Nkrumah sa id tha t he had taken ove r the pos ts  to 1 1  1 put the house in 
orde r ' "  and to clear up irregularitie s .  I t  was a t  a la ter t ime pointed 
out publ icly tha t Nkrumah himse l f  wa s re spons ible for the changes . The 
a s se rt ion wa s made by an opposi tion membe r o f  Pa rl iame nt (a l though the 
te rm "Opposition Side" had been banned , party labe l s  had not been) , bu t 
i t  wa s not conte s ted by CPP membe rs pre sent . 3 
The CPP had been e s tablished by Nkrumah , and he wa s its  l i fe 
4 chairman and leade r. As such , he himse l f  selec ted all members o f  the 
Central Committee . 5 The la tte r ,  in turn , wa s the "d irec torate" o f  the 
Na t ional Exe cutive Commi ttee and supervisor o f  the administra t ive 
6 machine ry at  all level s .  The value o f  oc cupying the role o f  Central 
2Accra Evening News , Ma rch 4, 196 1 ,  p .  12 . 
3 Parl iamen ta ry Deba te s ,  XXV (Octobe r 13 , 196 1) , col . 28 . 
4 
Ap te r ,  Gold Coa s t  in Trans ition, p .  208 . 
5
cpp cons t i tu tion, "Central Commi ttee o f  the Na tional Execut ive . "  
6 
CPP const itut ion , loc . cit . 
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Conuni t tee cha irman,  s ince as "Pa rty Leader" he al ready held ul tima te 
powe r,  wa s tha t it  made his func tioning more e ffic ient . The a s sump t ion 
of the gene ral secre ta ryship , the key adminis t ra tive pos t ,  wa s advan-
tageou s fo r the same rea son .  Occupancy o f  bo th office s put Nkrumah into 
a po s i tion to do more e ffic iently wha tever he chose to do in the party - -
whe the r i t  wa s to cut down on corrup tion, a s  al leged , o r  to enforce 
party disc ipline . 
Wha t a London Time s corre spondent termed "murmurs" aga ins t  some 
o f  Nkrumah ' s  pol ic ie s we re heard from among his own ranks while he wa s 
out o f  the country in March . 7 The Pre s ident ' s  re sponse wa s a re shuffl ing 
o f  his cabine t ,  an announcement tha t  he wa s tightening up measure s to 
control corrup t ion in the government , and an assertion tha t MP ' s  should 
remember tha t they owed the ir po s i t ions to the party . 8 
The la t ter a s sertion provoked a publ ic reply from one of his own 
mini s ters , P .  K. K. Qua idoo , the Minis ter of Soc ial Welare . In a 
speech in Parl iament , Qua idoo told the membe rs tha t i t  wa s the party 
which depended on them, not they on the pa rty . This wa s pa rticularly 
true in the ca se  of those who had bu il t it  up in its earl ier years , 
he sa id , bu t i t  wa s true al so for tho se who rep re sented i t  a t  pre sent . 
Then he went further and a t tacked,  by analogy , the no tion tha t no one 
should que s t ion the pronouncements of the Party Leader or tha t the 
7
London Time s ,  June 13 , 196 1 ,  p .  13 . 
8 "nawn Broadca s t , " April 8 ,  196 1 . Printed in Daily Graphic 
(Accra) , April 10 , 1961 , p .  1 .  
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Party Leader somehow knew more about wha t wa s bene ficial fo r Ghana than 
d id other people . A fre sh cab ine t shuffle announced a week later le ft 
Quaidoo ou t . 9 
The a t tacks on Nkrumah , his a s sump t ion of the CPP pos t s , and the 
frequent cab ine t shifts  were s trong indica t ions tha t he _ wa s experienc ing 
increa s ing d i fficul ty in mainta ining his pol itical pos i t ion . One of 
these change s ·, a trans fe r o f  port fol io , which wa s par t icularly no te ­
worthy wa s tha t o f  K. A .  Gbedemah from Finance to Hea l th in March, 196 1 .  
The Ca se o f  Gbedemah 
Rival ry 
The pre sent examination wil l  center on Gbedemah , for he wa s gener­
ally regarded a s  Nkrumah ' s mo s t  po tent riva1 . 10 His ba s ic phil osophy 
wa s close enough, up to 196 1 ,  to that o f  Nkrumah that the lat te r  wa s 
will ing to ent ru s t  him with the Finance port fol io . He al so had been 
a leading member of the CPP s ince its found ing in 1949 and wa s o ften 
11 regarded as se cond in command . 
The re is good rea son to suppose that  Nkrumah regarded Gbedemah 
as his �os t  dangerou s rival . The latter had a following from both the 
l e ft and the right , and he wa s considered amb i t ious . He had had an 
opportunity for build ing up a personal fol lowing among some of the 
rad ical elements of the party while Nkrumah wa s in ja il in 1 9 50 and 
9London Time s , loc . cit . 
lOLondon Time s , June 13 , 196 1 ,  p .  13 . 
llnavid Ap te r ,  Gold Coa s t  in Trans ition, p .  206 . 
9 5  
1951� 2 But in his conduc t of the Mini s try o f  Finance ,  the por t fol io for 
which he held from 1954 to the spring of 1 96 1 , he repre sented a conse rv­
ative viewpoint and wa s generally popular with conse rvat ive s . 13 In 
add ition to thi s ,  he wa s from the Ewe tribe , which had been spl i t  by the 
demarca tion of the boundary be tween Ghana and Togo and many membe rs o f  
which we re mil i tant in the ir de s ire to ef fe c t  a reunion a t  the expense 
14 of Ghana . Gbedemah the re fore po s ses sed appeal for a numbe r  of impor t -
ant group s in the socie ty and wa s in a good position t o  ga in the loyalty 
of key element s in the event tha t he eithe r de c ided or wa s persuaded to 
at temp t to depose Nkrumah . 
According to commenta to rs , Gbedemah wa s becoming more and more 
popular while Nkrumah wa s be coming increa s ingly unpopula r . 1 5  In a 
democracy Gbedemah could have ant ic ipa ted a high p robabil ity o f  a s sum-
ing the pre s idency . The mo s t  obviou s  means of preventing this open to 
Nkrumah wa s to shift his pol icy , the reby s teal ing the ba sis  of Gbede -
mah ' s appeal , bu t Nkru�h wa s unwil l ing to do this and cho se the course 
of demo t ing Gbedemah and finally ous t ing him a l togethe r .  Nkrumah wa s 
no t wil l ing to permi t  the CPP to se rve as  an e ffec t ive o rgan for the 
gu idance of public pol icy even wi thin l imi t s  which excluded challenge s 
to gove rnment pol icy rega rd ing pa rochial ism .  He could have done s o  
eithe r by mod ifying h i s  own pol icie s  i n  re sp onse t o  expre s s ions o f  
12 Ibid . and Munge r,  �· cit . , pp . 1 9 -23 . 
13London Time s ,  June 13 ,  196 1 ,  p .  13 . 
15London Time s ,  September 29 , 1 96 1 ,  p .  13 . 
1& Sup ra , p .  3 8 .  
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public demand as articulated in the CPP or else by relinquishing hegemony 
to someone more representative of a majority concensus . He did neither. 
Downfall 
The first intimation to the public that something was wrong be-
tween Gbedemah and Nkrumah came in the spring of 1961, when Gbedemah lost 
control of the budget.16 Then a few days afteE::the "sacking" of Quaidoo 
as a result of his criticism in Parliament of Nkrumah's position, Gbedemah 
"asked for" and received transfer of his portfolio from the highly import -
ant and influential Ministry of Finance to that of Health--for a man of 
Gbedemah ' s  experience and capabilities little more than a clerk's job, 
although as a matter of fact Health and Labour had been the ministry 
which Gbedemah had headed between 1951 and 1954, when Finance was retained 
by the British colonial government. The shift was not explained ; in a 
letter to the London Times, Gbedemah said that he had issued no state -
ment about the change to the press because he did not consider it to be 
the concern of anybody else.17 
In the meantime, the Times correspondent, John White , had been 
in the country and had written two long articles on the state of affairs 
in Ghana.18 Two of the points he made were that Nkrumah seemed to be 
leaning away from the conservative viewpoint, represented most promi-
nently within the party by Gbedemah, and that there was a growing number 
16 London Times, June 13, 1961, p. 13. 
17June 22 , 1961 . Quoted in Africa Digest, IX (August, 1961), p. 32. 
l�ondon Times, June 13, 1961, p. 13, and June 14, p. 13. The 
journalist is identified in the White Paper, �· cit., p. 28 . 
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o f  pe rsons who des ired a counter-balance to Nkrumah cente red around 
Gbedemah and the Army . According to White , thi s wa s so largely because 
many o f  the Army personne l , l ike Gbedemah , we re Ewe s . Gbedemah in reply 
to the art icle s d id not actual ly deny any growing dis content on his own 
part which migh t have encouraged a coalesc ing o f  oppo sition around him, 
but a s serted that he wa s "absolutely unaware of any discontent in the 
Army 
• • 
• 
" and tha t he had "no t  the fa inte s t  idea" o f  where White 
19 
might have go t ten any informa tion o f  any sort o f  impend ing Army revol t .  
Indee d ,  White never d id reveal the source o f  his information, but tha t 
he sugge s ted tha t some we re put ting their hope s in Gbedemah to move 
agains t Nkrumah ind icates tha t Nkrumah himself  might we ll have fe lt 
somewha t unea sy about Gbedemah ' s  presence in his cabinet . 
As reported in the previous chap ter ,  in Sep tembe r Gbedemah wa s 
dismi s sed from the cabine t al toge ther . At  the same t ime , five othe r 
membe rs o f  the gove rnment , includ ing Koj o  Bot s io ,  ano ther long - term 
a s sociate of Nkrumah, were fired . The official announcement and expla -
na t ion wa s made by Nkrumah himsel f in a " Sunset Broadcas t" on Sep tem-
20 her 28 . No spe ci fic allega tions we re made agains t e ithe r Gbedemah 
or Bot s io ,  bu t Nkrumah sa id tha t the re s ignat ions of all  six had been 
reque s ted because of e i ther of two spe c ific transgres s ions of the 
aus terity p rinc ip les  enunciated in the "Dawn Broadcas t" o f  the previ -
ous spring :  all ei ther had pers is ted in holding proper ty in exce s s  
1 9Africa D ige s t ,  loc . c i t . 
20"Sunse t Broadca s t , " quoted in Accra Evening News , Sep tember 29 , 
1 96 1 , p .  2 .  
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of the value fixed by Nkrumah for gove rnment officia l s  or we re involved 
in priva te bus ine s se s  or occupat ions deemed incompatible wi th the soc ia l -
21 i s t  ideal s  of Ghana . 
Gbedemah, howeve r ,  denied that e i the r of the s e  wa s the real rea -
son for his own dismissal , as se rt ing that he had not been a sked to hand 
over any o f  his prope rty and tha t ,  al though he wa s unwill ing to s ta te 
them publ icly , bo th he and Nkrumah knew that the rea sons we re o ther than 
tho se a s s igned . 2 2  He did pos s e s s  a poul try farm which had been the 
ob jec t o f  some critic ism but he had . o ffe red to sel l it  to the gove rnment 
at any price which would enable him to l iquida te his out s tand ing deb t ,  
and this had not been· a sked of him . 23 
The Que s t ion of Subve rs ion 
Bo th the se s ta tements were made in an interview shortly after the 
dismi s sal . Accord ing ·to the Graphic a ccount ,  "He sa id in the pa s t  thir-
teen years  not once had the Pre s ident impugned his integrity nor his 
abil i ty as a l ieutenant and a �reliable comrade o f  yours in the party 
and in the government . • n24 But this s tatement contradic t s  anothe r 
s tatement in the interview, for his rel iab il i ty had been que s t ioned . He 
told reporters that Nkrumah had actual ly put to him the ma t ter o f  whe ther 
21Ibid . 
2�e t ter to Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in part in Da ily Graphic , 
Sep tember 30 , 196 1 ,  p .  3 .  
23 To reporters , as  given in Da ily Graphic , loc . cit . 
2�be • . c it . 
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he wa s at temp ting to overthrow the government ; he had denied it  a t  the 
time , and s till denied i t .
2 5  
His sub sequent behavior in Parl iament showed 
that  while it may have been true tha t he wa s not a t temp t ing to depo se 
Nkrumah by consp iratorial means ,  he had lost  his enthusia sm for Nkrumah 
and his technique s to the extent that he wa s no longe r wil l ing to support 
authoritarian measure s des igned to protect  Nkrumah . He later became an 
out spoken critic of the di sre spect  bil l which would have made it illega l 
to critic ize the Pre s ident .
26 
The gove rnment ' s  White Paper had l inked him with the al leged con­
sp iracy o f  that fall but had avo ided ·accu s ing him directly o f  having 
had a del ibe ra te part in it . 27  Even though the Paper had done no thing 
more than emphas ize that Brempong wa s Gbedemah ' s  personal a s s i s tant and 
had acce s s  to secre t document s through his of fice , it is clear that the 
latter fel t  impl ica ted and be l ieved tha t his loya l ty had at lea s t  been 
que s t ioned in connec t ion with the alleged consp iracy . In a letter  
da ted December 21 to Geo ffrey Bing , at  tha t t ime Nkrumah ' s  l egal a s s is ­
tant , Gbedemah s tated tha t the a t temp t s  to a s sociate him with Brempong 
were dishone s t ,  ludicrou s ,  and child ish . He claimed tha t Brempong while 
in his employ wa s on proba t ion and tha t he neve r had had acce s s  to any 
confident ial document s . The accusation, conta ined in the Sta tement ,  
tha t he had had acce s s  t o  Pre s ident ial Commi s s ion documents wa s e spe -
c ially disgu s t ing , he sa id , for the se we re handed to members  of the 
2 5Ib id . 
26 Journal of the Parl iament s ,  LIII (April , 1962) , p .  170 . 
2 7  Supra , p .  79 . 
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commi s s ion by pre s ident ial secre ta rie s , dealt  with on the spo t ,  and col -
lec ted immedia tely . Bing wa s reported by We s t  Africa a s  having 
commented tha t Gbedemah ' s  let ter wa s di shone s t ,  bu t there wa s no elabor­
a t ion . 28 
The party ' s  Evening News al so ma inta ined tha t the let ter wa s 
dishone s t  and proceeded to p rint what wa s purported to be a fu rther 
expose of Gbedemah ' s  connect ion with Brempong . It s ta ted tha t Gbedemah 
had " instal led himse l f" as chairman o f  the Pre s ident ial Commis s ion 
specifically for the purpose of be ing able to give Brempong acce s s  
t o  i t s  pape rs . Many of the se , i t  sa id , we re sent t o  Gbedemah a t  his 
minis try o ffice , pre sumably where i t  would be ea s ier fo r Brempong to 
s tudy them. 
It went on to a s sert tha t  the connection be tween Gbedemah and 
Brempong wa s so close that  the la tter,  though a personal a s s is tant en -
t itled only to inferior accommoda t ions and third -c la s s  fare s ,  " s tayed 
the same expens ive ho tel s with him /sig•• and shared firs t -cla s s  
a ccommoda tions in general . This imp l ied some spec ial re lat ionship . 
Finally , the Evening News ment ioned the le t ter wri t ten to the Time s 
by Gbedemah the previou s  June in which he denied having any connection 
with the Army . It accused him o f  having intended not to answe r the 
accu sa t ions which had been made in the Time s at all , for fear tha t  
the Time s would publ ish furthe r deta il s .  The Evening News sa id tha t 
Gbedemah had as serted tha t he had repl ied promp tly bu t in actual ity 
28 We s t  Africa , January 6 ,  196 2 , p .  1 8 . 
he had no t done so;  when he did reply , it  wa s only a t  the urging o f  
Pre s ident Nkrumah , who feared tha t he would othe rwise b e  placed in a 
29 bad l ight . 
Breache s in security by Gbedemah, if they were such , do not 
appear to have been part icularly serious ; they do no t appear seriou s 
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on the ir face , and i f  they in fac t  we re serious the ir nature was such 
that they could have been s topped by Nkrumah almo s t  as soon as they 
s tarted . Gbedemah could not have broken security regula t ions by taking 
pape rs to his o ffice and re turning them to the ir proper l oca tions by 
me s senger without its  coming to the a ttent ion of o thers . What is  
important in this ma t ter and the fac t  tha t Nkrumah had ques t ioned 
Gbedemah ' s  loyal ty earl ie r is the perva s ive concern tha t the minis ter 
might have turned to subvers ive a c t ivitie s .  
Identi fica t ion With the Party 
Thi s  concern i s  part icularly s igni ficant in view of the fac t  
that i n  the pa s t  Gbe demah wa s one o f  the persons mo s t  clo sely a s so -
c iated with the ove r -a l l  princ iples  o f  the CPP . As  a mat ter o f  fac t ,  
he wa s one o f  the founders o f  the party and wa s i t s  firs t vice -chairman . 
He helped e s tabl ish the CPP Youth Movement and party newspaper and wa s 
30  an early ed itor o f  the la tter . In a sense it  can be said tha t Gbe -
demah made the CPP and put Nkrumah in powe r .  Al though Nkrumah pre sents  
a d i fferent p icture in  his autobiography , contemporary accounts o f  
29  Accra Evening News , January 2 ,  196 2 , p .  1 .  
30we s t  Africa , March 3 1 , 1951 , p .  26 9 .  
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Po sitive Ac tion in 1950 indica te tha t it wa s a fa ilure . It fa iled to 
arou se any kind of enthu s iasti c suppo rt . 3 1 The trial of Nkrumah and his 
a s soc iates aroused l i t tle inte re s t ,  and when Nkrumah wa s se ntenced the 
reaction of the populace wa s de sc ribed as "We l l ,  we ll . Fancy that . 
Poor fe llow . "3 2 The re we re no demons trations or any othe r ind ica t ion 
of support fo r the CPP . 33 I t s  officers , except fo r Nkrumah , lacked 
convic tion to such an extent tha t they de nied having had anything to do 
with Po sitive Ac tion, even though the prosecut ion had clear proo f of 
the ir associations . Only Nkrumah among tho se on trial admi tted having 
engaged in the a c t ivities  ci ted . 34 
The Convent ion Peop le ' s Pa rty,  after the early enthusiasm a s so ­
c iated with its  organiza tion, obviously rea ched its  nadi� a t  thi s time , 
and its  leader,  Nkrumah, had been sentenced to three years imprison ­
me nt . 3 5  Othe r leaders we re sentenced to va riou s l e s ser terms . Gbe demah, 
however , wa s no t among them . He wa s just fini shing up a term of six 
months fo r hav ing printed sedit iou s mate rial as editor of the Evening 
News,  and he wa s relea sed ju s t  as  Nkrumah and the othe rs we re inca rcerated . 
Nkrumah is  sa id to have told him a s  he wa s be ing moved from the court to 
a pr ison van, "Komla , you are ou t ;  we are going inside . Eve rything 
36 depends on you . " 
3 1we s t  Africa , January 28 , 1 9 50 ,  pp . 49 - 50 .  
3Zwe s t  Africa , March 4 , 1 950 , p .  1 70 .  
33Loc . cit . and Ma rch 2 5 ,  1950 ,  p .  242 . 
3 5 Nkrumah , Ghana , p .  1 26 . 
36 Munger, �· ci t . ,  p .  1 9 . 
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Gbedemah did no t let  them down . He went to the pol ice commi s s ioner 
and demanded tha t the ban on CPP me et ings then in e f fect be removed . A 
We stern journalist  who witne s sed some of the ra l l ies  Gbedemah handled 
repo rted that he had no doub t s  tha t "he re wa s a ma s s  movement . 1 13 7 On one 
occas ion he sa id tha t the African behind him be came so impa s s ioned from 
Gbedemah ' s  oratory tha t he pounded his shoulders "black and blue in 
fr iendly enthusiasm. "38 "C . P . P . AGAIN" posters appeared on wal l s ,  
badge s we re distribu ted a s  in Ame rican campa igns , and "vigorous voca l 
3 9 
persua s ion" wa s appl ied . When municipal elec tions in Accra were hel d ,  
the pa rty se t up booths ou tside eve ry vo ting s ta t ion and by va rious 
me thod s of persua sion , r idicule ,  and poss ibly even int imida t ion shepherded 
as many l ikely supporte r s ,  es pecially il l i te rate s ,  into the pol l s  as pos -
. bl 
40 41 
s �  e .  The CPP won eve ry conte s ted sea t ,  by a crushing 15-1  marg in . 
The n it prepared fo r the coming na tional elec t ion which would 
choose the new legi sla ture recommended by the Cous sey Commission . In 
this election Gbedemah exhib ited bo th sound pol it ical acumen and a deep 
sense of loya l ty to Nkrumah . He himself  wa s a convic ted crimina l ,  and 
so we re all the othe r impor tant l eade rs of the pa rty , including the su -
preme chie f .  Gbedemah turned this apparent s t igma into an important 
a s s e t  for the pa rty . One day at a ma s s  ra lly he solemnly procla imed 
his comrades  who had been impri soned gradua te s o f  " S t . Jame s Unive rs ity 
3 7 Ibid . , p .  21 . 38Ib id . ,  p .  20 . 
39we s t  Afr ica , Ap ril 1 5 ,  1 9 50 , p .  3 13 . 
40Ibid . 
41 Ibid . and Munge r,  �· c it . , p .  21 . 
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Prison . "  Hence forth they we re to be ent itled to wemr special cap s ,  o f  
which he exhib ited the firs t ,  with the ini tia l s  "P .G . " sewn on the 
fronts and to write the ini tia l s  a fter the ir name s in all co rrespondence . 42 
Be ing a "P . G . " be came such an a s se t  to a pol itical ly -minded individua l 
tha t  one such person i s  reported to have threa tened a mag is tra te and 
served a p rison term to win the cove ted t i tle . 
Gbedemah.' s act of pol i t ical loyal ty removed Nkrumah from ja il 
when he s t ill had two years to serve and advanced him to a po s t  almo s t  
equivalent t o  tha t  o f  prime mini s ter . The re can be l i t tle doub t that 
a t  tha t t ime Gbedemah wa s in e ffe c t ive control and could have cons igned 
Nkrumah to pol i tical ob scuri ty . If he could no t have done so ,  he could 
have tried , bu t according to Nkrumah himsel f he did no t even try .
43 
Ins tead , he conce ived the idea o f  promot ing Nkrumah, even though a 
prisoner,  for a sea t in the leg isla ture . He had been s tand ing for the 
Accra d i s trict sea t ,  whe re wi th his populari ty and personal foll owing 
he wa s almo s t  certa in o f  vic tory .  In the mid s t  of the- campa ign, however ,  
he trans ferred h i s  candidacy t o  the Ewe d is tric t - -where because o f  his 
tribal a ffil ia t ions he wa s fairly safe , but in which he s till had to 
44 build up a personal fol l owing a fter a long ab sence . 
The re sul t o f  all hi s e fforts  wa s ano ther impre s s ive vic tory . 
Both Nkrumah and Gbedemah we re elec ted , and CPP cand ida te s won twenty ­
nine o f  a possible thirty - three sea t s .
45 
Nkrumah wa s released from 
42 
Munger ,  loc . ci t .  
43 
Nkrumah , Ghana , pp . 1 28 -9 . 
44 
Munger,  op . c it . , pp . 22 -3 . 
45 
Ap te r ,  Gold Coa s t  in Trans ition, p .  199 . 
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jail and invited to become Leade r  o f  Gove rnment Bu s ine s s  and la ter Prime 
46 
Minis ter . Gbedemah wa s made Minis ter of Hea l th until the Finance port-
fol io wa s re l inqu ished by the British in 1954 ,  a fte r which time he served 
as Minister of Finance until 196 1 . 
Gbedemah had contr ibu ted as  much as  anybody el s e ,  except pos s ib ly 
Nkrumah, to bu ild ing the identity of the CPP . He had been with i t  as  
one of its  mos t  out s tand ing figure s from its  very beg inning and had demon-
strated a wil l ingne s s  to promote its gene ral princ iple s . Gbedemah wa s 
not an enemy o f  the principles  o f  the pa rty , but o f  some of the me thod s 
o f  Nkrumah which had become appa rent by 196 1 . The spl it which deve loped 
be tween the two men wa s over means ra ther than end s . 
The Real Rea sons for Dismi s sal 
The rea son tha t the pa rty organ and Nkrumah suspec ted Gbedemah of 
subversive ac t ivities wa s not tha t they had any cogent evidence tha t  he 
wa s engaged in them or that  he might be commi t ted to a d i fferent ideology 
bu t that they knew he disagre ed with Nkrumah and had no o the r mode s o f  
e ffe c t ive expre s s ion. If he had had them, he would not have been 
a t t rac ted by subvers ion, for he would have had a highe r probabil i ty of 
succe s s  in exp re s s ing his views and achieving the pre s idency , for which 
he probably wa s amb i t iou s ,  by working wi thin a democratic framework and 
appeal ing for elec toral support from the ma jor groups which favored his 
cand idacy . The su sp ic ion tha t  Gbedemah wa s a tra itor and his sub sequent 
d i smi s sal we re not ind ica t ions of the undemocra t ic cha ra c ter of Gbede -
mah ,  bu t of Nkrumah . 
46 Nkrumah , Ghana , p .  136 . 
106 
Furthe r support for thi s point of view come s from a serie s of 
articles wri t ten by the ed i tors o f  the Evening News �ediately a fte r 
Gbedemah ' s  ou s ter in an at temp t to discred it him. 47 Ko jo Bo t s io ,  
anothe r mini s ter of long s tanding , along with four othe r high officials 
wa s removed at  the same time , bu t the Evening News engaged in a bitter 
denunc ia tion of Gbedemah while coming close to ignoring the others ,  thu s 
concentra ting its energie s  and space on this one man. This sugge sts  
tha t Nkrumah had genuine fears abou t the possible rivalry of Gbedemah 
and wa s trying to draw away from him any pol it ical support he might 
have had . He could no t have be en incarcerated , for Gbedemah wa s well 
known and popular both within the country and ou tside it , and he wa s 
gene rally re cognized as the s tronge s t  potential rival of Nkrumah . Such 
an a c t , if the re wa s no sol id ev idence aga ins t him, would have been so 
transparent tha t it would have jeopard ized the support of such demo -
cra tic friends a s  Nkrumah had left . 
The second impl ica tion of the articles wa s tha t Gbedemah did 
no t or could no t support enthusias tical ly a numbe r of pol icie s which 
Nkrumah wa s promo t ing . The Evening News cha rged hLm with having fa iled 
the s tate and the people of Ghana in a wide number of ins tances in con -
ne ct ion with his of ficial du t ies . The mo s t  gene ral criticism wa s tha t 
he had been reluctant to Africanize the agenc ie s for which he wa s 
re spons ible , leav ing in cha rge of them Bri tons who tended to be unen-
thu s ias t ic and haphazard in the ir conduc t  of them. Thi s ,  if the re 
wa s any truth to i t ,  may have been a conseque nce of Gbedemah ' s  conserva -
t ive be l ief tha t expe rienced Engl ish civil servants gene rally we re mo re 
47
Accra Evening News , Septembe r  30 ,  1 96 1 , pp . 1 and 3 ; Octo­
ber 3 ,  p .  1 .  
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compe tent than the ir rela tively uneduca ted African counte rparts . Munge r,  
writ ing in 19 59 , did no t bel ieve tha t he wa s biased towa rd the use of 
the Br itish :  
He i s  strong for promo t ing Ghana ians • • .  bu t no t at the price 
of ine ffic iency . . . . The re is a cons tant and unde rs tandabl e 
temp tation to pol iticians to ask tha t a We s t  Ind ian or Engl ish­
man be declared redundant becau se a Ghanaian protege is almos t 
quali fied for the job .  Gbedemah ' s  approach is no t to ask fo r 
favors bu t to help Ghana ians qual i fy on me ri t . 48 
Howeve r this may have been, his re luctance to emp loy Ghana ians wa s sa id 
to have re sul ted in the loss for Ghana of mill ions of pound s from income 
tax eva s ion and in a slugg ish banking sy stem .  Gbedemah al so oppo sed 
(pre sumably in pa r ty counc il s) Nkrumah ' s  decis ion to make the United 
Ghana Fa �ers Council the sole agent fo r the pu rcha s ing of cocoa and 
a de cision of Parl iament to establ ish a s tate insurance company . Al l 
o f  the se all ega tions of fa ilure indica te a di ffe rence in point of view 
be tween Gbedemah and Nkrumah . 
The third impl ica tion wa s tha t Gbedemah had se riou sly trans -
gre s sed the principle s Nkrumah had laid down in his Dawn Broadca s t  to 
rid himse l f  and his gove rnment of the charge s of re ta ining office for 
i t s perqu i s i tes and p ro fits ra the r than in order to serve the people 
o f  Ghana . The Evening News a s serted tha t he owned ,  in the name s of 
re la t ive s ,  five house s ,  which he rented to expatriots . He had a finan-
cial inte re s t  in a transportat ion company . Regard ing his s tatement 
tha t he had offered to sell his poultry fa rm to the gove rnme nt for any 
price which would permi t him to se t tle his ou ts tand ing debts , "The 
4�unge r,  �· c i t . , pp . 24 -25 . 
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truth is tha t Mr . Gbedemah virtua lly demanded a purcha se price o f  ove r 
�GlOO , OOO in ca sh from the Governmen t in exchange for the take -ove r o f  
his poultry farm .  n49 
I t  is  c lea r that Nkrumah wa s s ince re in his effort s to rid his 
gove rnment o f  persons unwill ing to adop t the same aus teri ty mea su re s he 
wa s asking o f  his people . But the fact that he dismis sed Gbedemah 
ra ther than reque s t  publ icly , a s  he did of others , tha t he give up a 
port ion of his p rope rtie s is a strong indication tha t the all egations 
of re fusal to adop t au s terity mea sure s we re me rely ammunition used to 
discredit him.  There we re al so al lega t ions of confl ict of intere s t  as  
a re sul t o f  his priva te holdings , and the se can be  interpre ted in the 
50 
same way . 
The dismi s sal o f  Bo t sio should be ment ioned in this connec tion . 
Acco rd ing to persons famil iar  with the s itua tion , Bo t s io wa s almo s t  
os tenta t ious i n  h i s  d isplay of weal th and luxury . 51 Al though the 
London Times wro te edi torially tha t the rea son for his  d i smi s sal 
wa s that he wa s an experience d and the re fo re dange rou s membe r o f  
the Old Guard , the re ha s not been the sl ighte s t  shred o f  evidence 
advanced publ icly tha t there wa s any suspic ion abou t his loya l ty to 
52 
Nkrumah . He wa s kep t  ou t of o ffice for a year and a ha l f  bu t in 
49octobe r  3 ,  1 96 1 ,  p .  1 .  Cf . supra , p .  98 . 
50Accra Evening News,  loc . c i t . 
51Pe rsonal interview, June 16 , 1963 . The inte rviewees  asked 
no t to be named . 
5
�ondon Time s ,  Sep tember 29 , 196 1 , p .  13 . 
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the spring o f  1963 brought back into the government a s  Mini s te r  of For ­
e ign Affa irs . 53 Gbedemah became increa s ingly e s t ranged from Nkrumah 
and eventually went into voluntary exile . 
Minis ters Turned Tra itor 
The trouble s  o f  o ther prominent membe rs of the CPP can be inte r­
pre ted as  having cause s s imilar to those of Gbedemah .  The four o the r 
official s who se appointments we re te rminated at the same t ime a s  tho se  
o f  Gbedemah and Bot s io we re not prominent enough fo r info rma t ion about 
them to be gene rally ava ilable . But othe rs fired or de ta ined at othe r 
time s were . The se include P . K. Quaidoo , the mini s ter who wa s d i smis sed 
in the sp ring o f  1 96 1  and de tained in Octobe r,  and three o the r s ,  Tawia 
Adama fio , Ako Ad j e i ,  and H. H . Co fie Crabbe , who were de ta ined 
Augu s t  29 , 1 96 2 . At the t ime o f  the ir de tent ion , Adama fio wa s 
Nkrumah ' s  Mini s ter of Informat ion and Broadcas t ing ; Ad j e i  wa s the Minis ­
ter o f  Fore ign Affa irs ; and Crabbe wa s the execu t ive secre tary o f  the 
CPP . 54 
I t  will be recalled tha t  a short time a fter the Dawn Broad ca s t  
Qua idoo publ icly que s t ioned Nkrumah ' s  infa l l ib il ity . 55 His inclu s ion 
among the forty-nine de ta ined on October 3 wa s ba sed on allega tions 
53chana Today , VII {March 2 7 ,  1 963) , p .  1 .  
54Africa Dige s t ,  X (Oc tober,  1962) , p .  70 . 
55supra , pp . 93 -94 . 
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o f  de fini tely subversive activi t ie s . Accord ing to the White Paper,  he 
wa s l inked with the consp ira cy in two specific way s :  during the s trike , 
he had been among tho se del iberately mi s informing worke rs about the law 
on s trike s ;  and he had promised support and a s s i s tance to tho se organiz ­
ing the s trike . 56 Quaidoo appears to have been the firs t of Nkrumah ' s  
minis te rs to have engaged in trea sonous  activitie s  aga ins t  him .  
The rea sons for the de tent ion o f  the other three have not ye t 
been o fficially announced , but they were l inked in a public tria l  during 
the spring o f  1963 with a series of bomb - throwing incidents which had 
occurred the previous fal l  and winter,  and i t  seems l ikely that they 
were de ta ined on the susp icion o f  having helped to ins t igate those . 
Some o f  the bomb ing s we re de l ibera te a t temp t s  to a s sa s s ina te Pre s ident 
Nkrumah , wherea s others appear to have been a t temp ts to cau se d i s rup -
t ions which would bring abou t his downfall . 
The inc idents  began on Augus t  1 ,  196 2 ,  when a hand grenade 
exploded near the Pre s ident and kil led a numbe r  of s chool children . 
Anothe r wa s thrown into a crowd near the Pre s ident ' s  re s idence on Sep tem-
ber 8 ,  and ano ther at the res idence o f  one of his mini s te r s . Others on 
Sep tember 20 and Novembe r 6 ,  196 2 ,  and January 8 ,  1963 , we re thrown 
into crowds  celebrat ing party - sponsored event s .  In all ,  twenty - two 
persons were kil led by them and ove r three hundred were seriously 
57 
injured . 
56
Whi te Paper ,  �· �. , pp . 1 1  and 1 2 .  
57court op inion on the ca se o f  Te iko Tagoe � al . In Ghana 
Today , VII (April 24 , 1963) , pp . 1 and 2 .  
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Seven persons accu sed of be ing connec ted with the incident s were 
brought to trial in a special court set  up in January under the provi-
s ions o f  the law o f  O ctobe r ,  1 96 1 . I t s  ent ire p roceed ing s we re open 
to the publ ic and the de fendant s we re permi t ted and informed of the ir 
right to appo int counsel , al though none o f  them ava iled themselve s of 
the privilege . 58 One o f  the accu sed , none o f  whom were prominent per-
sons , told the court that Tawia Adama fio , the former Minister o f  Info rma -
t ion , had sent secre t  le t te rs and document s unde r a p seudonym t o  the 
Uni ted Party execut ive committee in exile in Lome , Togo . He sa id tha t 
in January o f  1 96 2  he had travel led with Adama fio in a taxi to a hide -
59 
out near Accra , where he wa s introduced to Ad j e i  and Crabbe . Te s t i -
mony from ano ther o f  the accused sa id tha t tho se three had given one o f  
the ir comrade s a parcel o f  e ight grenades  for the purpose of a s sa s s ina t ing 
the Pre s ident . They promised to pay L200 for a succe s s ful a ttemp t . 60 
The court took no te o f  the te s t Lmony but ,  s ince the forme r o ffic ial s 
were not be ing pro se cu ted , d id not make any findings  with regard to 
6 1  
them . 
The Re sort to Terror 
On June 6 ,  in Parl iament , an MP repo rted to his col league s tha t 
he had recently l ea rned tha t a special  branch o f  the pol ice (which he 
58
rb id . , p .  1 .  
59
we s t  Africa ,  Ap ril 6 ,  1963 , p .  387 . 
60we s t  Africa ,  Ma rch 23 , 1963 , p .  33 1 .  
6 1court Op inion, loc . ci t . , p .  2 .  
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re fe rred to only as the "CID") wa s re sort ing to torture to ext ract con-
fe s s ions from pe rsons suspe cted of subve rsion . Po ss ibly in orde r to 
p rotect himse l f, he said tha t this wa s no t ne ce s sarily the intent ion 
of eithe r Nkrumah or his interior mini s ter;  bu t his impl ication wa s tha t 
the Pre s ident had at  lea s t  e s tabl ished conditions such tha t police offi -
ce rs could be come ove r-exube rant and commit exce sses  wi thou t having the i r  
activitie s checked . 6 2  Some time s they came t o  arre st  the ir victims in 
the middle of the night , much in the s tyle of the Ge stapo . Seve ral 
ca ses we re pointed to by MP ' s in which it  wa s clear tha t innocent peop le 
had been de tained because the o fficia l s  conce rned we re no longe r taking 
the trouble to find out whe the r the ir vic tims we re gu il ty of the crime s 
63 alleged or no t .  
The atmo sphe re o f  te rror,  a t  lea s t  among tho se who we re no t 
os tentat iou s admire rs o f  Nkrumah, is mos t  graphically il lus trated in an 
article wr it ten by a We s tern journa l i s t  who visited Ghana in the summe r 
or fall o f  1 96 2 .  He wro te in pa r t :  
One inc ident symbol ize s for me the perva s ivene ss  o f  Nkrumah ' s  
a t tack on personal privacy . I t  occurred while I wa s vi s iting 
with a young p ro fe s sor at the Unive rs ity o f  Ghana . We were dis­
cu s s ing Nkrumah, the role of the oppo sition and , pa rt icula rly , 
the disintegrat ion of the unive r s i ty i t sel f .  ·He described the 
sense of fear which had swep t the college clean of its  European 
profe s sors and had sent mo st of its be s t  Ghana ians into exile 
or pri son . Re spected coll ege admini s tra tor s had been dismis sed 
in favor of youthful stooge s ,  who se prima ry du ty cons is ted in 
monitoring cla s s e s  fo r any s ign of " subve rs ion . "  The young 
profe s sor ' s word s ended in a s t rangely abrup t manne r,  howeve r ,  
when we heard a knock at  the doo r .  
6 2parl iamentary De bates , XXVII ( June 6 ,  1 96 2) , col . 576 . 
63parl iamenta ry Debate s ,  XXVII (June 8 ,  1 96 2) , col . 644 . 
When a repa irman ente red the room and began to dismantle 
the telephone , my friend col lap sed into an obviously frigh t ­
ened s ilence . La ter ,  as  we strolled through the beaut i ful 
Legon campus ,  he apologized , unnece s sarily , for his t imid ity %  
'You never know the se days who i s  a n  informer . I da red not 
talk in front o f  tha t man; he might have been a spy , and 
the se chap s ge t a good price for each pe rson they report . "  
Subsequent l e t ters to this pro fe s sor have gone unanswe red . 64 
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The extent o f  the use of te rror is d i fficul t to e s t ima te at the 
pre sent t ime . The re have been few published re fe rences  to i t ,  but this 
may be mo re because of succe s s  in hiding it  from the publ ic and from 
journalists  than i t s  rarity .  Pe rhaps i t  should be sa id only tha t Nkru -
mah ha s a t  lea s t  on occa sion been wil l ing to permit governmental agenc ie s 
to re sort to i t ,  pre sumably when he fe l t  lea s t  secure in his own position . 
At any ra te , such tac t ic s  can hardly be rega rded a s  indica tions o f  a 
wil l ingne s s  to re spond to democra t ic force s in the socie ty . 
Conclus ions 
Nkrumah ' s  a s sump t ion of the key pos t s  in the Convention People ' s  
Party , hi s manipula tion of his cabine ts , and the activi t ie s ,  both real 
and suspected, of ce rta in o f  his minis ters in opposition to him are all  
demons tra t ive of the part icular character of his  rule and the l ikel ihood 
of ne ce s s i ty for i t .  The se plus his use o f  te rror reveal tha t he ha s 
been unwil l ing to permit the pa rty to ac t a s  an e ffec t ive organ for 
the articula t ion and re ifica t ion of public  inte re s t s ,  tha t he ha s no t 
answered his a s socia te s  tha t  he woul d respond meaning fully to public  
op inion a s  expre s sed through channel s  other than the party , and that he 
64wil l iam . McCord , "Long Night in Ghana , " New Leade r ,  XLV (Novem­
ber 26 , 1962) , pp . 6 -7 .  
ha s not convinced even his own mini s ters tha t his part icular mode o f  
gove rnment is  i n  the be s t  inte re s t s  o f  Ghana . 
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As wa s sugge s ted a t  the beginning o f  this chap ter , some commenta ­
tors , even those close to the scene , have thought tha t democracy wa s 
expres sed inside the CPP even though no e ffective oppos ition to the 
power of the CPP wa s permitted . The experience s o f  Gbedemah in comb ina ­
t ion with the pa rt icula r circumstance s surrounding them ca s t  seriou s 
doubt on thi s point of view . 
The rea son i s  tha t in 196 1 Gbedemah probably wa s mo re repre senta ­
t ive o f  ma jor intere s t s  and viewpoint s in Ghana than any o ther man, 
including Nkrumah . Thi s  is  not to say tha t if  he had been in power he 
would ne ces sarily have served the intere s t s  o f  Ghana be t te r  than Nkru ­
mah did,  but the evidence is  tha t the number o f  people who thought he 
would wa s growing a t  the t Lme o f  his ous ter . If  Nkrumah had been 
at temp t ing to make his pol icy an accura te reflection of publ ic needs a s  
the publ ic i t sel f saw them, he would have retained Gbedemah and fol lowed 
his advice more and more , or el se s tepped a s ide and permi tted him to 
a s sume active leadership . 
That Gbedemah wa s su spected o f  subvers ion, wha teve r the evidence , 
i s  further ind ica t ion o f  the absence o f  democracy . With his popularity , 
under free cond itions Gbedemah could have enjoyed high expe ctat ions 
of becoming the next Pre s ident of Ghana . Certa inly such an eventual i ty 
wa s no t certa in ,  but it wa s far from improbable . It wa s highly unl ikely , 
however,  as Nkrumah ' s  succe s s  in fo il ing subve rs ion ha s demons tra ted , 
tha t any part icular subve rs ive plot would be succes s ful in d i slodg ing 
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him .  I f  Nkrumah had permitted a free play of democra t ic force s ,  even 
wi thin the bound s of the secular and unitary principles o f  the CPP , Gbedemah 
could have ant icipated a much higher probab il i ty of becoming Pre s ident 
within a l egal framework . Nkrumah , however ,  knew tha t democra tic force s 
we re no t permi t ted to opera te freely , and tha t if Gbedemah wa s ambi tious  
to  succeed him, he would be  forced to  re sort to subve r s ive means . Thu s 
the su sp ic ion . 
The ou s ter  of Gbedemah jus t  at the t ime when his viewpoint wa s 
becoming inc rea s ingly rep re senta t ive o f  publ ic op inion is  one ind icat ion 
tha t  Nkrumah d id no t make an e ffort to re spond to publ ic opinion or de -
mand . Ano the r ind ica tion, of course , wa s his suppre s s ion o f  the channe l s  
o f  communica tion . Newspape rs we re censored,  unde sirable fore ign publ i• 
ca tions were banned,  the right to hold publ ic mee ting s wa s limi ted , and 
the gove rnment itse l f  managed the ent ire broadcas t ing sys tem . Nkrumah 
could no t have re sponded adequately to publ ic op inion when the means o f  
communica t ing i t  we re s o  comple tely re s tric ted · 
Two d irec t  s ta tements tha t Nkrumah has l o s t  the support o f  a 
majority of his people have come to the a t tent ion o f  this wri ter . One 
wa s through persona l interview, in which the interviewee s ,  who them-
selve s  were opponent s  of Nkrumah and asked not to be named ,  s ta ted that  
the la tter  could no t po s s ibly win a free e le c t ion in Ghana a t  tha t  t ime , 
June , 1 963 . The other s ta tement wa s ba sed on an informal interview 
among such people a s  taxi drive rs and workers in Accra in the summer 
or fal l  o f  196 2 .  On the ba sis  o f  his find ings the interviewe r ,  McCo rd , 
repor ted tha t Nkrumah had los t almo s t  all  his previou s  support .
6 5  
6 5  Ibid . , p .  6 .  
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The que s t ion mu st finally be asked whe ther Nkrumah wa s forced into 
d ic ta torial practice s out of obvious ne ce s s ity . Tha t a nece s s i ty wa s not 
obviou s to some high -ranking officia l s  in 196 1 is clearly sugges ted by 
the activities of Quaidoo , Adama fio, Ad j e i ,  and Crabbe . Al though highly 
placed in the gove rnment and party , these four men we re not nearly as  
prominent a s  Gbedemah . Be fore the ir de tent ion they we re ra rely ment ioned 
in l itera ture on Ghana . Bu t they d id hold high pos ts in the gove rnment 
or pa rty . I f  they engaged in subvers ive activitie s ,  they were all taking 
heavy risks o f  los ing the de s irabl e po s it ions they held and facing heavy 
prison terms or exe cut ion beside s .  I f  they succeeded in depos ing Nkrumah , 
the ir anticipa t ion of a ttaining higher rewa rd s  for any leng th o f  time 
would have been rela t ively sl ight . None wa s prominent enough or popular 
enough to organize the political or mil i tary force s nece s sary to main-
ta in himself  in power for more than the time needed by someone e l se to 
organize new force s to depo se him .  Actually ,  there is no indicat ion tha t 
any o f  the se men had connect ions wi th the Army ;  i f  one or more o f  them 
did ,  the conne ct ions we re no t revealed in ei ther the White . Paper  or the 
trial in which Adamafio e t  a l . we re involved . 
- -
With a sl ight antic ipa t ion of personal reward ,  tha t the four we re 
will ing to do any thing which would cause Nkrumah to become su sp ic ious 
enough o f  them to order the ir de tention sugge s ts tha t they were act ing 
in wha t they bel ieved to be the be s t  inte re st of Ghana . Specifical ly , 
i t  would appear tha t ( 1) they bel ieved tha t Nkrumah wa s deleterious to 
Ghana ; (2) they could no t influence his policie s  s igni ficantly from 
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the ir posit ions within the cab ine t ;  and (3 ) they d id not bel ieve that 
he would submit himsel f to a free election when his legal term expired 
in 196 5 .  The latter conclus ion i s  ba sed on an as sumption that ,  con­
s idering the risks involved in try ing to depose him, they would have 
been will ing to allow him to rema in in office if only for three or four 
more years . 
CHAPTER VII 
OVERVIEW 
The evolut ion o f  Nkrumah ' s  powe r can be d ivided into three s tage s . 
In the first and third o f  the se no opposition to him could have been 
succe s s ful . In the se cond stage it .!ght have been . The bases of his 
powe r were shifting in such a way tha t his s t reng th wa s virtual ly un­
a s sa i lable a t  al•o s t  all t t.e s  except jus t  be fore the pa s sage o f  the 1 960 
cons t i tu t ion . This docuaent gave hLm new ba ses of power which we re 
e ffec t ive sub s t i tu te s  for the old ba se s which we re gradually being l os t .  
During the first s tage his powe r re s ted on a combina tion o f  a 
convic tion on the part o f  a grea t many peop le tha t the mea sure s Nkrumah 
advoca ted we re jus tified in the inte res t s  of the sta te toge the r with 
his pol i t ical control ove r a ma j ority of the legis la tors who had to en­
act his program . In the third s tage i t  appears tha t the convict ion of 
jus t if icat ion wa s all but gone , and so wa s the popular support on which 
he had ba sed his pol i tical leverage but by then he had secured legal 
ins truments which made hL. independent of tho se ba se s o f  powe r .  The re ­
fore i f  his powe r wa s eve r to have been broken, the second s tage wa s 
crucial . 
The second s tage wa s ma rked by the non-decis ive nature of the 
legal ins t ruments at Nkrumah ' s  disposal and the rela t ive uncerta inty 
o f  support flowing from the conviction tha t his pol icies were jus t ified 
and fro• popular appeal . The se va riabl e s  mu s t  be mea sured rathe r 
ind irectly , s ince the re we re no publ ic opinion poll s  and s ince public 
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s tatements by MP ' s  were re flections of Nkrumah ' s  decis ions . S ince Nkru -
mah ' s  cont rol became dec is ive wi th the pa s sage o f  the 1960 cons ti tution 
and s ince from the way in which he waged his campa ign it appea rs tha t 
the popula tion did not entirely tru s t  him at tha t time , one can conclude 
tha t the bes t  time for a general intra -party revolt  would have been 
then . But oppos i t ion within the party apparently did no t grow unt il it 
wa s too late . 
In cons idering the mot ivations fo r supporting Nkrumah which we re 
working on CPP MP ' s , two distinc tions need to be made . One is be tween 
fa ctors contributing to de cision-making which can be te nned e s sentially 
voluntary, based on an MP ' s  convic tion of the bene ficial na ture of 
the measure s he is supporting ,  and tho se which can be te nned e s sen-
tially coercive . The latter in turn can be d ivided into two cla s ses : 
I 
those in which the coe rc ion is pol itical , having to do with Nkrumah ' s  
ab il ity to a ffec t  the ou tcome of pa rl iamenta ry elec t ions , and those 
in which the coe rc ion is ba sed on lega l ins trument s and power dependent 
on governmental sanc tion or force . Nkrumah began in 1957  as  a com-
paratively weak Prime Mini s te r .  By 196 1  h i s  Pa rl iament had i n  e ffec t  
surrendered i t s  power to him, wi thou t a sy s tem for making sure that  
he used it p rope rly . I f  i t  is a s sumed tha t MP ' s  we re acting rat ionally ,  
two major type s  o f  influence s probably worked on them: legitima te 
needs of Ghana , and Nkrumah ' s  coercive pol itical power . But i t  is 
d i fficu l t  to be sure tha t they were at  all times act ing ra tional ly . 
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Considerations Contributing to Voluntary Support 
As has been noted earlier in Chapter III, Nkrumah was sometimes 
frank in acknowledging that democracy did not occupy a particularly 
high place in his scale of values . He was probably benevolent enough, 
but his attitude was paternalistic. His primary aim was to promote 
the material welfare of his country men, and if this goal came into con-
flict with democractic principles, the latter would have to be sacri-
ficed : 
My first objective is to abolish from Ghana poverty , ignorance 
and disease . We shall measure our progress by the improvement 
in the health of our people; by the number of children in 
school, and by the quality of the ir education; by the avail­
ability of water and electricity in our towns and villages • .  
The welfare of the people is our chief pride , and it is by 
this that my government will ask to be judged . 1 
There was no presumption that the greatest welfare was dependent on a 
response to democratic forces . 
The lack of political sophistication in Ghana furnished the founda-
tion for such a paternalistic philosophy . It is no exagge ration to say 
that the introduction of complete democracy , without some kind of 
authoritarian check, would have been disastrous . McCord pointed out 
in a generally critical article that on at least one occasion such 
an application of ideals actually was attempted for a short time . Villa -
gers on local levels were permitted to vote democratically for pro jects 
which they would like to foster under a community development scheme . 
The ir ty pical choices included such structures as post offices although 
no one could read--projects which were impressive but without utility � 
lNkrumah in speech on Christmas Eve , 1957 .  Quoted in Nkrumah, 
I Speak of Freedom, p. 117. 
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The government wa s wise  eno-ugh to  abandon democracy and order the villa­
gers to engage in more useful endeavors . 2 
Accord ing to a writer for � Africa , many of tho se who reg i s -
tered fo r the general election of 1951  we re s o  ignorant o f  the poli tical 
proce s s  as to be under the mi sapprehension tha t this ac t cons tituted 
vot ing . The Bri tish permit ted only those who had paid a levy of four 
shil l ings  to vo te , and a grea t many pre ferred the po s se s s ion of thi s  
sum t o  what they ca lled 1 1 the vo 1 • 1 1  They could not comp rehend wha t i t  
wa s abou t the latter which wa s worth four shillings . The wri ter e s t i ­
ma ted at  the time tha t only abou t thirty - five p e r  cent would regis ter . 3 
The meaning fulne s s  of the choice s made by those who regis tered 
and sub sequently exerc ised the vo te is doub t ful . The me thod s which it  
wa s pro fitable fo r the CPP to use in the 1951 campa ign have already 
4 been de scribed . Cond it ions by 1956 had not changed much . Bre tton 
ha s written in re fe rence to the campaign of tha t year :  
The campa ign me thods o f  the pa rties va ried from ou tright 
int imida tion, through the use o f  organized gang s call ed 
1 1a c t ion group s 1 1  or "a ction troopers , " through bribery ,  
blackma il ,  economic pre ssure , del ibe rate circulation o f  
mi slead ing rumors , invoca tion o f  fe t ishes , ju -ju,  triba l 
sanction, to p ropaganda wo rk in the fa shion of modern 
ma s s  partie s . Ra tional d is cus s ion o f  is sue s wa s re served 
to top cand ida te s ,  and even they re sorted , when hard 
pre s sed , to demago�ue ry or eve n to clear violation o f  
the election code . 
2 
McCord , op . cit . ,  p .  6 .  
3
we s t  Africa , Decembe r 16 , 1950 , p .  122 . 
5 Bre t ton, �· cit . , p .  58 . 
4 
Sup ra , p .  103 . 
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All parties used forms o f  pe rsua s ion o the r than pure ly ra t ional a rgument ; 
to have done o the rwi se ,  unde r exis t ing c ircums tanc e s ,  would ha rdly have 
been pol i t i ca l ly a s tute . 
Ap te r  reported tha t nea rly a l l  the MP ' s  he inte rviewe d who took 
the ir po s i t ions s e riously compla ined tha t  the ir cons t i tuenc ie s fa iled 
to unders tand the i r  p roblems . Dema nd s fo r spe c ial favor s  we re pa r t i cu ­
larly pers i s t ent and d i fficu l t  t o  re s i s t ,  and the re wa s a singular lack 
o f  pub l i c  ind igna t ion a t  the frequent expo sure s o f  corrup t ion in high 
place s . The a s sump t ion- -and demons t ra t ion- - o f  the p rinc iple tha t 
eve ryone had his p rice made i t  d i fficu l t  to rep re se nt the gene ral inte r ­
e s t  through the ins t rument o f  Pa rl iament . 6 
This lack o f  pol i ti cal sophi s t ica t ion on the pa rt o f  the popu ­
lace shoul d be bo rne in mind by anyone who want s  to unde r s ta nd  the 
dynamics o f  Ghana ian p ol i ti c s . Ac tua l ly ,  such c ircums tance s a s  tho se 
enume ra ted have no t gene ral ly been al luded to by the gove rnme nt i t s e l f  
in exp la ining i t s  pol i c ie s . Po l i t ical c ons ide ra t ions would p revent i t  
from do ing s o ,  for i t  could no t ma inta in wha t ma s s  suppo r t  i t  had by 
info rming i t s  fol l owe rs tha t i t  mu s t  adopt undemocra t ic me tho d s  to deal 
w i th them be cau s e  they we re too unsophi s t ica ted to know how t o  fend fo r 
themse lve s .  Ra the r ,  the tra i ts d i s cu s sed should be rega rded a s  fu rni sh ­
ing a large pa rt o f  the rea son for the appa rent lack o f  conce rn for 
demo c ra t ic p r inc ip l e s  whi ch many leade r s  o f  the CPP, includ ing Nkrumah , 
have shown . I f  the we l fare o f  the people wa s rega rded a s  the p r ime 
ob j e c tive , the be s t  knowl edge o f  how to a chieve i t  cou l d  no t be a s sumed 
6Ap te r ,  Gold Coa s t  in Tra ns i t ion , pp . 286 - 288 . 
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to come from the people themselve s ,  bu t from a member or members o f  an 
el ite . As suming tha t ju s t ificat ion for the exercise o f  powe r lay in 
se rvice to the publ ic,  the que s t ion wa s who could most clea rly discern 
the means be st sui ted to tha t end . The re wa s no ba s is for an as sump ­
tion tha t a group wa s be tter adap ted for choo s ing the means than an 
individual wa s .  A group would be advantageou s only if its  compo s ition 
wa s a re fle ction of the dist ribu t ion of needs of the public  to be served . 
An a s sumpt ion that this wa s true in the ca se o f  Ghana would have been 
d i fficul t to ju stify .  
I f  CPP l egi sla to rs could condone undemocra tic p rac tices by thei r  
gove rnment o n  the ba s is o f  arguments conce rning the lack o f  publ ic 
sophis t ica tion, they could al so condone them on the ba s i s  of argu­
ments conce rning the nature of the opposition.  No t only wa s i t  
pa rochial and given t o  violence , but it  wa s al so a t  lea s t  a s  undemo -
crat ic a s  the CPP . The Na tional Libera t ion Movement , the ma jor const itu ­
ent o f  the later United Pa rty , wa s controlled by the Asantemen Counc il , 
made up of chie fs selec ted from royal famil ie s  by non-democra tic means . 7 
Other cons tituent s ,  such a s  the Mo slem As soc iation Par ty and the Togo ­
land Congre s s ,  we re s imila rly lacking in democratic orienta t ion. 8 K. A .  
Bus ia ,  at one t ime the leader o f  the opposition and the chie f critic 
o f  the gove rnment ,  wa s the b ro ther o f  a chie f and genera l ly regarded 
as "an aristo cra t and snob . " 9 The o ther ma jor leade r of the United 
7 
Bre tton, �· c it . , pp . 56 -57 . 
8rb id . 
9
Ap ter ,  Go ld Coa st in Transi t ion , p .  226 . 
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Pa rty ,  Dr . J .  B .  Danquah , wa s a l so o f  royal l ineage and had so l it tle 
popular appeal tha t in 1954 he lost  his legisla t ive sea t in his own 
home d istric t . 10 
As wa s no ted in Chap te r II,  the Na tional Libe ra tion Movement 
"mushroome d" into exi s tence in 1954 wi th purely pa rochial  mot ive s .  Its  
pol it ical  s tra tegy wa s based on tribal ism and included a t temp t s  to force 
compl iance with its  dictates . 1 1  Violence engendered by it became so 
seve re as to make it impos s ible for a CPP of fi cial to go into Kuma s i ,  
the capital  of Ashant i . 12  Accord ing t o  Nkrumah , seve ral hundred o f  the 
rank and file CPP supporters in tha t city we re fo rced to move ou t ,  and 
an a t temp t wa s made to burn Nkrumah ' s  house . 13 The pa ra -milita ry 
activities o f  the Togoland Congre s s  in the spring of 19 5 7 ,  the Awha i tey 
plot o f  1 9 58 ,  and the alleged plo t s  in 196 1 we re new ins tance s of sub -
ve rs ion and violence , and extraordinary mea sure s we re nec e s sary for 
deal ing with them. That the violence would neve r have been engaged in 
if the opposition ' s  demands had been me t wa s not of pa rt icular �por t -
ance g iven the wide and firm consensu s tha t the federal s tructure 
demanded wa s imp ract ical and dele terious . 
As se rtions tha t pa rochial and conserva t ive in te re s t s  we re lent 
support by fore ign gove rnme nt s and cap ital we re made exclu s ive ly by the 
gove rnment , and there is no ce rtain way of check ing the ir val id i ty .  
10 Ibid . and p .  298 . 
1 1  i . 60 Snown s s , �· �· , p.  
• 
12 Angl in, op . c it . , pp . 43 -44 . 
13Nkrumah, Ghana , pp . 216 and 2 18 . 
1 2 5  
Bu t whe the r valid o r  no t ,  such a s sertions , i f  bel ieved,  furni shed ano ther 
ju s t ifica tion for grant ing extraord inary powe r s  to the government .  I t  
canno t be expected tha t the risk o f  influence from fore ign gove rnments 
or fo re ign priva te capital would have been pre fe rred by mo st Ghana ians 
to leade rship exerted by the ind igenous CPP , particula rly up to 1 9 59 or 
1960 . 
Al l o f  the se cons iderat ions gave the CPP cons iderable popular 
support and gave any pa rt icular member  of Pa rl iament repre sent ing the 
pa rty genuine jus ti fica tion for support ing tts  mea sures . They d i s ­
couraged opposi tion t o  coe rcive legal ins trument s and p ractices for the 
sake of mainta ining democra t ic p rinc iple s . Whe ther they jus t ified , even 
to CPP members , the placeme nt of a grea t dea l of coercive powe r in the 
hand s of a s ingle ind ividual is no t so clear . Pe rhap s it is sa fe s t  to 
say that there wa s no t enough anxie ty abou t it to encourage a concer ted 
e ffor t  to avo id i t . The re would have to have been cons ide rable anxie ty 
for CPP MP ' s  to have been will ing to make such an e ffor t ,  for had they 
done so they would have run a pol itical risk . Nkrumah wa s able both to 
at tract and compel support for his mea sure s .  Hi s sole means of compul ­
sion when the Bri t i sh departed in 1957  wa s wha t we have termed "pol itical . "  
Tha t means had cons iderable potency and may have been much more important 
on the whole than an altrui s t ic regard for the long - term wel fare o f  
Ghana . 
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The Channe l s  of Coe rc ion 
Pol itical 
Nkrumah ' s pol it ical control sprang from his control o f  the party , 
which in turn wa s ba sed on his personal popularity_ wi th vo te rs and on a 
consumma te skill in us ing i t  to ma inta in par ty d iscipl ine . Ap te r,  writ-
ing in  1 9 54 ,  as serted tha t  Nkrumah wa s not a party dic ta tor in  the usual 
sense of the word , tha t decis ions arrived at were response s  to popular 
will at  the grass -roots level as  communicated through extensive and even 
acrimonious debate a t  the levcl of the key Central Committee . 14 On the 
othe r hand ,  as l i fe cha irman o f  a party wi th a centrist  organiza t ion, he 
wa s in an ext remely good po s ition to use his charisma t ic appeal ma in-
ta ined by his usual flexibili ty to counter oppos i t ion on i s sue s which 
he cons ide red to be o f  pa rticular impor tance . As it  turned out , he handled 
his role in such a way as to make his powe r una s sailable a few years 
after the a t ta inment o f  independence . 
S ince Ap ter ha s made by far the mo s t  il lumina ting study o f  the 
pol i tical ba s i s  o f  Nkrumah ' s  powe r ,  he wil l  be quo ted extensively : 
Overshadowing both the o ffices and personal i t ie s  /of the CPP7 
is Nkrumah . The o ffice s o f  the centra l  commi t te e-and the -
na tional secre tariat  are hardly l imit ing fac tors in the role 
definit ion of the occupants of the se po st s .  Ra ther ,  de fini ­
tion come s from Nkrumah, and a s soc ia t ion wi th him provides  
legi t imacy .  Pro cedural convenience ra the r than the ins t i tu ­
tional iza t ion o f  role s  se ts  the ope ra t ing mode o f  the party 
organs . This  is  of some importance . It  means that so far 
the cons t itut ion and structure o f  the party are structure s  
of convenience ra ther t ha n  legitima cy , and the legitima cy i t ­
sel f stems from the l eader,  Nkrumah . Not only is  the C . P . P . 
14 Ap te r,  Gold Coas t  in Trans ition, p .  2 16 . 
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fl exible , but no orga�iza t ional group a t  any level is a s sured 
o f  independent au thority and powe r ,  excep t the l i fe chairman . 1 5  
I n  the structuring of action in the C . P. P .  ce rta in type s 
of rol e s  are formed a t  key organiza tional points which a re 
reinforced and su s ta ined by. the ir l inks with Nk rumah .  Ob ­
serve rs often remark a t  the acce s s ibil ity of Mkrumah in the 
party . Ra the r than acce s s ibility, i t  is evidence of d irec t 
control , and d irec t and cons tan t need by the member to re ­
ce ive his mandate from Nkrumah for role activity and support . 
Support , ins tead o f  s teaaing p r ima rily from local uni ts , come s 
from above ; it is endowed as grace , which in turn is mani fe s ted 
through d irec tive s and personal contact . The highly organized 
C . P . P . mainta ins its discipline as a party through the personal 
allegiance to Nkrumah on the part o f  tho se who pe rce ive the ir 
de stiny as being achieved J ideol og ical ly and psycholog ically ,  
through the leader and the party organiza tion . All service 
to Nkrumah is the enhancement of local s t reng th through orga ­
nization, and his re sponse , be ing non-doc trina ire , allows 
many d iverse ind ividual s and groups to ident i fy  their future s 
wi th hLm. At the same t ime ,  the local organizat ions are open 
eaough so tha t public idea s ,  expre s sions of demand , problems 
of a l ocal na ture , and general d iscu s s ions can be bad , with 
the love r  level leaders depending upon l ocal support as a requisite 
for Nkrumah 1 s support . The se local uni t s  admit o f  the wide st 
membership , and no t all o f  them a re ef fec tively under disc ip l ine . 
The Kuma s i  reg ional C . P . P . , for example ,  ha s  such an independent 
l ocal fol l owing tha t i t s  guid ing l ight , Xrobo Eduse i ,  wa s trea ted 
wi th grea t considera t ion by Hkrumah, who made him chie f govern­
ment whip , a l though his qual i fica tions were by no means cl ear . l6 
Hi s coaproaises with Eduse i as well as the fact that he never was 
able to bring about a CPP victory in some par t s  o f  Ghana a t te st to the 
tact that Nkrumah lacked complete pol itical control . But the no t incon -
s iderable power which he d id pos se s s  he used wi sely to cu t off members 
who had developed ideologie s  which aight be dangerous and to qua sh 
serious rivalrie s  to his own authority wi thin the CPP . Through his con-
trol of the party machinery and especially of the Nat ional Executive 
15
tbid . ,  p .  207 . 
16 rbid . , p .  2oa . 
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Commit tee he wa s able e ithe r to wi thhold CPP sponsorship from persons of 
doubt ful loyal ty or to place them in cons tituenc ie s  whe re they could not 
win : 
• • •  Nkrumah ha s sma shed the C . P . P . back bench in the a s sembly . 
The potential leadership o f  Anthony Woode , the pro -communis t 
member of the C . P . P . back bench, ha s been ended with his expul ­
s ion from the C . P . P . Mr . Bed iako Poku , who figured so promi ­
nently in the Wenchi d ispute , wa s not g iven C . P . P . backing and 
d id not run for o ffice . An Ewe , Mr . C . K. Qua shie , a close 
a s s oc ia te o f  Woode , wa s g iven an uncerta in cons t i tuence in 
Togoland where Antor and the Togoland Congre s s  wa s strong , and 
he lost  his seat in the a s sembly . The ne t e ffec t  ha s been the 
abol ition o f  a po s s ibly dangerous independent left-wing group 
in the ba ck bench, which supported Gbedemah and looked to him 
almo s t  a s  much a s  to Nkrumah for party leadership . At one 
stroke , Nkrumah ha s strengthened his control over the party 
group ing s and reduced the potent ial rival ry of Gbedemah,  
17 while re ta ining the lat ter ' s  service s in the new gove rnment . 
Such persons were free to at temp t  to oppo se party -backed cand ida te s in 
cons t i tuencie s where the CPP wa s popula r ,  but succe s s  in such an enter-
p ri se would have been uncerta in ,  and they would have faced the pena l ty 
18 of be ing read ou t o f  the party and neve r rece iving its backing aga in .  
They were then free to join one o f  the oppo s ing part ie s ,  but a s  long a s  
the CPP rema ined a s  e ffec t ive and a s  popular a s  i t  wa s ,  the ir pol itical 
future s we re cons iderably more certa in if they ma inta ined allegiance to 
Nkrumah . 
Legal 
With a comb ina t ion o f  pol it ical coerc ion and an abil ity to point 
ou t the po s i t ive need for s trict mea sure s which would conta in an opposition 
17Ibid . ,  p .  299 . 
18George Benne t t ,  " The Gold Coa s t  Gene ra l  Elect ion of 1954 . "  
Parl iamentary Affa ir s ,  VII (Au tumn , 1954) , p .  43 1 . 
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whose activities might othe rwise wreck the country , Nkrumah built up a 
series of legal instruments which gave him personally the power to con­
trol not just parochial opposition but any opposition which appeared 
threatening to his personal leadership. An examination of the instru ­
ments suggests that in promoting them Nkrumah and his assistants made 
an attempt to hide their true character and the implication that 
Nkrumah might have been seeking unfettered power. The measures were 
worded in such a way that they gave him such power only in combination 
with one another; looked at separately , each appeared to be directed 
to the purpose of advancing legitimate ends and giving Nkrumah only so 
much power as would appear tolerable to MP's who had to be depended on 
to enact the measures. 
Of the potentially repressive measures enacted before 1960, only 
two, the Preventive Detention Act and the National Assembly Disqualifi­
cation Act, significantly enhanced the personal power of Nkrumah . The 
deportation acts discussed, of course, were limited in their applica ­
bility , although certainly at times they were useful to Nkrumah for 
getting rid of some of his more persistent and troublesome opposition. 
Deportation could be used only against aliens. The provisions of the 
Emergency Powers Act were carefully drawn so as to retain for the legis ­
lature the ultimate control of the application of the act. It would 
have been an extremely uncertain and inefficient instrument for the con­
struction of a personal dictatorship . 
The Preventive Detention Act, however, could be used for a period 
of five y ears against any native Ghanaian, including MP ' s, without any 
restriction from either the legislature or the courts. Public opinion 
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might have controlled its usage to some extent ,  bu t it  is clear from its 
na ture tha t it  coul d be used to control public op inion also . The legis­
la ture might at any time have repealed or  mod ified it,  bu t s ince the act  
wa s appl icable to  MP ' s , it  prov ided a means of controll ing them al so . 
Publ ic op inion might have made the unwarranted de tent ion of a s igni ficant 
number of MP ' s  fo r any leng th of t ime ri sky ; but the provis ion of the 
Na tional Assembly Disqual ifica t ion Act previously di scussed would have 
made it  po ssible to arre s t  MP ' s  fo r a rela tively short time on ' ' susp icion" 
of subve r s ive ac t ivities and to have elimina ted the ir abil i ty effe ctively 
to oppose gove rnmental measure s .  
The Prevent ive De tent ion Act wa s to exp ire a t  the end of five 
years . To assure its  renewal by de ta ining its  opponent s would have been 
awkwa rd ; the gove rnment made such awkwardne s s  unne ce s sa ry by the provi ­
sions of the 1960 cons titution . Art icle Fi fty - five toge ther  with the 
ab sence of any genuine prote ction of fundamental right s gave Nkrumah 
the authority to carry ou t the prov is ions of the Preve nt ive De tent ion 
Act by exe cu t ive decree if ne ce s sary . This wa s in contra s t  to the im­
pl ied as surance by tho se provis ions that the legisla ture , through its  
own au thor ity e i ther to renew or not to renew the mea sure at  the end of 
five years , wa s in ul tima te control o f  it . Article Fi fty- five made such 
au thor ity almo s t  meaningle s s  and wi thdrew ef fe ctive control from the 
legi sla ture . 
Al though Article Fifty - five , which enabled the Pre s ident to 
"alter" any leg isla tive enactment , e i the r expre s s ly or by impl ica t ion, 
wa s de c i s ive , ano the r provi s ion wa s highly use ful in ,�help ing promo te 
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the appearance of leg it imacy . Thi s wa s conta ined in Article Twenty - four,  
. .  
and it  granted the power o f  absolute veto . No means were provided for 
overriding a pre s ident ial ve to . Thus , even if enough members o f  the 
Na tional As sembly to form an extraord inary ma jority opposed Nkrumah , 
they could no t exp re s s  the ir opposi tion in the fo rm of a law re s trict ing 
the Pre s ident or contrad ict ing a mea sure he had promulgated . The mo s t  
they could d o  wa s t o  pas s  a re solut ion or s igni fy their  a s sent t o  a bill 
which would no t be come law . 
The Mot ivat ions of Legisla tors 
I f  one cons iders the re s i s tance to Nkrumah which apparently grew 
up wi thin hi s own ranks and the terrorism which had to be imposed by the 
summe r of 196 2 ,  the behavior o f  members o f  Parl iament who vo ted for some 
of  the more autoc ra tic measure s which we re pre sented for the ir approval 
seems almos t irra t ional . Of  the se mea sure s ,  the Preventive De tention 
Act and the provis ions o f  the 1960 cons t i tution which have been dis cus sed 
are out s tand ing . But MP ' s  could not fore see future developments with 
certa inty , of course , and the fac t s  ava ilable for the ir cons idera t ion 
at the t �e were not such as to ind ica te the need for concern . Al l influ -
ence s working toge ther apparently made it  seem more ra tiona l to vote for 
the mea sure s than aga ins t them. 
The Prevent ive De tent ion Act 
When CPP MP ' s  voted in favor o f  the Prevent ive De tention Ac t ,  
three ma jor cons idera tions appear t o  have influenced the ir action . As 
ind ica ted both in Chap ter III and the pre sent chap ter,  it would have 
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seemed to any one who shared the unitary and secular outlook of the CPP 
that some kind of extraordinary measures were needed to control the 
opposition . Something had to be done to keep the violent and subversive 
activities being engaged in from being successful and overthrowing not 
only Nkrumah but the entire Convention People ' s  Party . Ghana was pass­
ing through a critical period, and the court sy stem could not be entirely 
relied upon . The question was not whether the government should have the 
power of detention, but how it was to be controlled . 
Two means of controlling the power existed. Nkrumah had proposed 
a bill which gave him complete freedom to use the detention power for 
five y ears . But the legislature would retain ultimate authority , for 
the government was still parliamentary in form. Furthermore , the bill 
specifically provided for parliamentary reconsideration when the five 
y ears had passed. Thus, to all appearances it was not particularly 
dangerous to vote for enactment . 
But there was another consideration also : the political leverage 
which Nkrumah held at this time . Since Nkrumah was sponsoring the bill, 
opposition to it on the part of any CPP member would have been futile . 
He would have lost party sponsorship at the next election and been 
soundly defeated . If enough party members had refused to support the 
bill so that its enactment had actually been thwarted, Parliament could 
have been dissolved immed iately and all those persons replaced by 
others more docile . Only two y ears after his outstanding victory of 
1956, Nkrumah still was easily popular enough to determine the outcome 
of an election in the ma jority of constituenc ies . It would have been 
futile for an MP to oppose the bill in the first place and foolhardy 
from a personal standpoint . 
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The 1960 Constitution 
While it is not di fficul t to unders tand the mo tive s of the leg i s ­
lators with re spect  t o  the Prevent ive De tention Ac t ,  it is  somewha t 
mo re d ifficul t to do so wi th re spec t to the cons t i tut ion . That document 
not only gave the execut ive the au thori ty nece s sary to meet  emergencie s  
unhampered b y  a nece s sity t o  secure a specific legisla tive mandate fo r 
ea ch new measure , bu t it al so removed the abil i ty of the leg i slature to 
re s trict the exe cu t ive ' s  activities even if it dec ided that they we re 
be ing mi sused . 
Apparently Nkrumah bel ieved in 1 96 0  tha t a popular manda te for 
the a s sump tion of ab solute powe r by him wa s una t ta inable . He achieved 
virtual ly ab solute powe r when the 196 0  cons titution became effe ctive ; 
the cons t i tution ' s  provi s ions toge ther with those of the Preventive 
De tent ion Act gave hLm the means to p romulga te measure s de sp ite oppos i ­
tion i n  the legisla tu re and t o  crush oppo s i tion which might seriously 
threa ten him . The ab sence o f  fo rmal machinery for l imit ing the Pre sident ' s  
powe r p robably d id no t appear intolerable to mo s t  members of the CPP so 
long as Nkrumah wa s wil l ing to formula te his pol ic ies  in acco rdance wi th 
re commenda tions arrive d a t  collective ly . But it would no t have done any 
ha rm to insure tha t he would do so by making the exerc i se of his powe rs 
cons titutionally dependent, ul tima te ly ,  on legi slative app roval . If 
legi slators had ins is ted on thi s ,  they probably could have won the ir 
ca se by threa tening to make a campaign is sue ou t of the inclu s ion of 
Article Fifty- five in the const itution and by carrying their ca se to the 
electorate . They could have done so by re fu s ing to support the inclu s ion 
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of Art icle Fi fty - five ; the only recourse open to Nkrumah - - s ince as ye t 
he possessed no de cree power- -would have been to go to the el ec torate . 
I f  Nkrumah wa s a fra id to face the voters on that  issue , he would have 
been forced to back down . The leg islature would no t have had to bind 
the execu t ive in such a way a s  to hinder his legitimate ac t ivitie s .  
They could have provided for a leg islative ve to on the ba s i s  o f  an 
extraordinary ma j ority ,  for example . But they provided for no re s tric­
t ion a t  al l .  
The ma jor rea sons apparently were tha t they d id not expect tha t 
they would eve r come into serious disagreement with Nkrumah ' s  policie s  
and that even i n  1960 they would have been taking a seriou s ris k in 
trying to oppose him .  The re is no evidence tha t up to this point he 
had misused any of his powers , including tha t of de tention . He had 
used them only to hamper the opposition- -not the CPP . In the pa s t  his 
pol ic ie s had been just i fied : there wa s no solid evidence that in the 
fu ture anything woul d change . In the pa s t  al so it  had been he , eithe r 
personal ly or through his mini s te rs , who had init ia ted and p romulga ted 
the important leg islation . The new cons t i tu t ion in e ffe c t  seemed to 
be acknowledg ing him for wha t he really was :  the und i sputed leader o f  
both the par ty and the gove rnment . 
Even if the legislature had had sol id ground s for anxie ty , it  
s till would have been p ol it ically dange rou s  to oppose the new ins tru ­
ment . While Nkrumah appears t o  have been a fra id t o  face the na t ion with 
the real na ture o f  the cons t itution, he s t il l  wa s pol it ically powe rful , 
a s  evidenced by the overwhelming ma jor ity o f  vote s he rece ived in the 
13 5 
elec tion connec ted wi th the pleb iscite . Legisla tors , i f  they had been 
de te rmined to do so , might have been succe s s ful in prevent ing him from 
po sse s s ing the decree power ,  but i t  would have been a t  cons ide rable 
pol itical  risk to themselve s .  The Chie f Executive would have campa igned 
aga ins t them at  the next elec t ion and probably cau sed their defea t at 
the poll s .  
Coe rc ion Afte r 196 0  
I n  Chap ter V we argued tha t  the pa s sage o f  the d isre spect and 
spec ial  court s a c t s ,  or the pa rt icular form they took,  wa s no t dec ided 
by a convic tion of the legislators who vo ted for them that they we re 
in the be s t  intere s t  o f  Ghana , but by cons ide ra t ions o f  sel f- inte re s t .  
The que s t ion rema ins a s  to whe ther a penal ty for vo t ing the wrong way 
on the bil l s  would have emana ted from the electora te in a free pol itical 
proce s s  or whe ther it  would have been brought about by Nkrumah himsel f .  
In Chap te r VI we ind icated tha t  by 196 1 Nkrumah wa s us ing in othe r  
s itua t ions fo r:ms of coercion which were no t e s sent ially pol i t ical -­
that i s ,  which d id not depend on his abil ity to a ffec t  the politica l 
choice s o f  the electora te . Furthe r  analy s i s  sugge s t s , by the proce s s  
o f  e l imina t ion, tha t the fo r:m o f  coerc ion which wa s opera t ing o n  the 
l egislators in 1 96 1  a l so wa s non-pol i t ical . 
Using wha t wa s appa rently Nkrumah ' s  own e s timate of his s trength, 
we conclude tha t by the spring o f  1 960 , when the campa ign fo r the con­
s t itut ion wa s waged , a ma jori ty of voters were oppo sed to unl imited 
powe rs for Nkrumah . No other explana t ion o f  the way in which he went 
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about ge t ting the 1 960 cons titution adopted can be found . And the fact 
tha t  he secured wha t in e ffec t  wa s unl imi ted powe r Lmplie s  strongly tha t 
he bel ieved that  he could no longe r depend on pol itical leve rage . 
Finally ,  if he wa s afra id to at temp t to secure a popular mandate for 
his acquisi tion o f  dic tatoria l  powers , it can be as sumed tha t by the 
fal l  of 1 96 1 ,  a fter support seems to have continued to fall away from 
him, MP 1 s  would no t have expec ted the majori ty of the ir cons t i tue nt s 
to approve of the ir grant ing Nkrumah ins t ruments which could ea sily be 
used furthe r to conta in his opposition . 
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